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Full vulnerability report · 2026
CVE-2026-56424High confidence

Broken access control in MISP core allows cross-organization unauthorized modification or deletion of analyst data, event reports, collections, templates, and decaying models

misp · misp

7.1HighCVSS 4.0
Recommended action
Within 7 days

High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.

Patch available
R
Operational reassessment

Published severity in operational context

Open reassessment dashboard →
Published severityHighOperational priority:High, unchanged from published severity.unchanged

Evidence used

  • No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
  • EPSS is 0.52% for the current model date.

Compensating controls

  • Validate the affected product branch and deploy the verified fixed release.
  • Restrict the affected network interface to trusted sources where business-safe.
  • Monitor vendor guidance and exploitation sources for a material change.

Verification

  1. Confirm that the asset runs misp misp and falls inside the recorded affected range.
  2. Verify the installed build against the product-specific fixed version after deployment.
  3. Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
  4. Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
Mitigation target: Within 30 daysRemediation target: Within 180 days

This automated reassessment organises public evidence. It does not know asset exposure, business impact or control effectiveness and does not replace CVSS or a human risk decision.

Optional official sources

National CERT insights
?CERT means Computer Emergency Response Team; CSIRT is the closely related term Computer Security Incident Response Team.

Choose official national sources for this report. Each advisory shows its original language. Your selection is remembered on this device and included in shared links.

Official European source

ENISA European Vulnerability Database

Official EUVD identifiers, advisory evidence and known-exploited context. Missing fields are not treated as evidence of low risk.

1 current
ENISA EUVD identifier

EUVD-2026-38227

No EUVD known-exploited evidence

ENISA has published the identifier mapping but no EUVD description has been stored yet.

EUVD state
Present in the current official mapping
Known exploitation
Not present in the current ENISA EUVD known-exploited dataset. This is not proof of no exploitation.
ENISA score
Not supplied in the stored EUVD record
Advisory evidence
No linked advisory details stored yet
Recommended actionWithin 7 days

High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.

Patch available
01

What, why and how

MISP core contained multiple broken access-control flaws where authorization checks were performed against the wrong entity, or where ownership/editability checks were missing on write paths. In affected subsystems, a lower-privileged authenticated user with the relevant feature permission could cause the application to authorize one object but mutate another, or could modify objects that were merely visible rather than editable by the user’s organization. The affected paths included: * Event Reports tag removal: the route-authorized report could differ from the report ID used for tag detachment, enabling cross-organization tag removal from another event report * Collection Elements bulk deletion: bulk deletion authorized against a collection whose ID matched the collection-element row ID, rather than the element’s actual parent collection, enabling deletion of elements from collections the user did not own. * Analyst Data capture/update: nested analyst data updates could overwrite an existing record without applying the normal canEditAnalystData ownership check, enabling cross-organization overwrite of analyst data records. * Template Elements editing: editing authorized against a template whose ID matched the template-element ID, rather than the element’s actual parent template, enabling unauthorized edits to another organization’s template elements. * Decaying Model editing and mappings: write paths loaded models using view-scope access but did not verify edit ownership, enabling users to edit or remap visible models owned by another organization.  Successful exploitation could allow an authenticated user with subsystem-specific permissions to perform unauthorized cross-organization modifications or deletions of MISP data, resulting in integrity loss, unauthorized tampering with shared intelligence, and disruption of analyst workflows.

