rxrpc: Fix ACKALL packet handling

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix ACKALL packet handling rxrpc_input_ackall() accepts ACKALL packets without checking whether the call is in a state that can legitimately have outstanding transmit buffers. A forged ACKALL can therefore reach a new service call in RXRPC_CALL_SERVER_RECV_REQUEST before any reply packets have been queued. In that state call->tx_top is zero and call->tx_queue is NULL, so rxrpc_rotate_tx_window() dereferences a NULL txqueue and triggers a null-pointer dereference. Fix the handling of ACKALL packets by the following means: (1) Add two new call states: RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND which indicates that the client call is connected, but nothing has been transmitted as yet; and RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_ACK, which indicates that everything has been transmitted at least once, but we're now waiting for the stuff remaining in the Tx buffer to be ACK'd (retransmissions may still happen). The RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_PRE_SEND state is set when the call is assigned a channel and transitions to RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_SEND_REQUEST when the first packet is transmitted. RXRPC_CALL_CLIENT_AWAIT_REPLY is then narrowed in scope to indicate that all Tx packets have been ACK'd and we're now waiting for the reply to be received. (2) As per Wyatt Feng's original patch[1], the ACKALL handler then checks that the call state is one in which there might be stuff in the Tx buffer to ACK, but now this includes AWAIT_ACK rather than AWAIT_REPLY. ACKALL packets are ignored if received in the wrong state. Note that unlike Wyatt Feng's patch, it's no longer necessary to check to see if the Tx buffer exists as this the state set now covers this. (3) Make the ACKALL handler use call->tx_transmitted rather than call->tx_top as the former is explicitly the highest packet seq number transmitted, whereas the latter has a looser definition. Thanks to Jeffrey Altman for a description of the history of the ACKALL packet[1].

The current structured CVE record identifies a security weakness, but the root cause requires confirmation in the linked vendor material.

An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.