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Full vulnerability report · 2026
CVE-2026-56812High confidence

Phoenix JavaScript presence client crashes on presence keys colliding with Object.prototype members in Presence.syncState/syncDiff

phoenixframework · phoenix

Official source article: GitHub GHSA-63MC-HW7G-86RR ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.

6.3MediumCVSS 4.0
Recommended action
Within 7 days

Medium technical severity with public exploit material referenced by a structured source; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.

Patch available
R
Operational reassessment

Published severity in operational context

Open reassessment dashboard →
Published severityMediumOperational priority:High, raised one band.upgradedsince 24 Sep 2026

Evidence used

  • No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
  • A structured source references public exploit or proof-of-concept material.
  • The selected CVSS metric records a network-reachable, unauthenticated path with no user interaction.
  • EPSS is 0.80% for the current model date.

Compensating controls

  • Validate the affected product branch and deploy the verified fixed release.
  • Restrict the affected network interface to trusted sources where business-safe.
  • Increase monitoring for the attack path and post-exploitation behaviour described in the report.

Verification

  1. Confirm that the asset runs phoenixframework phoenix and falls inside the recorded affected range.
  2. Verify the installed build against the product-specific fixed version after deployment.
  3. Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
  4. Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
Mitigation target: Within 30 daysRemediation target: Within 180 days

This automated reassessment organises public evidence. It does not know asset exposure, business impact or control effectiveness and does not replace CVSS or a human risk decision.

Open-source package ranges16 source-attributed ranges

These OSV and GitHub advisory ranges apply only to the named package and ecosystem. A listed fixed version is not a universal product patch or proof that an update is installed.

Ecosystem and packageAffected rangeFirst fixed versionEvidence
HexphoenixSEMVER: introduced 1.2.0-rc.0; fixed 1.5.151.5.15OSV record ↗aggregator derived · 24 Sep 2026
HexphoenixSEMVER: introduced 1.6.0-rc.0; fixed 1.6.171.6.17OSV record ↗aggregator derived · 24 Sep 2026
HexphoenixSEMVER: introduced 1.7.0-rc.0; fixed 1.7.241.7.24OSV record ↗aggregator derived · 24 Sep 2026
HexphoenixSEMVER: introduced 1.8.0-rc.0; fixed 1.8.91.8.9OSV record ↗aggregator derived · 24 Sep 2026
erlangphoenix>= 1.2.0-rc.0, < 1.5.151.5.15GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 3 Sep 2026
erlangphoenix>= 1.6.0-rc.0, < 1.6.171.6.17GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 3 Sep 2026
erlangphoenix>= 1.7.0-rc.0, < 1.7.241.7.24GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 3 Sep 2026
erlangphoenix>= 1.8.0-rc.0, < 1.8.91.8.9GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 3 Sep 2026
npmphoenix>= 1.2.0-rc.0, < 1.5.151.5.15GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 3 Sep 2026
npmphoenix>= 1.6.0-rc.0, < 1.6.171.6.17GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 3 Sep 2026
npmphoenix>= 1.7.0-rc.0, < 1.7.241.7.24GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 3 Sep 2026
npmphoenix>= 1.8.0-rc.0, < 1.8.91.8.9GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 3 Sep 2026
npmphoenixSEMVER: introduced 1.2.0-rc.0; fixed 1.5.151.5.15OSV record ↗aggregator derived · 24 Sep 2026
npmphoenixSEMVER: introduced 1.6.0-rc.0; fixed 1.6.171.6.17OSV record ↗aggregator derived · 24 Sep 2026
npmphoenixSEMVER: introduced 1.7.0-rc.0; fixed 1.7.241.7.24OSV record ↗aggregator derived · 24 Sep 2026
npmphoenixSEMVER: introduced 1.8.0-rc.0; fixed 1.8.91.8.9OSV record ↗aggregator derived · 24 Sep 2026
Optional official sources

National CERT insights
?CERT means Computer Emergency Response Team; CSIRT is the closely related term Computer Security Incident Response Team.

Choose official national sources for this report. Each advisory shows its original language. Your selection is remembered on this device and included in shared links.

