Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- A structured source references public exploit or proof-of-concept material.
- EPSS is 0.22% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE Intelligenceelixir-ecto · postgrex
Low technical severity with public exploit material referenced by a structured source; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
Low technical severity with public exploit material referenced by a structured source; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
Patch availableSQL Injection vulnerability in elixir-ecto postgrex allows an attacker who can influence a LISTEN channel name to inject SQL into the reconnect replay query, causing a denial of service of the notification connection. Postgrex.Notifications sanitizes channel names with quote_channel/1, which doubles double quotes so the name is safe inside a double-quoted identifier. This protects the single-statement LISTEN and UNLISTEN paths. On every (re)connect, however, handle_connect/1 replays all registered channels at once by concatenating their LISTEN statements and wrapping them in a dollar-quoted anonymous code block (DO $$BEGIN ... END$$). quote_channel/1 does not escape the $$ dollar-quote delimiter that opens and closes this block. The listen/3 guards only reject null bytes and names longer than 63 bytes, so a channel name containing $$ passes validation unchanged. Once such a name is embedded, its $$ prematurely terminates the outer dollar-quoted string and PostgreSQL parses the remainder as additional top-level statements. Because handle_connect/1 runs on every (re)connect, the malformed replay query is rejected each time and the notification connection never re-establishes its subscriptions, silently dropping notifications for every channel sharing that connection. An application is affected when it passes untrusted input (for example a tenant or user identifier) as a channel name to Postgrex.Notifications.listen/3. The double-quote doubling prevents forming a fully valid injected statement, so arbitrary SQL execution is not possible, but the corrupted query reliably breaks the shared notification connection for all tenants, resulting in denial of service. This issue affects postgrex: from 0.16.0 before 0.22.3.
SQL Injection vulnerability in elixir-ecto postgrex allows an attacker who can influence a LISTEN channel name to inject SQL into the reconnect replay query, causing a denial of service of the notification connection. Postgrex.Notifications sanitizes channel names with quote_channel/1, which doubles double quotes so the name is safe inside a double-quoted identifier. This protects the single-statement LISTEN and UNLISTEN paths. On every (re)connect, however, handle_connect/1 replays all registered channels at once by concatenating their LISTEN statements and wrapping them in a dollar-quoted anonymous code block (DO $$BEGIN ... END$$). quote_channel/1 does not escape the $$ dollar-quote delimiter that opens and closes this block. The listen/3 guards only reject null bytes and names longer than 63 bytes, so a channel name containing $$ passes validation unchanged. Once such a name is embedded, its $$ prematurely terminates the outer dollar-quoted string and PostgreSQL parses the remainder as additional top-level statements. Because handle_connect/1 runs on every (re)connect, the malformed replay query is rejected each time and the notification connection never re-establishes its subscriptions, silently dropping notifications for every channel sharing that connection. An application is affected when it passes untrusted input (for example a tenant or user identifier) as a channel name to Postgrex.Notifications.listen/3. The double-quote doubling prevents forming a fully valid injected statement, so arbitrary SQL execution is not possible, but the corrupted query reliably breaks the shared notification connection for all tenants, resulting in denial of service. This issue affects postgrex: from 0.16.0 before 0.22.3.
Attacker-controlled data is not kept separate from SQL query syntax, allowing the intended database operation to be changed.
An attacker operating through local access may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may disrupt the affected service.
SQL Injection vulnerability in elixir-ecto postgrex allows an attacker who can influence a LISTEN channel name to inject SQL into the reconnect replay query, causing a denial of service of the notification connection. Postgrex.Notifications sanitizes channel names with quote_channel/1, which doubles double quotes so the name is safe inside a double-quoted identifier. This protects the single-statement LISTEN and UNLISTEN paths. On every (re)connect, however, handle_connect/1 replays all registered channels at once by concatenating their LISTEN statements and wrapping them in a dollar-quoted anonymous code block (DO $$BEGIN ... END$$). quote_channel/1 does not escape the $$ dollar-quote delimiter that opens and closes this block. The listen/3 guards only reject null bytes and names longer than 63 bytes, so a channel name containing $$ passes validation unchanged. Once such a name is embedded, its $$ prematurely terminates the outer dollar-quoted string and PostgreSQL parses the remainder as additional top-level statements. Because handle_connect/1 runs on every (re)connect, the malformed replay query is rejected each time and the notification connection never re-establishes its subscriptions, silently dropping notifications for every channel sharing that connection. An application is affected when it passes untrusted input (for example a tenant or user identifier) as a channel name to Postgrex.Notifications.listen/3. The double-quote doubling prevents forming a fully valid injected statement, so arbitrary SQL execution is not possible, but the corrupted query reliably breaks the shared notification connection for all tenants, resulting in denial of service. This issue affects postgrex: from 0.16.0 before 0.22.3.
Attacker-controlled data is not kept separate from SQL query syntax, allowing the intended database operation to be changed.
An attacker operating through local access may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may disrupt the affected service.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
CISA Vulnrichment records proof-of-concept exploitation in its SSVC data. BlackTree has not independently executed or validated exploit material.
CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'). The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 4.0: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 10 Jul 2026 · Last source change 10 Jul 2026, 12:50 UTC · CWE-89 · Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.