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Full vulnerability report · 2026
CVE-2026-55953High confidence

TLS 1.2 and DTLS client accepts unoffered anonymous cipher suite, bypassing server authentication

Erlang · OTP

Official source article: GitHub GHSA-C6CW-PR89-W882 ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.

9.1CriticalCVSS 4.0
Recommended action
Patch only the product branches with a verified fix

Critical technical impact with a remotely reachable, unauthenticated path; no CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded. Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 1 structured product or package state remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.

Fix availability varies by product
R
Operational reassessment

Published severity in operational context

Open reassessment dashboard →
Published severityCriticalOperational priority:Critical, unchanged from published severity.unchanged

Evidence used

  • No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
  • The selected CVSS metric records a network-reachable, unauthenticated path with no user interaction.
  • EPSS is 0.23% for the current model date.

Compensating controls

  • Validate the affected product branch and deploy the verified fixed release.
  • Restrict the affected network interface to trusted sources where business-safe.
  • Monitor vendor guidance and exploitation sources for a material change.

Verification

  1. Confirm that the asset runs Erlang OTP and falls inside the recorded affected range.
  2. Verify the installed build against the product-specific fixed version after deployment.
  3. Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
  4. Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
Mitigation target: Within 3 daysRemediation target: Within 90 days

This automated reassessment organises public evidence. It does not know asset exposure, business impact or control effectiveness and does not replace CVSS or a human risk decision.

Cross-source reconciliation

Remediation availability differs by product scope

Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 1 structured product or package state remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.

Distribution package intelligence

Release-specific package status

Debian, ubuntu findings are scoped to the named distribution, release and source package. An absent finding does not mean a package is unaffected.

5 package states
Package result overrides the generic status

BlackTree has verified remediation for at least one product or source, but the relevant distribution still reports no fixed package for 1 affected package state shown here. Treat those rows as affected with no fix until that distribution publishes a fixed version.

Repository candidate not checked

A published vendor fix does not prove that a matching update is enabled and installable on a particular asset. Confirm the local package candidate before scheduling remediation.

Distribution releaseSource packageVendor stateFixed versionEvidence
Debian trixietrixie · sourceerlangVendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release.1:27.3.4.1+dfsg-1+deb13u3Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026
Debian bookwormbookworm · sourceerlangAffected, no fix publishedDebian currently tracks this release as open.Not published in this feedDebian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026
Debian forkyforky · sourceerlangVendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release.1:29.0.4+dfsg-1Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026
Debian sidsid · sourceerlangVendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release.1:29.0.4+dfsg-1Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026
Ubuntu 24.04 LTSnoble · standard archiveerlangVendor fix publishedCanonical reports that a fixed source package version has been published. Repository candidate availability is not checked by BlackTree.1:25.3.2.8+dfsg-1ubuntu4.7Canonical Ubuntu Security ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026
Optional official sources

National CERT insights
?CERT means Computer Emergency Response Team; CSIRT is the closely related term Computer Security Incident Response Team.

Choose official national sources for this report. Each advisory shows its original language. Your selection is remembered on this device and included in shared links.

Official European source

ENISA European Vulnerability Database

Official EUVD identifiers, advisory evidence and known-exploited context. Missing fields are not treated as evidence of low risk.

1 current
ENISA EUVD identifier

EUVD-2026-49323

No EUVD known-exploited evidence

The Erlang/OTP ssl TLS 1.2 (and earlier) and DTLS client does not verify that the cipher suite selected by the server in ServerHello was among the suites offered by the client in ClientHello. The client-side tls_handshake:hello/5 handler validates the negotiated protocol version and the downgrade sentinel but hands the server-chosen suite directly to ssl_handshake:handle_server_hello_extensions/9, which installs it without a membership check. The TLS 1.3 client path performs this check (per RFC 8446), so it is not affected. An on-path attacker between the client and the intended server can respond with a ServerHello selecting an anonymous key exchange suite such as TLS_DH_anon_* or TLS_ECDH_anon_* that the client never offered. Anonymous suites do not require the server to present a certificate, so the entire verify_peer and cacerts configuration is bypassed: the attacker completes the handshake with its own ephemeral parameters, no certificate is validated, no hostname is checked, and ssl:connect returns {ok, Socket}. All subsequent application traffic is readable and modifiable by the attacker. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.15, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.4, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.4, corresponding to ssl from 5.3.4 before 11.2.12.11, from 11.3 before 11.6.0.4, and from 11.7 before 11.7.4. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to ssl before 5.3.4, is affected is unknown.

