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Full vulnerability report · 2026
CVE-2026-55676High confidence

Malcolm vulnerable to RCE via unrestricted .php upload to the file-upload component

cisagov · Malcolm

Official source article: GitHub GHSA-8CVP-M7PG-QRP7 ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.

8.7HighCVSS 4.0
Recommended action
Within 7 days

High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.

Patch available
R
Operational reassessment

Published severity in operational context

Open reassessment dashboard →
Published severityHighOperational priority:High, unchanged from published severity.unchanged

Evidence used

  • No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
  • EPSS is 0.60% for the current model date.

Compensating controls

  • Validate the affected product branch and deploy the verified fixed release.
  • Restrict the affected network interface to trusted sources where business-safe.
  • Monitor vendor guidance and exploitation sources for a material change.

Verification

  1. Confirm that the asset runs cisagov Malcolm and falls inside the recorded affected range.
  2. Verify the installed build against the product-specific fixed version after deployment.
  3. Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
  4. Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
Mitigation target: Within 30 daysRemediation target: Within 180 days

This automated reassessment organises public evidence. It does not know asset exposure, business impact or control effectiveness and does not replace CVSS or a human risk decision.

Optional official sources

National CERT insights
?CERT means Computer Emergency Response Team; CSIRT is the closely related term Computer Security Incident Response Team.

Choose official national sources for this report. Each advisory shows its original language. Your selection is remembered on this device and included in shared links.

Official European source

ENISA European Vulnerability Database

Official EUVD identifiers, advisory evidence and known-exploited context. Missing fields are not treated as evidence of low risk.

1 current
ENISA EUVD identifier

EUVD-2026-56948

No EUVD known-exploited evidence

Malcolm is a network traffic analysis tool suite. The file-upload component (FilePond PHP backend) accepts uploads at `POST /server/php/submit.php` and stores them in a directory served by the same nginx and php-fpm instance. The allow-list that should restrict accepted file types is an empty array by default (`file-upload/php/config.php:16`), so the type check is a no-op and every extension is accepted. The filename sanitizer keeps the `.php` extension intact. Committed files land in `/var/www/upload/server/php/files` (`file-upload/php/config.php:7`), and the component's nginx routes any URL ending in `.php` to php-fpm. An authenticated `GET /server/php/files/<name>.php` then executes the uploaded code as `www-data`. Prior to version 26.06.1, in RBAC mode, the upload endpoint is reachable by the granular `ROLE_UPLOAD` role (`nginx/lua/nginx_auth_helpers.lua:71`), a role intended only for submitting capture files. As a result, a user holding the upload-only role runs arbitrary PHP as `www-data` inside the file-upload container. Version 26.06.1 fixes the issue.

EUVD state
Present in the current official mapping
Known exploitation
Not present in the current ENISA EUVD known-exploited dataset. This is not proof of no exploitation.
ENISA score
8.7 · CVSS 4.0
Advisory evidence
No linked advisory details stored yet
Recommended actionWithin 7 days

High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.

Patch available
01

What, why and how

Malcolm is a network traffic analysis tool suite. The file-upload component (FilePond PHP backend) accepts uploads at `POST /server/php/submit.php` and stores them in a directory served by the same nginx and php-fpm instance. The allow-list that should restrict accepted file types is an empty array by default (`file-upload/php/config.php:16`), so the type check is a no-op and every extension is accepted. The filename sanitizer keeps the `.php` extension intact. Committed files land in `/var/www/upload/server/php/files` (`file-upload/php/config.php:7`), and the component's nginx routes any URL ending in `.php` to php-fpm. An authenticated `GET /server/php/files/<name>.php` then executes the uploaded code as `www-data`. Prior to version 26.06.1, in RBAC mode, the upload endpoint is reachable by the granular `ROLE_UPLOAD` role (`nginx/lua/nginx_auth_helpers.lua:71`), a role intended only for submitting capture files. As a result, a user holding the upload-only role runs arbitrary PHP as `www-data` inside the file-upload container. Version 26.06.1 fixes the issue.