What

MISP core contained multiple broken access-control flaws where authorization checks were performed against the wrong entity, or where ownership/editability checks were missing on write paths. In affected subsystems, a lower-privileged authenticated user with the relevant feature permission could cause the application to authorize one object but mutate another, or could modify objects that were merely visible rather than editable by the user’s organization. The affected paths included: * Event Reports tag removal: the route-authorized report could differ from the report ID used for tag detachment, enabling cross-organization tag removal from another event report * Collection Elements bulk deletion: bulk deletion authorized against a collection whose ID matched the collection-element row ID, rather than the element’s actual parent collection, enabling deletion of elements from collections the user did not own. * Analyst Data capture/update: nested analyst data updates could overwrite an existing record without applying the normal canEditAnalystData ownership check, enabling cross-organization overwrite of analyst data records. * Template Elements editing: editing authorized against a template whose ID matched the template-element ID, rather than the element’s actual parent template, enabling unauthorized edits to another organization’s template elements. * Decaying Model editing and mappings: write paths loaded models using view-scope access but did not verify edit ownership, enabling users to edit or remap visible models owned by another organization.  Successful exploitation could allow an authenticated user with subsystem-specific permissions to perform unauthorized cross-organization modifications or deletions of MISP data, resulting in integrity loss, unauthorized tampering with shared intelligence, and disruption of analyst workflows.

Why

The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.

How

An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.

What

MISP core contained multiple broken access-control flaws where authorization checks were performed against the wrong entity, or where ownership/editability checks were missing on write paths. In affected subsystems, a lower-privileged authenticated user with the relevant feature permission could cause the application to authorize one object but mutate another, or could modify objects that were merely visible rather than editable by the user’s organization. The affected paths included: * Event Reports tag removal: the route-authorized report could differ from the report ID used for tag detachment, enabling cross-organization tag removal from another event report * Collection Elements bulk deletion: bulk deletion authorized against a collection whose ID matched the collection-element row ID, rather than the element’s actual parent collection, enabling deletion of elements from collections the user did not own. * Analyst Data capture/update: nested analyst data updates could overwrite an existing record without applying the normal canEditAnalystData ownership check, enabling cross-organization overwrite of analyst data records. * Template Elements editing: editing authorized against a template whose ID matched the template-element ID, rather than the element’s actual parent template, enabling unauthorized edits to another organization’s template elements. * Decaying Model editing and mappings: write paths loaded models using view-scope access but did not verify edit ownership, enabling users to edit or remap visible models owned by another organization.  Successful exploitation could allow an authenticated user with subsystem-specific permissions to perform unauthorized cross-organization modifications or deletions of MISP data, resulting in integrity loss, unauthorized tampering with shared intelligence, and disruption of analyst workflows.

Why

The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.

How

An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.

02

Exploit reality and attack path

CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.

Observed exploitation
?Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.
No confirmed evidence

No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.

Public PoC / exploit material
?Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.
None recorded

No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.

Likely attack path
a network path → Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key → cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor
Attack surface
Network
Privileges required
Low: a basic authenticated account is required
User interaction
None
Attack complexity
Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
Security boundary
Not a CVSS 4.0 base metric
Weakness
?CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness.
CWE-639 ↗

CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key. The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.

CVSS vector
?CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N

Common Vulnerability Scoring System 4.0: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.

AVNetworkAttack vector: The vulnerable component can be reached over a network.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.ATNoneAttack requirements: No additional deployment or execution condition is required.PRLowPrivileges required: The attacker needs basic user-level privileges.UINoneUser interaction: No action by another user is required.VCHighVulnerable-system confidentiality: A successful attack can cause a major loss.VILowVulnerable-system integrity: A successful attack can cause a limited loss.VANoneVulnerable-system availability: No direct loss is represented by this metric.SCLowSubsequent-system confidentiality: A successful attack can cause a limited loss.SINoneSubsequent-system integrity: No direct loss is represented by this metric.SANoneSubsequent-system availability: No direct loss is represented by this metric.
Post-exploitation / living off the land
No specific living-off-the-land technique is confirmed in the structured sources. Monitor normal administration tools for activity inconsistent with the affected service's baseline.
NetworkCWE-639
A

Official authority intelligence

Only matched European and national findings are included. Language selectors and unavailable sources are omitted.

BSI · German · WID-SEC-2026-2035MISP: Mehrere Schwachstellen

Ein entfernter, authentisierter Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in MISP ausnutzen, um beliebigen Code auszuführen, Zugriffskontrollen zu umgehen, Daten zu verändern, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen, Benutzersitzungen zu kapern oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand zu verursachen.

