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Full vulnerability report · 2026
CVE-2026-91085High confidence

Apache Karaf: config:install missing ACL entry allows privilege escalation to admin

Apache Software Foundation · Apache Karaf

6.3MediumCVSS 3.1
Recommended action
Scheduled

Medium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.

Fix not verified
R
Operational reassessment

Published severity in operational context

Open reassessment dashboard →
Published severityMediumOperational priority:Medium, unchanged from published severity.unchanged

Evidence used

  • No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
  • EPSS is 0.20% for the current model date.

Compensating controls

  • Restrict the affected network interface to trusted sources where business-safe.
  • Monitor vendor guidance and exploitation sources for a material change.

Verification

  1. Confirm that the asset runs Apache Software Foundation Apache Karaf and falls inside the recorded affected range.
  2. Recheck the vendor advisory before scheduling a change because no verified fixed version is currently retained.
  3. Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
  4. Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
Mitigation target: As exposure requiresRemediation target: Within 365 days

This automated reassessment organises public evidence. It does not know asset exposure, business impact or control effectiveness and does not replace CVSS or a human risk decision.

Optional official sources

National CERT insights
?CERT means Computer Emergency Response Team; CSIRT is the closely related term Computer Security Incident Response Team.

Choose official national sources for this report. Each advisory shows its original language. Your selection is remembered on this device and included in shared links.

Official European source

ENISA European Vulnerability Database

Official EUVD identifiers, advisory evidence and known-exploited context. Missing fields are not treated as evidence of low risk.

1 current
ENISA EUVD identifier

EUVD-2026-88663

No EUVD known-exploited evidence

Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user. The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-*/update on the jmx.acl.*, org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role. config:install <url> <finalname> fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf.*.acl.* files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL. Because felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc} (etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any .cfg file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart. By contrast, bundle:install, feature:install and kar:install are all admin-only in their own ACLs, and config:delete is admin in this same ACL, config:install was the outlier. MitigationAdd install = admin in etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg (create the file is absent), and/or set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties (and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.

EUVD state
Present in the current official mapping
Known exploitation
Not present in the current ENISA EUVD known-exploited dataset. This is not proof of no exploitation.
ENISA score
6.3 · CVSS 3.1
Advisory evidence
No linked advisory details stored yet
Recommended actionScheduled

Medium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.

Fix not verified
01

What, why and how

Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user. The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-*/update on the jmx.acl.*, org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role. config:install <url> <finalname> fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf.*.acl.* files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL. Because felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc} (etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any .cfg file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart. By contrast, bundle:install, feature:install and kar:install are all admin-only in their own ACLs, and config:delete is admin in this same ACL, config:install was the outlier. MitigationAdd install = admin in etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg (create the file is absent), and/or set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties (and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.

What

Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user. The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-*/update on the jmx.acl.*, org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role. config:install <url> <finalname> fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf.*.acl.* files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL. Because felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc} (etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any .cfg file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart. By contrast, bundle:install, feature:install and kar:install are all admin-only in their own ACLs, and config:delete is admin in this same ACL, config:install was the outlier. MitigationAdd install = admin in etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg (create the file is absent), and/or set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties (and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.

Why

The application reaches a protected operation without first confirming that the requester is authorised.

How

An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.

What

Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user. The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-*/update on the jmx.acl.*, org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role. config:install <url> <finalname> fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf.*.acl.* files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL. Because felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc} (etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any .cfg file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart. By contrast, bundle:install, feature:install and kar:install are all admin-only in their own ACLs, and config:delete is admin in this same ACL, config:install was the outlier. MitigationAdd install = admin in etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg (create the file is absent), and/or set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties (and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.

Why

The application reaches a protected operation without first confirming that the requester is authorised.

How

An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.

02

Exploit reality and attack path

CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.

Observed exploitation
?Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.
No confirmed evidence

No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.

Public PoC / exploit material
?Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.
None recorded

No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.