EUVD state
Present in the current official mapping
Known exploitation
Not present in the current ENISA EUVD known-exploited dataset. This is not proof of no exploitation.
ENISA score
9.1 · CVSS 4.0
Advisory evidence
No linked advisory details stored yet
Recommended actionPatch only the product branches with a verified fix

Critical technical impact with a remotely reachable, unauthenticated path; no CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded. Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 1 structured product or package state remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.

Fix availability varies by product
01

What, why and how

The Erlang/OTP ssl TLS 1.2 (and earlier) and DTLS client does not verify that the cipher suite selected by the server in ServerHello was among the suites offered by the client in ClientHello. The client-side tls_handshake:hello/5 handler validates the negotiated protocol version and the downgrade sentinel but hands the server-chosen suite directly to ssl_handshake:handle_server_hello_extensions/9, which installs it without a membership check. The TLS 1.3 client path performs this check (per RFC 8446), so it is not affected. An on-path attacker between the client and the intended server can respond with a ServerHello selecting an anonymous key exchange suite such as TLS_DH_anon_* or TLS_ECDH_anon_* that the client never offered. Anonymous suites do not require the server to present a certificate, so the entire verify_peer and cacerts configuration is bypassed: the attacker completes the handshake with its own ephemeral parameters, no certificate is validated, no hostname is checked, and ssl:connect returns {ok, Socket}. All subsequent application traffic is readable and modifiable by the attacker. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.15, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.4, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.4, corresponding to ssl from 5.3.4 before 11.2.12.11, from 11.3 before 11.6.0.4, and from 11.7 before 11.7.4. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to ssl before 5.3.4, is affected is unknown.

What

The Erlang/OTP ssl TLS 1.2 (and earlier) and DTLS client does not verify that the cipher suite selected by the server in ServerHello was among the suites offered by the client in ClientHello. The client-side tls_handshake:hello/5 handler validates the negotiated protocol version and the downgrade sentinel but hands the server-chosen suite directly to ssl_handshake:handle_server_hello_extensions/9, which installs it without a membership check. The TLS 1.3 client path performs this check (per RFC 8446), so it is not affected. An on-path attacker between the client and the intended server can respond with a ServerHello selecting an anonymous key exchange suite such as TLS_DH_anon_* or TLS_ECDH_anon_* that the client never offered. Anonymous suites do not require the server to present a certificate, so the entire verify_peer and cacerts configuration is bypassed: the attacker completes the handshake with its own ephemeral parameters, no certificate is validated, no hostname is checked, and ssl:connect returns {ok, Socket}. All subsequent application traffic is readable and modifiable by the attacker. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.15, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.4, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.4, corresponding to ssl from 5.3.4 before 11.2.12.11, from 11.3 before 11.6.0.4, and from 11.7 before 11.7.4. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to ssl before 5.3.4, is affected is unknown.

Why

A protocol or its implementation supports interaction between multiple actors and allows those actors to negotiate which algorithm should be used as a protection mechanism such as encryption or authentication, but it does not select the strongest algorithm that is available to both parties.

How

An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.

What

The Erlang/OTP ssl TLS 1.2 (and earlier) and DTLS client does not verify that the cipher suite selected by the server in ServerHello was among the suites offered by the client in ClientHello. The client-side tls_handshake:hello/5 handler validates the negotiated protocol version and the downgrade sentinel but hands the server-chosen suite directly to ssl_handshake:handle_server_hello_extensions/9, which installs it without a membership check. The TLS 1.3 client path performs this check (per RFC 8446), so it is not affected. An on-path attacker between the client and the intended server can respond with a ServerHello selecting an anonymous key exchange suite such as TLS_DH_anon_* or TLS_ECDH_anon_* that the client never offered. Anonymous suites do not require the server to present a certificate, so the entire verify_peer and cacerts configuration is bypassed: the attacker completes the handshake with its own ephemeral parameters, no certificate is validated, no hostname is checked, and ssl:connect returns {ok, Socket}. All subsequent application traffic is readable and modifiable by the attacker. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.15, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.4, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.4, corresponding to ssl from 5.3.4 before 11.2.12.11, from 11.3 before 11.6.0.4, and from 11.7 before 11.7.4. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to ssl before 5.3.4, is affected is unknown.

Why

A protocol or its implementation supports interaction between multiple actors and allows those actors to negotiate which algorithm should be used as a protection mechanism such as encryption or authentication, but it does not select the strongest algorithm that is available to both parties.

How

An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.

02

Exploit reality and attack path

CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.

Observed exploitation
?Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.
No confirmed evidence

No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.

Public PoC / exploit material
?Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.
None recorded

No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.

