Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
BlackTreeCVE IntelligenceFull vulnerability report · 2026
CVE-2026-99018High confidence
riscv: entry: gate shadow call stack reload on sstatus.SPP, not tp
Linux · Linux
…UnscoredAssess manually
Needs assessment
Patch availableNo CVSS base score is available from the CNA, CISA ADP or NIST. Absence of a score is not evidence of low risk; review the vendor advisory, affected exposure and exploit evidence.
R
Open reassessment dashboard →Operational reassessment
Published severity in operational context
Published severityUnscored→Operational priority:Needs assessment, manual assessment needed.unscored
Compensating controls
- Validate the affected product branch and deploy the verified fixed release.
- Restrict local access and enforce least privilege on affected hosts.
- Monitor vendor guidance and exploitation sources for a material change.
Verification
- Confirm that the asset runs Linux Linux and falls inside the recorded affected range.
- Verify the installed build against the product-specific fixed version after deployment.
- Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
- Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
Distribution package intelligence
4 package statesRelease-specific package status
Debian findings are scoped to the named distribution, release and source package. An absent finding does not mean a package is unaffected.
Repository candidate not checked
A published vendor fix does not prove that a matching update is enabled and installable on a particular asset. Confirm the local package candidate before scheduling remediation.
| Distribution release | Source package | Vendor state | Fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debian trixietrixie · source | linux | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 6.12.113-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 23 Oct 2026 |
| Debian bookwormbookworm · source | linux | Not affectedDebian marks this release not affected (fixed-version marker 0). | Not published in this feed | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 23 Oct 2026 |
| Debian forkyforky · source | linux | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 7.2.11-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 23 Oct 2026 |
| Debian sidsid · source | linux | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 7.2.11-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 23 Oct 2026 |
No CVSS base score is available from the CNA, CISA ADP or NIST. Absence of a score is not evidence of low risk; review the vendor advisory, affected exposure and exploit evidence.
Patch available01
What, why and how
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: entry: gate shadow call stack reload on sstatus.SPP, not tp Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK, handle_exception() reloads the kernel shadow call stack pointer (gp) only when the trap came from userspace. It made that decision with scs_load_current_if_task_changed, which compares the trap-time tp (read back from sscratch into s5) against the current tp: beq \prev, tp, _skip_scs scs_load_current _skip_scs: tp is a user-writable register. A user task that sets tp to the linear-map address of its own task_struct (¤t) before trapping makes the comparison succeed (can achieve by brute force with KASLR enable under our test), so the kernel skips scs_load_current and keeps running with the gp that userspace left in place. Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK gp is the shadow call stack pointer and load_global_pointer is a no-op, so the compiler-emitted "sd ra, -8(gp)" / "ld ra, -8(gp)" in every non-leaf function then write to, and return through, an attacker-controlled address -- an unprivileged kernel arbitrary-write and control-flow-hijack primitive. The poisoned gp is saved to task_struct.scs_sp on return, so the reload is skipped on every subsequent entry as well. Decide "came from userspace" from the hardware sstatus.SPP bit (already in s1 at this point) instead of from tp, mirroring the check that ret_from_exception already uses a few instructions later. SPP is written by hardware on trap entry and cannot be forged from U-mode. Legitimate behaviour is unchanged: user entries (SPP=0) reload the task shadow call stack, nested kernel entries (SPP=1) skip it.
What
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: entry: gate shadow call stack reload on sstatus.SPP, not tp Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK, handle_exception() reloads the kernel shadow call stack pointer (gp) only when the trap came from userspace. It made that decision with scs_load_current_if_task_changed, which compares the trap-time tp (read back from sscratch into s5) against the current tp: beq \prev, tp, _skip_scs scs_load_current _skip_scs: tp is a user-writable register. A user task that sets tp to the linear-map address of its own task_struct (¤t) before trapping makes the comparison succeed (can achieve by brute force with KASLR enable under our test), so the kernel skips scs_load_current and keeps running with the gp that userspace left in place. Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK gp is the shadow call stack pointer and load_global_pointer is a no-op, so the compiler-emitted "sd ra, -8(gp)" / "ld ra, -8(gp)" in every non-leaf function then write to, and return through, an attacker-controlled address -- an unprivileged kernel arbitrary-write and control-flow-hijack primitive. The poisoned gp is saved to task_struct.scs_sp on return, so the reload is skipped on every subsequent entry as well. Decide "came from userspace" from the hardware sstatus.SPP bit (already in s1 at this point) instead of from tp, mirroring the check that ret_from_exception already uses a few instructions later. SPP is written by hardware on trap entry and cannot be forged from U-mode. Legitimate behaviour is unchanged: user entries (SPP=0) reload the task shadow call stack, nested kernel entries (SPP=1) skip it.