Likely attack path
a network path → Missing Authorization → cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor
Attack surface
Network
Privileges required
Low: a basic authenticated account is required
User interaction
None
Attack complexity
Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
Security boundary
Unchanged: impact remains within the vulnerable component's security authority
Weakness
?CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness.
CWE-862 ↗

CWE-862: Missing Authorization. The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

CVSS vector
?CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L

Common Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.

AVNetworkAttack vector: The vulnerable component can be reached over a network.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.PRLowPrivileges required: The attacker needs basic user-level privileges.UINoneUser interaction: No action by another user is required.SUnchangedScope: The security impact remains within the vulnerable component's authority.CLowConfidentiality impact: A successful attack can cause a limited loss.ILowIntegrity impact: A successful attack can cause a limited loss.ALowAvailability impact: A successful attack can cause a limited loss.
Post-exploitation / living off the land
No specific living-off-the-land technique is confirmed in the structured sources. Monitor normal administration tools for activity inconsistent with the affected service's baseline.
NetworkCWE-862
A

Official authority intelligence

Only matched European and national findings are included. Language selectors and unavailable sources are omitted.

ENISA EUVD · EUVD-2026-88663Official EUVD mapping

Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.<scope>.cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user. The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-*/update on the jmx.acl.*, org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role. config:install <url> <finalname> fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf.*.acl.* files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL. Because felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc} (etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any .cfg file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart. By contrast, bundle:install, feature:install and kar:install are all admin-only in their own ACLs, and config:delete is admin in this same ACL, config:install was the outlier. MitigationAdd install = admin in etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg (create the file is absent), and/or set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties (and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.

Official EUVD record ↗
03

Patch and workaround

Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.

Status
?Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change.
Fix not verified
Affected
Apache Karaf: < 4.4.12
Fixed
No fixed version is explicitly recorded in the structured CVE data.
Action
No verified patch reference is present in the current structured sources. Check the vendor advisory before making a change.
Workaround
No verified workaround is recorded. If business-safe, reduce exposure to the affected interface and allow only trusted sources until authoritative guidance is available.
04

Evidence and provenance

Published 29 Sept 2026 · Last source change 1 Oct 2026, 14:18 UTC · CWE-862 · Missing Authorization

CVE recordCVE.org · 5.2
CVSS sourceCISA ADP
EPSS source
?The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.
FIRST · tracked since 2026-09-29
European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2026-88663
Product sourceCNA
Remediation sourceCVE/CNA references
CWE sourceCNA
NVD statusNVD awaiting enrichment

Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.

Material change intelligence

What changed after publication

View recent updates ↗
  1. SeveritySeverity changed from Unknown to Medium.
    Before
    Unknown
    After
    Medium
    CISA ADP ↗
  2. CVSS scoreCVSS score changed from not recorded to 6.3 (CVSS 3.1 · CISA ADP · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L).
    Before
    not recorded
    After
    6.3 (CVSS 3.1 · CISA ADP · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L)
    CISA ADP ↗
  3. ENISA EUVD mappingEUVD-2026-88663 was added to the official ENISA EUVD mapping for this CVE.
    Before
    not recorded
    After
    {"euvdId":"EUVD-2026-88663"}
    ENISA EUVD ↗
  4. Catalogue recordCVE added to the BlackTree catalogue.
    CNA ↗
Material fields only · duplicate refreshes suppressed · history retained for the configured operational retention period
CVE published
ENISA EUVD · EUVD-2026-88663↗CVE authority or vendor reference↗Official CVE record (CNA and ADP data)↗NVD record↗
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
CVE
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
CVSS
Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
EPSS
Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
CWE
Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
CNA
CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
CISA ADP
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
NVD
National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
CERT / CSIRT
A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
PoC
Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
CSAF
Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
LoTL
Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.
Free version - for non-commercial use only.CVE-2026-91085 · cve.blacktree.nl