Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- The selected CVSS metric records a network-reachable, unauthenticated path with no user interaction.
- EPSS is 0.44% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE Intelligencekap-sh · zapros
Official source article: GitHub GHSA-6CP7-3M3C-5X5C ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
These OSV and GitHub advisory ranges apply only to the named package and ecosystem. A listed fixed version is not a universal product patch or proof that an update is installed.
| Ecosystem and package | Affected range | First fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPIzapros | ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 0.14.0 | 0.14.0 | OSV record ↗aggregator derived · 1 Oct 2026 |
| PyPIzapros | ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 0.14.0 | 0.14.0 | OSV record ↗source linked ecosystem record · 1 Oct 2026 |
| pipzapros | < 0.14.0 | 0.14.0 | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 23 Sep 2026 |
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
Fix not verifiedZapros, a Python HTTP client, prior to version 0.14.0 is vulnerable to denial of service via memory exhaustion. The issue affects all callers who streamed compressed responses relying on the chunk size — explicit (`iter_bytes(chunk_size=...)`) or the default — to bound memory. The decoder ignored that bound, so a chunk could be far larger than requested and a single compressed response could overflow memory. Version 0.14.0 contains a patch. Some workarounds are available. Read the still-compressed body with `Response.iter_raw()` / `Response.async_iter_raw()`, which bypass the built-in decoders, and decompress it yourself with an explicit output-size bound (e.g. `zlib`'s `max_length`), aborting once a configured limit is exceeded. Where feasible, send `Accept-Encoding: identity` to disable response compression so bodies are not decompressed client-side. Avoid decoding response bodies from untrusted servers.
Zapros, a Python HTTP client, prior to version 0.14.0 is vulnerable to denial of service via memory exhaustion. The issue affects all callers who streamed compressed responses relying on the chunk size — explicit (`iter_bytes(chunk_size=...)`) or the default — to bound memory. The decoder ignored that bound, so a chunk could be far larger than requested and a single compressed response could overflow memory. Version 0.14.0 contains a patch. Some workarounds are available. Read the still-compressed body with `Response.iter_raw()` / `Response.async_iter_raw()`, which bypass the built-in decoders, and decompress it yourself with an explicit output-size bound (e.g. `zlib`'s `max_length`), aborting once a configured limit is exceeded. Where feasible, send `Accept-Encoding: identity` to disable response compression so bodies are not decompressed client-side. Avoid decoding response bodies from untrusted servers.
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may disrupt the affected service.
Zapros, a Python HTTP client, prior to version 0.14.0 is vulnerable to denial of service via memory exhaustion. The issue affects all callers who streamed compressed responses relying on the chunk size — explicit (`iter_bytes(chunk_size=...)`) or the default — to bound memory. The decoder ignored that bound, so a chunk could be far larger than requested and a single compressed response could overflow memory. Version 0.14.0 contains a patch. Some workarounds are available. Read the still-compressed body with `Response.iter_raw()` / `Response.async_iter_raw()`, which bypass the built-in decoders, and decompress it yourself with an explicit output-size bound (e.g. `zlib`'s `max_length`), aborting once a configured limit is exceeded. Where feasible, send `Accept-Encoding: identity` to disable response compression so bodies are not decompressed client-side. Avoid decoding response bodies from untrusted servers.
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may disrupt the affected service.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling. The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 4.0: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 21 Sept 2026 · Last source change 22 Sept 2026, 14:41 UTC · CWE-770 · Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.