Official European source

ENISA European Vulnerability Database

Official EUVD identifiers, advisory evidence and known-exploited context. Missing fields are not treated as evidence of low risk.

1 current
ENISA EUVD identifier

EUVD-2026-42050

No EUVD known-exploited evidence

Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions vulnerability in phoenixframework phoenix (Presence JavaScript client) allows an attacker with ordinary channel access to cause a persistent client-side denial of service against every viewer of a presence channel topic. This vulnerability is associated with program files assets/js/phoenix/presence.js and program routines Presence.syncState and Presence.syncDiff. The Phoenix JavaScript presence client checks whether a presence already exists with a bare truthiness test (state[key]) instead of an own-property check. Presence keys can be attacker-controlled, because applications track presences under a username or id supplied by the client. A user who joins a channel choosing a key that is an Object.prototype member name (__proto__, constructor, toString, hasOwnProperty, and similar) makes that lookup return JavaScript's built-in Object.prototype instead of undefined. Because the prototype is truthy, the code treats it as an existing presence and reads .metas.map(...) off it, which throws an uncaught TypeError. The exception propagates out of the presence message handler, so the local state is never updated and onSync() never fires. Because the malicious key is tracked on the server, it is re-pushed on every presence update and keeps re-throwing, so presence sync stays broken for every viewer of that channel topic until the attacker leaves. Both syncState and syncDiff use the same unsafe existence-check pattern. The impact is limited to the affected topic and is a read-time confusion of the prototype object, not a mutation of Object.prototype (it is not prototype pollution). This issue affects phoenix: from 1.2.0-rc.0 before 1.5.15, from 1.6.0-rc.0 before 1.6.17, from 1.7.0-rc.0 before 1.7.24, and from 1.8.0-rc.0 before 1.8.9; phoenix: from 1.2.0-rc.0 before 1.5.15, from 1.6.0-rc.0 before 1.6.17, from 1.7.0-rc.0 before 1.7.24, and from 1.8.0-rc.0 before 1.8.9.

EUVD state
Present in the current official mapping
Known exploitation
Not present in the current ENISA EUVD known-exploited dataset. This is not proof of no exploitation.
ENISA score
6.3 · CVSS 4.0
Advisory evidence
No linked advisory details stored yet
Recommended actionWithin 7 days

Medium technical severity with public exploit material referenced by a structured source; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.

Patch available
01

What, why and how

Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions vulnerability in phoenixframework phoenix (Presence JavaScript client) allows an attacker with ordinary channel access to cause a persistent client-side denial of service against every viewer of a presence channel topic. This vulnerability is associated with program files assets/js/phoenix/presence.js and program routines Presence.syncState and Presence.syncDiff. The Phoenix JavaScript presence client checks whether a presence already exists with a bare truthiness test (state[key]) instead of an own-property check. Presence keys can be attacker-controlled, because applications track presences under a username or id supplied by the client. A user who joins a channel choosing a key that is an Object.prototype member name (__proto__, constructor, toString, hasOwnProperty, and similar) makes that lookup return JavaScript's built-in Object.prototype instead of undefined. Because the prototype is truthy, the code treats it as an existing presence and reads .metas.map(...) off it, which throws an uncaught TypeError. The exception propagates out of the presence message handler, so the local state is never updated and onSync() never fires. Because the malicious key is tracked on the server, it is re-pushed on every presence update and keeps re-throwing, so presence sync stays broken for every viewer of that channel topic until the attacker leaves. Both syncState and syncDiff use the same unsafe existence-check pattern. The impact is limited to the affected topic and is a read-time confusion of the prototype object, not a mutation of Object.prototype (it is not prototype pollution). This issue affects phoenix: from 1.2.0-rc.0 before 1.5.15, from 1.6.0-rc.0 before 1.6.17, from 1.7.0-rc.0 before 1.7.24, and from 1.8.0-rc.0 before 1.8.9; phoenix: from 1.2.0-rc.0 before 1.5.15, from 1.6.0-rc.0 before 1.6.17, from 1.7.0-rc.0 before 1.7.24, and from 1.8.0-rc.0 before 1.8.9.

