Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- The selected CVSS metric records a network-reachable, unauthenticated path with no user interaction.
- EPSS is 0.34% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE IntelligenceFull vulnerability report · 2026
CVE-2026-82180High confidence
Authorisation is reduced to two string comparisons on attacker-supplied data: the DN-qualifier must equal "sy" or "op", and the cloud-name part of the CN must match the server's
Eclipse Foundation · Eclipse Arrowhead
9.5CriticalCVSS 4.0
Within 72 hours
Fix not verifiedCritical technical impact with a remotely reachable, unauthenticated path; no CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
R
Open reassessment dashboard →Operational reassessment
Published severity in operational context
Published severityCritical→Operational priority:Critical, unchanged from published severity.unchanged
Compensating controls
- Restrict the affected network interface to trusted sources where business-safe.
- Monitor vendor guidance and exploitation sources for a material change.
Verification
- Confirm that the asset runs Eclipse Foundation Eclipse Arrowhead and falls inside the recorded affected range.
- Recheck the vendor advisory before scheduling a change because no verified fixed version is currently retained.
- Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
- Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
Critical technical impact with a remotely reachable, unauthenticated path; no CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
Fix not verified01
What, why and how
In Eclipse Arrowhead versions from 5.0.0 to 5.2.1 when the MQTT API is enabled with the certificate authentication policy, CertificateMqttFilter parses an X.509 certificate that the client sends inside the MQTT message payload (the authentication field of MqttRequestTemplate) and treats its Subject DN as the authenticated identity. The certificate is decoded with CertificateFactory.generateCertificate() but its signature is never verified and its issuer chain is never validated against any trust store. Authorisation is reduced to two string comparisons on attacker-supplied data: the DN-qualifier must equal "sy" or "op", and the cloud-name part of the CN must match the server's. Both values are public (the cloud name is in the server's own TLS certificate). An attacker who can publish to the MQTT broker can therefore mint a self-signed certificate with CN=Sysop.<cloud>.<org>.arrowhead.eu, dnQualifier=op, send it as the authentication field, and be authenticated as the cloud's system operator with isSysOp == true. This passes the downstream ManagementServiceMqttFilter (request.isSysOp() → allowed) and gives full management access over MQTT. The HTTP CertificateFilter is not affected — it reads the certificate from jakarta.servlet.request.X509Certificate, which Tomcat populates only after a successful mTLS handshake against the configured trust store.
What
In Eclipse Arrowhead versions from 5.0.0 to 5.2.1 when the MQTT API is enabled with the certificate authentication policy, CertificateMqttFilter parses an X.509 certificate that the client sends inside the MQTT message payload (the authentication field of MqttRequestTemplate) and treats its Subject DN as the authenticated identity. The certificate is decoded with CertificateFactory.generateCertificate() but its signature is never verified and its issuer chain is never validated against any trust store. Authorisation is reduced to two string comparisons on attacker-supplied data: the DN-qualifier must equal "sy" or "op", and the cloud-name part of the CN must match the server's. Both values are public (the cloud name is in the server's own TLS certificate). An attacker who can publish to the MQTT broker can therefore mint a self-signed certificate with CN=Sysop.<cloud>.<org>.arrowhead.eu, dnQualifier=op, send it as the authentication field, and be authenticated as the cloud's system operator with isSysOp == true. This passes the downstream ManagementServiceMqttFilter (request.isSysOp() → allowed) and gives full management access over MQTT. The HTTP CertificateFilter is not affected — it reads the certificate from jakarta.servlet.request.X509Certificate, which Tomcat populates only after a successful mTLS handshake against the configured trust store.
Why
The product does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate.