What

Malcolm is a network traffic analysis tool suite. The file-upload component (FilePond PHP backend) accepts uploads at `POST /server/php/submit.php` and stores them in a directory served by the same nginx and php-fpm instance. The allow-list that should restrict accepted file types is an empty array by default (`file-upload/php/config.php:16`), so the type check is a no-op and every extension is accepted. The filename sanitizer keeps the `.php` extension intact. Committed files land in `/var/www/upload/server/php/files` (`file-upload/php/config.php:7`), and the component's nginx routes any URL ending in `.php` to php-fpm. An authenticated `GET /server/php/files/<name>.php` then executes the uploaded code as `www-data`. Prior to version 26.06.1, in RBAC mode, the upload endpoint is reachable by the granular `ROLE_UPLOAD` role (`nginx/lua/nginx_auth_helpers.lua:71`), a role intended only for submitting capture files. As a result, a user holding the upload-only role runs arbitrary PHP as `www-data` inside the file-upload container. Version 26.06.1 fixes the issue.

Why

The upload path does not sufficiently restrict the type, name, location or later execution of attacker-supplied files.

How

An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.

What

Malcolm is a network traffic analysis tool suite. The file-upload component (FilePond PHP backend) accepts uploads at `POST /server/php/submit.php` and stores them in a directory served by the same nginx and php-fpm instance. The allow-list that should restrict accepted file types is an empty array by default (`file-upload/php/config.php:16`), so the type check is a no-op and every extension is accepted. The filename sanitizer keeps the `.php` extension intact. Committed files land in `/var/www/upload/server/php/files` (`file-upload/php/config.php:7`), and the component's nginx routes any URL ending in `.php` to php-fpm. An authenticated `GET /server/php/files/<name>.php` then executes the uploaded code as `www-data`. Prior to version 26.06.1, in RBAC mode, the upload endpoint is reachable by the granular `ROLE_UPLOAD` role (`nginx/lua/nginx_auth_helpers.lua:71`), a role intended only for submitting capture files. As a result, a user holding the upload-only role runs arbitrary PHP as `www-data` inside the file-upload container. Version 26.06.1 fixes the issue.

Why

The upload path does not sufficiently restrict the type, name, location or later execution of attacker-supplied files.

How

An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.

02

Exploit reality and attack path

CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.

Observed exploitation
?Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.
No confirmed evidence

No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.

Public PoC / exploit material
?Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.
None recorded

No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.

Likely attack path
a network path → Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type → cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor
Attack surface
Network
Privileges required
Low: a basic authenticated account is required
User interaction
None
Attack complexity
Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
Security boundary
Not a CVSS 4.0 base metric
Weakness
?CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness.
CWE-434 ↗

CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type. The product allows the upload or transfer of dangerous file types that are automatically processed within its environment.

CVSS vector
?CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Common Vulnerability Scoring System 4.0: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.

AVNetworkAttack vector: The vulnerable component can be reached over a network.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.ATNoneAttack requirements: No additional deployment or execution condition is required.PRLowPrivileges required: The attacker needs basic user-level privileges.UINoneUser interaction: No action by another user is required.VCHighVulnerable-system confidentiality: A successful attack can cause a major loss.VIHighVulnerable-system integrity: A successful attack can cause a major loss.VAHighVulnerable-system availability: A successful attack can cause a major loss.SCNoneSubsequent-system confidentiality: No direct loss is represented by this metric.SINoneSubsequent-system integrity: No direct loss is represented by this metric.SANoneSubsequent-system availability: No direct loss is represented by this metric.
Post-exploitation / living off the land
No specific living-off-the-land technique is confirmed in the structured sources. Monitor normal administration tools for activity inconsistent with the affected service's baseline.
NetworkCWE-434
A

Official authority intelligence

Only matched European and national findings are included. Language selectors and unavailable sources are omitted.

ENISA EUVD · EUVD-2026-56948Official EUVD mapping

Malcolm is a network traffic analysis tool suite. The file-upload component (FilePond PHP backend) accepts uploads at `POST /server/php/submit.php` and stores them in a directory served by the same nginx and php-fpm instance. The allow-list that should restrict accepted file types is an empty array by default (`file-upload/php/config.php:16`), so the type check is a no-op and every extension is accepted. The filename sanitizer keeps the `.php` extension intact. Committed files land in `/var/www/upload/server/php/files` (`file-upload/php/config.php:7`), and the component's nginx routes any URL ending in `.php` to php-fpm. An authenticated `GET /server/php/files/<name>.php` then executes the uploaded code as `www-data`. Prior to version 26.06.1, in RBAC mode, the upload endpoint is reachable by the granular `ROLE_UPLOAD` role (`nginx/lua/nginx_auth_helpers.lua:71`), a role intended only for submitting capture files. As a result, a user holding the upload-only role runs arbitrary PHP as `www-data` inside the file-upload container. Version 26.06.1 fixes the issue.

