Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- EPSS is 0.21% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE Intelligencesovlix · GoodMeet – Google Meet Integration for Webinar, Meeting & Video Conference
Medium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
Medium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
Fix not verifiedThe GoodMeet – Google Meet Integration for Webinar, Meeting & Video Conference plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in versions up to and including 1.1.8. This is due to a missing nonce verification in the reset_credential() function, which handles the wp_ajax_goodmeet_reset_google_meet_credential AJAX action. While the function does verify the user's capability (manage_options), it does not validate a nonce, making it susceptible to CSRF attacks. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to trick a site administrator into clicking a malicious link that will reset (delete) the plugin's stored Google Meet API credentials (goodmeet_google_credentials) and OAuth tokens (goodmeet_google_token), effectively disabling the Google Meet integration on the site.
The GoodMeet – Google Meet Integration for Webinar, Meeting & Video Conference plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in versions up to and including 1.1.8. This is due to a missing nonce verification in the reset_credential() function, which handles the wp_ajax_goodmeet_reset_google_meet_credential AJAX action. While the function does verify the user's capability (manage_options), it does not validate a nonce, making it susceptible to CSRF attacks. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to trick a site administrator into clicking a malicious link that will reset (delete) the plugin's stored Google Meet API credentials (goodmeet_google_credentials) and OAuth tokens (goodmeet_google_token), effectively disabling the Google Meet integration on the site.
The application accepts a state-changing browser request without a reliable anti-forgery check.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication after a user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
The GoodMeet – Google Meet Integration for Webinar, Meeting & Video Conference plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in versions up to and including 1.1.8. This is due to a missing nonce verification in the reset_credential() function, which handles the wp_ajax_goodmeet_reset_google_meet_credential AJAX action. While the function does verify the user's capability (manage_options), it does not validate a nonce, making it susceptible to CSRF attacks. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to trick a site administrator into clicking a malicious link that will reset (delete) the plugin's stored Google Meet API credentials (goodmeet_google_credentials) and OAuth tokens (goodmeet_google_token), effectively disabling the Google Meet integration on the site.
The application accepts a state-changing browser request without a reliable anti-forgery check.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication after a user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF). The web application does not, or cannot, sufficiently verify whether a request was intentionally provided by the user who sent the request, which could have originated from an unauthorized actor.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 10 Jul 2026 · Last source change 10 Jul 2026, 17:01 UTC · CWE-352 · Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.