What

Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions vulnerability in phoenixframework phoenix (Presence JavaScript client) allows an attacker with ordinary channel access to cause a persistent client-side denial of service against every viewer of a presence channel topic. This vulnerability is associated with program files assets/js/phoenix/presence.js and program routines Presence.syncState and Presence.syncDiff. The Phoenix JavaScript presence client checks whether a presence already exists with a bare truthiness test (state[key]) instead of an own-property check. Presence keys can be attacker-controlled, because applications track presences under a username or id supplied by the client. A user who joins a channel choosing a key that is an Object.prototype member name (__proto__, constructor, toString, hasOwnProperty, and similar) makes that lookup return JavaScript's built-in Object.prototype instead of undefined. Because the prototype is truthy, the code treats it as an existing presence and reads .metas.map(...) off it, which throws an uncaught TypeError. The exception propagates out of the presence message handler, so the local state is never updated and onSync() never fires. Because the malicious key is tracked on the server, it is re-pushed on every presence update and keeps re-throwing, so presence sync stays broken for every viewer of that channel topic until the attacker leaves. Both syncState and syncDiff use the same unsafe existence-check pattern. The impact is limited to the affected topic and is a read-time confusion of the prototype object, not a mutation of Object.prototype (it is not prototype pollution). This issue affects phoenix: from 1.2.0-rc.0 before 1.5.15, from 1.6.0-rc.0 before 1.6.17, from 1.7.0-rc.0 before 1.7.24, and from 1.8.0-rc.0 before 1.8.9; phoenix: from 1.2.0-rc.0 before 1.5.15, from 1.6.0-rc.0 before 1.6.17, from 1.7.0-rc.0 before 1.7.24, and from 1.8.0-rc.0 before 1.8.9.

Why

The product does not check or incorrectly checks for unusual or exceptional conditions that are not expected to occur frequently during day to day operation of the product.

How

An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may disrupt the affected service.

What

Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions vulnerability in phoenixframework phoenix (Presence JavaScript client) allows an attacker with ordinary channel access to cause a persistent client-side denial of service against every viewer of a presence channel topic. This vulnerability is associated with program files assets/js/phoenix/presence.js and program routines Presence.syncState and Presence.syncDiff. The Phoenix JavaScript presence client checks whether a presence already exists with a bare truthiness test (state[key]) instead of an own-property check. Presence keys can be attacker-controlled, because applications track presences under a username or id supplied by the client. A user who joins a channel choosing a key that is an Object.prototype member name (__proto__, constructor, toString, hasOwnProperty, and similar) makes that lookup return JavaScript's built-in Object.prototype instead of undefined. Because the prototype is truthy, the code treats it as an existing presence and reads .metas.map(...) off it, which throws an uncaught TypeError. The exception propagates out of the presence message handler, so the local state is never updated and onSync() never fires. Because the malicious key is tracked on the server, it is re-pushed on every presence update and keeps re-throwing, so presence sync stays broken for every viewer of that channel topic until the attacker leaves. Both syncState and syncDiff use the same unsafe existence-check pattern. The impact is limited to the affected topic and is a read-time confusion of the prototype object, not a mutation of Object.prototype (it is not prototype pollution). This issue affects phoenix: from 1.2.0-rc.0 before 1.5.15, from 1.6.0-rc.0 before 1.6.17, from 1.7.0-rc.0 before 1.7.24, and from 1.8.0-rc.0 before 1.8.9; phoenix: from 1.2.0-rc.0 before 1.5.15, from 1.6.0-rc.0 before 1.6.17, from 1.7.0-rc.0 before 1.7.24, and from 1.8.0-rc.0 before 1.8.9.

Why

The product does not check or incorrectly checks for unusual or exceptional conditions that are not expected to occur frequently during day to day operation of the product.

How

An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may disrupt the affected service.

02

Exploit reality and attack path

CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.

Observed exploitation
?Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.
No confirmed evidence

No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.

Public PoC / exploit material
?Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.
Reference recorded

A structured CVE source labels at least one public reference as exploit material. BlackTree has not independently validated that it is safe, reliable or weaponised.

