Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- The selected CVSS metric records a network-reachable, unauthenticated path with no user interaction.
- EPSS is 0.27% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE Intelligenceappwrite · templates
Medium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
Medium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
Fix not verifiedThe github-issue-bot templates in appwrite/templates verify the GitHub webhook signature with an inverted condition. verifyWebhook in node/github-issue-bot/src/github.js and in node-typescript/github-issue-bot/src/github.ts returns "typeof signature !== 'string' || (await verify(...))", so when the X-Hub-Signature-256 header is absent the first operand is true, the logical OR short-circuits, and the function reports success without performing any HMAC verification. main.js rejects a request only when verifyWebhook returns false, so an unauthenticated request carrying no signature passes the check. Processing then continues to postComment, which takes the repository and issue objects directly from the request body, letting the caller direct the deployed function to post a comment on a repository and issue of their choosing using the configured GITHUB_TOKEN, with the issue author login from the body interpolated into the comment text.
The github-issue-bot templates in appwrite/templates verify the GitHub webhook signature with an inverted condition. verifyWebhook in node/github-issue-bot/src/github.js and in node-typescript/github-issue-bot/src/github.ts returns "typeof signature !== 'string' || (await verify(...))", so when the X-Hub-Signature-256 header is absent the first operand is true, the logical OR short-circuits, and the function reports success without performing any HMAC verification. main.js rejects a request only when verifyWebhook returns false, so an unauthenticated request carrying no signature passes the check. Processing then continues to postComment, which takes the repository and issue objects directly from the request body, letting the caller direct the deployed function to post a comment on a repository and issue of their choosing using the configured GITHUB_TOKEN, with the issue author login from the body interpolated into the comment text.
The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
The github-issue-bot templates in appwrite/templates verify the GitHub webhook signature with an inverted condition. verifyWebhook in node/github-issue-bot/src/github.js and in node-typescript/github-issue-bot/src/github.ts returns "typeof signature !== 'string' || (await verify(...))", so when the X-Hub-Signature-256 header is absent the first operand is true, the logical OR short-circuits, and the function reports success without performing any HMAC verification. main.js rejects a request only when verifyWebhook returns false, so an unauthenticated request carrying no signature passes the check. Processing then continues to postComment, which takes the repository and issue objects directly from the request body, letting the caller direct the deployed function to post a comment on a repository and issue of their choosing using the configured GITHUB_TOKEN, with the issue author login from the body interpolated into the comment text.
The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature. The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 4.0: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 20 Aug 2026 · Last source change 24 Sept 2026, 14:19 UTC · CWE-347 · Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.