Likely attack path
a network path → Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation ('Algorithm Downgrade') → cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor
Attack surface
Network
Privileges required
None: unauthenticated exploitation is possible
User interaction
None
Attack complexity
Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
Security boundary
Not a CVSS 4.0 base metric
Weakness
?CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness.
CWE-757 ↗

CWE-757: Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation ('Algorithm Downgrade'). A protocol or its implementation supports interaction between multiple actors and allows those actors to negotiate which algorithm should be used as a protection mechanism such as encryption or authentication, but it does not select the strongest algorithm that is available to both parties.

CVSS vector
?CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Common Vulnerability Scoring System 4.0: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.

AVNetworkAttack vector: The vulnerable component can be reached over a network.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.ATPresentAttack requirements: A particular deployment or execution condition must be present.PRNonePrivileges required: The attacker does not need an account or existing privileges.UINoneUser interaction: No action by another user is required.VCHighVulnerable-system confidentiality: A successful attack can cause a major loss.VIHighVulnerable-system integrity: A successful attack can cause a major loss.VANoneVulnerable-system availability: No direct loss is represented by this metric.SCNoneSubsequent-system confidentiality: No direct loss is represented by this metric.SINoneSubsequent-system integrity: No direct loss is represented by this metric.SANoneSubsequent-system availability: No direct loss is represented by this metric.
Post-exploitation / living off the land
No specific living-off-the-land technique is confirmed in the structured sources. Monitor normal administration tools for activity inconsistent with the affected service's baseline.
NetworkUnauthenticatedCWE-757
A

Official authority intelligence

Only matched European and national findings are included. Language selectors and unavailable sources are omitted.

ENISA EUVD · EUVD-2026-49323Official EUVD mapping

The Erlang/OTP ssl TLS 1.2 (and earlier) and DTLS client does not verify that the cipher suite selected by the server in ServerHello was among the suites offered by the client in ClientHello. The client-side tls_handshake:hello/5 handler validates the negotiated protocol version and the downgrade sentinel but hands the server-chosen suite directly to ssl_handshake:handle_server_hello_extensions/9, which installs it without a membership check. The TLS 1.3 client path performs this check (per RFC 8446), so it is not affected. An on-path attacker between the client and the intended server can respond with a ServerHello selecting an anonymous key exchange suite such as TLS_DH_anon_* or TLS_ECDH_anon_* that the client never offered. Anonymous suites do not require the server to present a certificate, so the entire verify_peer and cacerts configuration is bypassed: the attacker completes the handshake with its own ephemeral parameters, no certificate is validated, no hostname is checked, and ssl:connect returns {ok, Socket}. All subsequent application traffic is readable and modifiable by the attacker. This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 27.3.4.15, from OTP 28.0 before OTP 28.5.0.4, and from OTP 29.0 before OTP 29.0.4, corresponding to ssl from 5.3.4 before 11.2.12.11, from 11.3 before 11.6.0.4, and from 11.7 before 11.7.4. Whether OTP before OTP 17.0, corresponding to ssl before 5.3.4, is affected is unknown.

Official EUVD record ↗
BSI · German · WID-SEC-2026-2533Erlang/OTP: Mehrere Schwachstellen

Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Erlang/OTP ausnutzen, um einen Denial of Service Angriff durchzuführen, beliebigen Code auszuführen, Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen sowie Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen.

Official advisory ↗
Cyber Security Agency of Singapore · English · CSA-SB-20260729Security Bulletin 29 Jul 2026

The Cyber Security Agency of Singapore included this CVE in its official Security Bulletin 29 Jul 2026, published on 29 July 2026. Open the linked bulletin for the product, severity and reference information published in that issue.

Official advisory ↗
JVN iPedia · Japanese · JVNDB-2026-027782ERLANGのErlang/OTP等の複数製品におけるアルゴリズムのダウングレードに関する脆弱性