Likely attack path
a network path → Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions → disrupt the affected service
Attack surface
Network
Privileges required
None: unauthenticated exploitation is possible
User interaction
None
Attack complexity
Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
Security boundary
Not a CVSS 4.0 base metric
Weakness
?CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness.
CWE-754 ↗

CWE-754: Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions. The product does not check or incorrectly checks for unusual or exceptional conditions that are not expected to occur frequently during day to day operation of the product.

CVSS vector
?CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Common Vulnerability Scoring System 4.0: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.

AVNetworkAttack vector: The vulnerable component can be reached over a network.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.ATPresentAttack requirements: A particular deployment or execution condition must be present.PRNonePrivileges required: The attacker does not need an account or existing privileges.UINoneUser interaction: No action by another user is required.VCNoneVulnerable-system confidentiality: No direct loss is represented by this metric.VINoneVulnerable-system integrity: No direct loss is represented by this metric.VALowVulnerable-system availability: A successful attack can cause a limited loss.SCNoneSubsequent-system confidentiality: No direct loss is represented by this metric.SINoneSubsequent-system integrity: No direct loss is represented by this metric.SANoneSubsequent-system availability: No direct loss is represented by this metric.
Post-exploitation / living off the land
No specific living-off-the-land technique is confirmed in the structured sources. Monitor normal administration tools for activity inconsistent with the affected service's baseline.
NetworkUnauthenticatedDenial of serviceCWE-754Public exploit reference
A

Official authority intelligence

Only matched European and national findings are included. Language selectors and unavailable sources are omitted.

ENISA EUVD · EUVD-2026-42050Official EUVD mapping

Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions vulnerability in phoenixframework phoenix (Presence JavaScript client) allows an attacker with ordinary channel access to cause a persistent client-side denial of service against every viewer of a presence channel topic. This vulnerability is associated with program files assets/js/phoenix/presence.js and program routines Presence.syncState and Presence.syncDiff. The Phoenix JavaScript presence client checks whether a presence already exists with a bare truthiness test (state[key]) instead of an own-property check. Presence keys can be attacker-controlled, because applications track presences under a username or id supplied by the client. A user who joins a channel choosing a key that is an Object.prototype member name (__proto__, constructor, toString, hasOwnProperty, and similar) makes that lookup return JavaScript's built-in Object.prototype instead of undefined. Because the prototype is truthy, the code treats it as an existing presence and reads .metas.map(...) off it, which throws an uncaught TypeError. The exception propagates out of the presence message handler, so the local state is never updated and onSync() never fires. Because the malicious key is tracked on the server, it is re-pushed on every presence update and keeps re-throwing, so presence sync stays broken for every viewer of that channel topic until the attacker leaves. Both syncState and syncDiff use the same unsafe existence-check pattern. The impact is limited to the affected topic and is a read-time confusion of the prototype object, not a mutation of Object.prototype (it is not prototype pollution). This issue affects phoenix: from 1.2.0-rc.0 before 1.5.15, from 1.6.0-rc.0 before 1.6.17, from 1.7.0-rc.0 before 1.7.24, and from 1.8.0-rc.0 before 1.8.9; phoenix: from 1.2.0-rc.0 before 1.5.15, from 1.6.0-rc.0 before 1.6.17, from 1.7.0-rc.0 before 1.7.24, and from 1.8.0-rc.0 before 1.8.9.

Official EUVD record ↗
Cyber Security Agency of Singapore · English · CSA-SB-20260708Security Bulletin 8 July 2026 [PDF, 1MB]]

The Cyber Security Agency of Singapore included this CVE in its official Security Bulletin 8 July 2026 [PDF, 1MB]], published on 8 July 2026. Open the linked bulletin for the product, severity and reference information published in that issue.

Official advisory ↗
JVN iPedia · Japanese · JVNDB-2026-023422Phoenix teamのPhoenixにおける例外的な状態のチェックに関する脆弱性