Official advisory ↗
Cyber Security Agency of Singapore · English · CSA-SB-20260624Security Bulletin 24 June 2026

The Cyber Security Agency of Singapore included this CVE in its official Security Bulletin 24 June 2026, published on 24 June 2026. Open the linked bulletin for the product, severity and reference information published in that issue.

Official advisory ↗
JVN iPedia · Japanese · JVNDB-2026-020916MISP projectのMalware Information Sharing Platform (MISP)における複数の脆弱性

MISPコアには複数のアクセス制御の不具合があり、認可チェックが誤ったエンティティに対して実行されることや、書き込み経路で所有権および編集権のチェックが欠如していました。影響を受けるサブシステムでは、関連する機能権限を持つ権限の低い認証済みユーザーが、あるオブジェクトの認可を受けていながら別のオブジェクトを変更したり、ユーザーの組織が閲覧可能だが編集権限のないオブジェクトを変更することが可能でした。影響を受けるパスは以下の通りです。 * イベントレポートのタグ削除:ルート認可されたレポートとタグ解除に使用されるレポートIDが異なり、別組織の他のイベントレポートからタグを削除できました。 * コレクション要素の一括削除:一括削除がコレクション要素の行IDと一致するコレクションIDに対して認可されており、要素の親コレクションのIDではなかったため、ユーザーが所有していないコレクションから要素を削除できます。 * アナリストデータの取得・更新:入れ子になったアナリストデータの更新がcanEditAnalystDataの所有権チェックを適用せずに既存レコードを上書きでき、組織間でアナリストデータレコードを上書き可能でした。 * テンプレート要素の編集:テンプレート要素のIDと一致するテンプレートに対して編集が認可されていましたが、実際の親テンプレートではなかったため、別組織のテンプレート要素を不正に編集できました。 * 減衰モデルの編集およびマッピング:書き込み経路がビュー・スコープのアクセスを使ってモデルを読み込んでいたものの編集所有権を確認せず、別組織が所有する表示可能なモデルを編集または再マッピングできました。 これらの不具合を悪用すると、特定サブシステムの権限を持つ認証済みユーザーがMISPデータの組織間で不正な変更や削除を行い、整合性を喪失させ、共有インテリジェンスの不正改ざんやアナリストのワークフロー混乱を引き起こす可能性があります。

Official advisory ↗
NCSC-NL · Dutch · NCSC-2026-0213Kwetsbaarheden verholpen in MISP platform

MISP core contains multiple access-control vulnerabilities that allow authenticated users with specific permissions to perform unauthorized cross-organization data modifications or deletions, compromising data integrity and disrupting workflows.

Official advisory ↗
03

Patch and workaround

Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.

Status
?Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change.
Patch available
Affected
misp: ≤ 2.5.41
Fixed
An authoritative update reference is available, but the fixed version is not recorded in the structured CVE fields. Check the linked vendor advisory for the applicable release.
Action
Review the linked authoritative reference and apply the recorded fixed release appropriate to the affected product branch.
Workaround
No verified workaround is recorded. If business-safe, reduce exposure to the affected interface and allow only trusted sources until authoritative guidance is available.
04

Evidence and provenance

Published 22 Jun 2026 · Last source change 23 Jun 2026, 14:19 UTC · CWE-639 · Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

CVE recordCVE.org · 5.2
CVSS sourceCNA
EPSS source
?The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.
FIRST · tracked since 2026-08-14
European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2026-38227
Product sourceCNA
Remediation sourceCVE/CNA references
CWE sourceCNA
NVD statusNVD enriched

Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.

Material change intelligence

What changed after publication

View recent updates ↗

No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.

Material fields only · duplicate refreshes suppressed · history retained for the configured operational retention period
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
CVE
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
CVSS
Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
EPSS
Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
CWE
Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
CNA
CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
CISA ADP
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
NVD
National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
CERT / CSIRT
A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
PoC
Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
CSAF
Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
LoTL
Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.
Free version - for non-commercial use only.CVE-2026-56424 · cve.blacktree.nl