Erlang/OTPのsslモジュールにおいて、TLS 1.2(およびそれ以前)およびDTLSクライアントは、ServerHelloでサーバーが選択した暗号スイートがClientHelloでクライアントが提示したスイートの中に含まれているかどうかを検証しません。クライアント側のtls_handshake:hello/5ハンドラーはネゴシエートされたプロトコルバージョンとダウングレードセンチネルを検証しますが、サーバーが選択したスイートを直接ssl_handshake:handle_server_hello_extensions/9に渡し、メンバーシップチェックを行わずにインストールします。TLS 1.3クライアント経路ではこのチェック(RFC 8446に準拠)が行われているため、影響を受けません。クライアントと意図したサーバーの間にいるオンパス攻撃者は、ClientHelloで提供されていない匿名鍵交換スイート(TLS_DH_anon_*やTLS_ECDH_anon_*など)を選択したServerHelloで応答できます。匿名スイートはサーバーに証明書の提示を要求しないため、verify_peerやcacertsの設定が回避され、攻撃者は自身のエフェメラルパラメータでハンドシェイクを完了させ、証明書の検証もホスト名のチェックも行われない状態でssl:connectは{ok, Socket}を返します。以降のアプリケーション通信は攻撃者によって読み取りや改ざんが可能となります。この問題は、OTP R13B03からOTP 27.3.4.15未満、OTP 28.0からOTP 28.5.0.4未満、OTP 29.0からOTP 29.0.4未満、およびそれに対応するsslモジュールのバージョン(3.10.7から11.2.12.11未満、11.3から11.6.0.4未満、11.7から11.7.4未満)に影響します。OTP R13B03以前(ssl 3.10.7以前)については影響の有無が不明です。

Official advisory ↗
03

Patch and workaround

Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.

Status
?Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change.
Fix availability varies by product
Affected
otp: 29.0 < 29.0.4, 11.3 < 11.6.0.4, 28.0 < 28.5.0.4, 11.7 < 11.7.4, 5.3.4 < 11.2.12.11, 84adefa331c4159d432d22840663c38f155cd4c1 < *, 17.0 < 27.3.4.15
Fixed
An authoritative update reference is available, but the fixed version is not recorded in the structured CVE fields. Check the linked vendor advisory for the applicable release.
Action
Use the product-specific evidence above. Patch only products with a verified fixed release, and keep every affected or under-investigation state without a matching fix in the remediation queue.
Workaround
No verified workaround is recorded. If business-safe, reduce exposure to the affected interface and allow only trusted sources until authoritative guidance is available.
04

Evidence and provenance

Published 27 Jul 2026 · Last source change 8 Sept 2026, 01:06 UTC · CWE-757 · Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation ('Algorithm Downgrade')

CVE recordCVE.org · 5.2
CVSS sourceCNA
EPSS source
?The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.
FIRST · tracked since 2026-08-14
European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2026-49323
Product sourceCNA
Remediation sourceCVE/CNA references
CWE sourceCNA
NVD statusNVD modified after enrichment

Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.

Material change intelligence

What changed after publication

View recent updates ↗
  1. Affected versionsThe structured affected or fixed version information changed.
    Before
    < 17.0; 17.0 < 27.3.4.15; 28.0 < 28.5.0.4; 29.0 < 29.0.4; < 5.3.4; 5.3.4 < 11.2.12.11; 11.3 < 11.6.0.4; 11.7 < 11.7.4 · Fixed: An authoritative update reference is available, but the fixed version is not recorded in the structured CVE fields. Check the linked vendor advisory for the applicable release.
    After
    OTP: < 17.0, 17.0 < 27.3.4.15, 28.0 < 28.5.0.4, 29.0 < 29.0.4, < 5.3.4, 5.3.4 < 11.2.12.11, 11.3 < 11.6.0.4, 11.7 < 11.7.4, 84adefa331c4159d432d22840663c38f155cd4c1 < * · Fixed: An authoritative update reference is available, but the fixed version is not recorded in the structured CVE fields. Check the linked vendor advisory for the applicable release.
    CNA ↗
  2. Affected versionsThe structured affected or fixed version information changed.
    Before
    < R13B03; R13B03 < 27.3.4.15; 28.0 < 28.5.0.4; 29.0 < 29.0.4; < 3.10.7; 3.10.7 < 11.2.12.11; 11.3 < 11.6.0.4; 11.7 < 11.7.4 · Fixed: An authoritative update reference is available, but the fixed version is not recorded in the structured CVE fields. Check the linked vendor advisory for the applicable release.
    After
    < 17.0; 17.0 < 27.3.4.15; 28.0 < 28.5.0.4; 29.0 < 29.0.4; < 5.3.4; 5.3.4 < 11.2.12.11; 11.3 < 11.6.0.4; 11.7 < 11.7.4 · Fixed: An authoritative update reference is available, but the fixed version is not recorded in the structured CVE fields. Check the linked vendor advisory for the applicable release.
    CNA ↗
Material fields only · duplicate refreshes suppressed · history retained for the configured operational retention period
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
CVE
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
CVSS
Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
EPSS
Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
CWE
Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
CNA
CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
CISA ADP
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
NVD
National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
CERT / CSIRT
A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
PoC
Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
CSAF
Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
LoTL
Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.
Free version - for non-commercial use only.CVE-2026-55953 · cve.blacktree.nl