Why
The current structured CVE record identifies a security weakness, but the root cause requires confirmation in the linked vendor material.
How
An attacker operating through the affected interface may attempt exploitation when the stated preconditions are met. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
What
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: entry: gate shadow call stack reload on sstatus.SPP, not tp Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK, handle_exception() reloads the kernel shadow call stack pointer (gp) only when the trap came from userspace. It made that decision with scs_load_current_if_task_changed, which compares the trap-time tp (read back from sscratch into s5) against the current tp: beq \prev, tp, _skip_scs scs_load_current _skip_scs: tp is a user-writable register. A user task that sets tp to the linear-map address of its own task_struct (¤t) before trapping makes the comparison succeed (can achieve by brute force with KASLR enable under our test), so the kernel skips scs_load_current and keeps running with the gp that userspace left in place. Under CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK gp is the shadow call stack pointer and load_global_pointer is a no-op, so the compiler-emitted "sd ra, -8(gp)" / "ld ra, -8(gp)" in every non-leaf function then write to, and return through, an attacker-controlled address -- an unprivileged kernel arbitrary-write and control-flow-hijack primitive. The poisoned gp is saved to task_struct.scs_sp on return, so the reload is skipped on every subsequent entry as well. Decide "came from userspace" from the hardware sstatus.SPP bit (already in s1 at this point) instead of from tp, mirroring the check that ret_from_exception already uses a few instructions later. SPP is written by hardware on trap entry and cannot be forged from U-mode. Legitimate behaviour is unchanged: user entries (SPP=0) reload the task shadow call stack, nested kernel entries (SPP=1) skip it.
Why
The current structured CVE record identifies a security weakness, but the root cause requires confirmation in the linked vendor material.
How
An attacker operating through the affected interface may attempt exploitation when the stated preconditions are met. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
02
Exploit reality and attack path
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
Observed exploitation No confirmed evidence
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
Public PoC / exploit material None recorded
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
- Likely attack path
- the affected interface → vulnerable operation → cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor
- Attack surface
- Unspecified
- Privileges required
- Not stated in the selected CVSS metric
- User interaction
- Not stated in the selected CVSS metric
- Attack complexity
- Not stated in the selected CVSS metric
- Security boundary
- Not stated in the selected CVSS metric
- Weakness
?
CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration. - CWE not yet assigned
- CVSS vector
?
CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity. Not available from the selected scoring authority.- Post-exploitation / living off the land
- No specific living-off-the-land technique is confirmed in the structured sources. Monitor normal administration tools for activity inconsistent with the affected service's baseline.
03
Patch and workaround
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
- Status
?
Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change. - Patch available
- Action
- Review the linked authoritative reference and apply the recorded fixed release appropriate to the affected product branch.
- Workaround
- No verified workaround is recorded. Limit untrusted access and use least privilege until authoritative guidance is available.
04
Evidence and provenance
Published 23 Oct 2026 · Last source change 23 Oct 2026, 12:20 UTC · CWE not yet assigned
CVE recordCVE.org · 5.2
CVSS sourceUnavailable
EPSS source Unavailable
?
The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.European sourceNo official EUVD mapping
Product sourceCNA
Remediation sourceCVE/CNA references
CWE sourceUnavailable
NVD statusNVD received
Missing structured fields: CVSS base score, CWE classification. Missing data is not evidence of low risk; review the primary advisory.
Material change intelligence
View recent updates ↗What changed after publication
- Catalogue recordCVE added to the BlackTree catalogue.CNA ↗
- Vendor guidanceAuthoritative vendor guidance changed: added remediation: git.kernel.org/6639735367a7d491977e9e5e7afc50b489d81d83; removed remediation: git.kernel.org/37b4401ee6fa06046446d55e97e8d11784080843.CNA ↗
- Before
- remediation: git.kernel.org/37b4401ee6fa06046446d55e97e8d11784080843
- After
- remediation: git.kernel.org/6639735367a7d491977e9e5e7afc50b489d81d83
CVE published
Fixed release or patch reference recorded
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
- CVE
- Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
- CVSS
- Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
- EPSS
- Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
- CWE
- Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
- CNA
- CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
- CISA ADP
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
- NVD
- National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
- CERT / CSIRT
- A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
- PoC
- Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
- CSAF
- Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
- LoTL
- Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.