Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- EPSS is 0.47% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE IntelligenceConcrete CMS · Concrete CMS
Low technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
These OSV and GitHub advisory ranges apply only to the named package and ecosystem. A listed fixed version is not a universal product patch or proof that an update is installed.
| Ecosystem and package | Affected range | First fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Packagistconcrete5/concrete5 | ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 9.5.1 | 9.5.1 | OSV record ↗aggregator derived · 10 Sep 2026 |
| composerconcrete5/concrete5 | < 9.5.1 | 9.5.1 | GitHub advisory ↗github reviewed aggregator · 24 Jun 2026 |
Low technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
Fix not verifiedConcrete CMS 9.5.0 and below is vulnerable to IDOR in AddMessage/UpdateMessage via attachments[] parameter which can lead to file permission bypass. The `AddMessage` and `UpdateMessage` conversation controllers accept user-supplied file attachment IDs and load files directly via `$em->find(File::class, $attachmentID)` without checking per-file permissions (`canViewFile()`). A user who can post in any conversation can reference any file in the CMS file manager by its sequential ID, effectively bypassing the file permission system. The Concrete CMS security team gave this vulnerability a CVSS v.4.0 score of 2.3 with a vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N. Thanks Tristan Mandani for reporting. if a site truly has private files, the owner should set up a private storage location https://documentation.concretecms.org/user-guide/editors-reference/dashboard/system-and-maintenance/files/file-storage-locations outside of the webroot so that permissions can be checked on view as well. That way, even if a authorized user attaches a file, or otherwise links to it, unauthorized users won't be able to view the file.
Concrete CMS 9.5.0 and below is vulnerable to IDOR in AddMessage/UpdateMessage via attachments[] parameter which can lead to file permission bypass. The `AddMessage` and `UpdateMessage` conversation controllers accept user-supplied file attachment IDs and load files directly via `$em->find(File::class, $attachmentID)` without checking per-file permissions (`canViewFile()`). A user who can post in any conversation can reference any file in the CMS file manager by its sequential ID, effectively bypassing the file permission system. The Concrete CMS security team gave this vulnerability a CVSS v.4.0 score of 2.3 with a vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N. Thanks Tristan Mandani for reporting. if a site truly has private files, the owner should set up a private storage location https://documentation.concretecms.org/user-guide/editors-reference/dashboard/system-and-maintenance/files/file-storage-locations outside of the webroot so that permissions can be checked on view as well. That way, even if a authorized user attaches a file, or otherwise links to it, unauthorized users won't be able to view the file.
The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
Concrete CMS 9.5.0 and below is vulnerable to IDOR in AddMessage/UpdateMessage via attachments[] parameter which can lead to file permission bypass. The `AddMessage` and `UpdateMessage` conversation controllers accept user-supplied file attachment IDs and load files directly via `$em->find(File::class, $attachmentID)` without checking per-file permissions (`canViewFile()`). A user who can post in any conversation can reference any file in the CMS file manager by its sequential ID, effectively bypassing the file permission system. The Concrete CMS security team gave this vulnerability a CVSS v.4.0 score of 2.3 with a vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N. Thanks Tristan Mandani for reporting. if a site truly has private files, the owner should set up a private storage location https://documentation.concretecms.org/user-guide/editors-reference/dashboard/system-and-maintenance/files/file-storage-locations outside of the webroot so that permissions can be checked on view as well. That way, even if a authorized user attaches a file, or otherwise links to it, unauthorized users won't be able to view the file.
The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key. The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 4.0: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 21 May 2026 · Last source change 22 May 2026, 13:12 UTC · CWE-639 · Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.