How
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
What
In Eclipse Arrowhead versions from 5.0.0 to 5.2.1 when the MQTT API is enabled with the certificate authentication policy, CertificateMqttFilter parses an X.509 certificate that the client sends inside the MQTT message payload (the authentication field of MqttRequestTemplate) and treats its Subject DN as the authenticated identity. The certificate is decoded with CertificateFactory.generateCertificate() but its signature is never verified and its issuer chain is never validated against any trust store. Authorisation is reduced to two string comparisons on attacker-supplied data: the DN-qualifier must equal "sy" or "op", and the cloud-name part of the CN must match the server's. Both values are public (the cloud name is in the server's own TLS certificate). An attacker who can publish to the MQTT broker can therefore mint a self-signed certificate with CN=Sysop.<cloud>.<org>.arrowhead.eu, dnQualifier=op, send it as the authentication field, and be authenticated as the cloud's system operator with isSysOp == true. This passes the downstream ManagementServiceMqttFilter (request.isSysOp() → allowed) and gives full management access over MQTT. The HTTP CertificateFilter is not affected — it reads the certificate from jakarta.servlet.request.X509Certificate, which Tomcat populates only after a successful mTLS handshake against the configured trust store.
Why
The product does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate.
How
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
02
Exploit reality and attack path
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
Observed exploitation No confirmed evidence
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
Public PoC / exploit material None recorded
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
- Likely attack path
- a network path → Improper Certificate Validation → cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor
- Attack surface
- Network
- Privileges required
- None: unauthenticated exploitation is possible
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
- Security boundary
- Not a CVSS 4.0 base metric
- Weakness
?
CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness. - CWE-295 ↗
CWE-295: Improper Certificate Validation. The product does not validate, or incorrectly validates, a certificate.
- CVSS vector
?
CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity. CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:HCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 4.0: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
AVNetworkAttack vector: The vulnerable component can be reached over a network.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.ATPresentAttack requirements: A particular deployment or execution condition must be present.PRNonePrivileges required: The attacker does not need an account or existing privileges.UINoneUser interaction: No action by another user is required.VCHighVulnerable-system confidentiality: A successful attack can cause a major loss.VIHighVulnerable-system integrity: A successful attack can cause a major loss.VANoneVulnerable-system availability: No direct loss is represented by this metric.SCHighSubsequent-system confidentiality: A successful attack can cause a major loss.SIHighSubsequent-system integrity: A successful attack can cause a major loss.SAHighSubsequent-system availability: A successful attack can cause a major loss.- Post-exploitation / living off the land
- No specific living-off-the-land technique is confirmed in the structured sources. Monitor normal administration tools for activity inconsistent with the affected service's baseline.
03
Patch and workaround
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
- Status
?
Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change. - Fix not verified
- Affected
- Eclipse Arrowhead: 5.0.0 ≤ 5.2.1
- Fixed
- No fixed version is explicitly recorded in the structured CVE data.
- Action
- No verified patch reference is present in the current structured sources. Check the vendor advisory before making a change.
- Workaround
- No verified workaround is recorded. If business-safe, reduce exposure to the affected interface and allow only trusted sources until authoritative guidance is available.
04
Evidence and provenance
Published 3 Sept 2026 · Last source change 3 Sept 2026, 13:31 UTC · CWE-295 · Improper Certificate Validation
CVE recordCVE.org · 5.2
CVSS sourceCNA
EPSS source FIRST · tracked since 2026-09-04
?
The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2026-70467
Product sourceCNA
Remediation sourceCVE/CNA references
CWE sourceCNA
NVD statusNVD not scheduled
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
Material change intelligence
View recent updates ↗What changed after publication
- ENISA EUVD mappingEUVD-2026-70467 was added to the official ENISA EUVD mapping for this CVE.ENISA EUVD ↗
- Before
- not recorded
- After
- {"euvdId":"EUVD-2026-70467"}
- Catalogue recordCVE added to the BlackTree catalogue.CNA ↗
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
- CVE
- Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
- CVSS
- Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
- EPSS
- Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
- CWE
- Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
- CNA
- CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
- CISA ADP
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
- NVD
- National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
- CERT / CSIRT
- A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
- PoC
- Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
- CSAF
- Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
- LoTL
- Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.