Remember-me sign-in guard reads a session key that is never written in ash_authentication, allowing session replacement

Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability in team-alembic ash_authentication allows an attacker who can plant a remember-me cookie in a victim's browser to replace that victim's authenticated session with one for the attacker's own account. AshAuthentication.Plug.Helpers.sign_in_using_remember_me/3 skips re-authenticating an already-signed-in visitor by checking the session for "<subject_name>_token", but store_in_session/2 writes that key only when require_token_presence_for_authentication? is enabled and otherwise writes the bare subject name. At the default setting the guard therefore reads a key that is never written, its already-signed-in branch is unreachable, and the remember-me sign-in runs on every request through the per-request browser pipeline plug. A planted remember-me cookie is consequently honoured even for a visitor holding a live authenticated session, so whatever the victim enters afterwards lands in data the attacker controls. The read path in authenticate_resource_from_session/4 selects the key correctly, so the guard and the reader disagree about which key holds the session. This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.10.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.

This attack-focused weakness is caused by incorrectly implemented authentication schemes that are subject to spoofing attacks.

An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may bypass an access boundary or take over an account.