phoenixframeworkのphoenix(Presence JavaScriptクライアント)における異常または例外条件の不適切なチェックの脆弱性により、通常のチャネルアクセス権を持つ攻撃者が、Presenceチャネルトピックのすべての閲覧者に対して永続的なクライアント側サービス拒否(DoS)を引き起こすことが可能です。この脆弱性は、プログラムファイルassets/js/phoenix/presence.jsおよびプログラムルーチンPresence.syncStateとPresence.syncDiffに関連しています。PhoenixのJavaScript presenceクライアントは、存在チェックに自身のプロパティかどうかではなく単純な真偽値テスト(state[key])を使用しています。Presenceのキーは攻撃者が制御可能であり、アプリケーションはクライアントから提供されたユーザー名やIDの下でpresencesを追跡しています。ユーザーがチャネルに参加する際に、Object.prototypeのメンバー名(__proto__、constructor、toString、hasOwnPropertyなど)をキーに選択すると、そのルックアップは未定義(undefined)ではなくJavaScriptの組み込みObject.prototypeを返します。プロトタイプはtruthyであるため、コードはそれを既存のpresenceとみなし、.metas.map(...)を読み取ろうとして未捕捉のTypeErrorを投げます。この例外はpresenceメッセージハンドラーの外に伝播し、その結果ローカルステートが更新されず、onSync()も発火しません。悪意のあるキーはサーバー上で追跡されるため、各presence更新時に再度プッシュされ続け例外が繰り返し発生し、そのチャネルトピックのすべての閲覧者に対してpresence同期が壊れ続けます。攻撃者が離脱するまで問題は解決されません。syncStateとsyncDiffは同じ安全でない存在確認パターンを使用しています。影響は対象トピックに限定され、プロトタイプオブジェクトの読み取り時の混乱であり、Object.prototypeの変更(プロトタイプ汚染)ではありません。この問題は、phoenixのバージョン1.2.0-rc.0から1.5.15未満、1.6.0-rc.0から1.6.17未満、1.7.0-rc.0から1.7.24未満、および1.8.0-rc.0から1.8.9未満に影響します。

Official advisory ↗
03

Patch and workaround

Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.

Status
?Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change.
Patch available
Affected
phoenix: 1.6.0-rc.0 < 1.6.17, 1.7.0-rc.0 < 1.7.24, 1.2.0-rc.0 < 1.5.15, 2270aaf21bd02c6a6a1022820564efb605a97655 < *, 1.8.0-rc.0 < 1.8.9
Fixed
An authoritative update reference is available, but the fixed version is not recorded in the structured CVE fields. Check the linked vendor advisory for the applicable release.
Action
Review the linked authoritative reference and apply the recorded fixed release appropriate to the affected product branch.
Workaround
A mitigation or workaround reference is available from the source linked below; validate it against the affected product and version.
04

Evidence and provenance

Published 7 Jul 2026 · Last source change 24 Sept 2026, 21:29 UTC · CWE-754 · Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions

CVE recordCVE.org · 5.2
CVSS sourceCNA
EPSS source
?The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.
FIRST · tracked since 2026-08-14
European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2026-42050
Product sourceCNA
Remediation sourceCVE/CNA references
CWE sourceCNA
NVD statusNVD modified after enrichment

Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.

Material change intelligence

What changed after publication

View recent updates ↗
  1. Affected versionsThe structured affected or fixed version information changed.
    Before
    1.2.0-rc.0 < 1.5.15; 1.6.0-rc.0 < 1.6.17; 1.7.0-rc.0 < 1.7.24; 1.8.0-rc.0 < 1.8.9; 2270aaf21bd02c6a6a1022820564efb605a97655 < * · Fixed: An authoritative update reference is available, but the fixed version is not recorded in the structured CVE fields. Check the linked vendor advisory for the applicable release.
    After
    phoenix: 1.2.0-rc.0 < 1.5.15, 1.6.0-rc.0 < 1.6.17, 1.7.0-rc.0 < 1.7.24, 1.8.0-rc.0 < 1.8.9, 2270aaf21bd02c6a6a1022820564efb605a97655 < * · Fixed: An authoritative update reference is available, but the fixed version is not recorded in the structured CVE fields. Check the linked vendor advisory for the applicable release.
    CNA ↗
Material fields only · duplicate refreshes suppressed · history retained for the configured operational retention period
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
CVE
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
CVSS
Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
EPSS
Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
CWE
Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
CNA
CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
CISA ADP
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
NVD
National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
CERT / CSIRT
A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
PoC
Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
CSAF
Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
LoTL
Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.
Free version - for non-commercial use only.CVE-2026-56812 · cve.blacktree.nl