Official EUVD record ↗
Canadian Centre for Cyber Security · English · AV26-841[Control Systems] CISA ICS security advisory (AV26-841)

As of August 18, 2026, Malcolm is affected by vulnerabilities in the following product:

Official advisory ↗
CISA · English · ICSA-26-230-01CISA Malcolm

Malcolm is a network traffic analysis tool suite. The file-upload component (FilePond PHP backend) accepts uploads at POST /server/php/submit.php and stores them in a directory served by the same nginx and php-fpm instance. The allow-list that should restrict accepted file types is an empty array by default (file-upload/php/config.php:16), so the type check is a no-op and every extension is accepted. The filename sanitizer keeps the .php extension intact. Committed files land in /var/www/upload/server/php/files (file-upload/php/config.php:7), and the component's nginx routes any URL ending in .php to php-fpm. An authenticated GET /server/php/files/ .php then executes the uploaded code as www-data. Prior to version 26.06.1, in RBAC mode, the upload endpoint is reachable by the granular ROLE_UPLOAD role (nginx/lua/nginx_auth_helpers.lua:71), a role intended only for submitting capture files. As a result, a user holding the upload-only role runs arbitrary PHP as www-data inside the file-upload container. Version 26.06.1 fixes the issue.

Official advisory ↗
03

Patch and workaround

Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.

Status
?Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change.
Patch available
Affected
Malcolm: < 26.06.1
Fixed
Malcolm: 26.06.1
Action
Review the linked authoritative reference and apply the recorded fixed release appropriate to the affected product branch.
Workaround
No verified workaround is recorded. If business-safe, reduce exposure to the affected interface and allow only trusted sources until authoritative guidance is available.
04

Evidence and provenance

Published 11 Aug 2026 · Last source change 2 Oct 2026, 20:20 UTC · CWE-434 · Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type

CVE recordCVE.org · 5.2
CVSS sourceCNA
EPSS source
?The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.
FIRST · tracked since 2026-08-14
European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2026-56948
Product sourceCNA
Remediation sourceCVE/CNA references
CWE sourceCNA
NVD statusNVD not scheduled

Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.

Material change intelligence

What changed after publication

View recent updates ↗
  1. Vendor guidanceAuthoritative vendor guidance changed: added remediation: github.com/GHSA-8cvp-m7pg-qrp7; removed remediation: cisa.gov/icsa-26-230-01.
    Before
    remediation: cisa.gov/icsa-26-230-01
    After
    remediation: github.com/GHSA-8cvp-m7pg-qrp7
    CNA ↗
  2. Vendor guidanceAuthoritative vendor guidance changed: added remediation: cisa.gov/icsa-26-230-01; removed remediation: cyber.gc.ca/control-systems-cisa-security-advisory-av26-841.
    Before
    remediation: cyber.gc.ca/control-systems-cisa-security-advisory-av26-841
    After
    remediation: cisa.gov/icsa-26-230-01
    CNA ↗
  3. Affected versionsThe structured affected or fixed version information changed.
    Before
    Malcolm: < 26.06.1 · Fixed: No fixed version is explicitly recorded in the structured CVE data.
    After
    Malcolm: < 26.06.1 · Fixed: Malcolm: 26.06.1
    CNA ↗
  4. Remediation statusRemediation status changed from Mitigation available to Patch available.
    Before
    Mitigation available
    After
    Patch available
    CNA ↗
  5. CVSS scoreCVSS score changed from 8.8 (CVSS 3.1 · CNA · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) to 8.7 (CVSS 4.0 · CNA · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N).
    Before
    8.8 (CVSS 3.1 · CNA · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H)
    After
    8.7 (CVSS 4.0 · CNA · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N)
    CNA ↗
  6. Vendor guidanceAuthoritative vendor guidance changed: removed remediation: cyber.gc.ca/control-systems-cisa-security-advisory-av26-841.
    Before
    remediation: cyber.gc.ca/control-systems-cisa-security-advisory-av26-841
    After
    no authoritative guidance recorded
    CNA ↗
  7. Affected versionsThe structured affected or fixed version information changed.
    Before
    < 26.06.1 · Fixed: No fixed version is explicitly recorded in the structured CVE data.
    After
    Malcolm: < 26.06.1 · Fixed: No fixed version is explicitly recorded in the structured CVE data.
    CNA ↗
  8. Remediation statusRemediation status changed from Mitigation available to Awaiting fix.
    Before
    Mitigation available
    After
    Awaiting fix
    CNA ↗
  9. Remediation statusRemediation status changed from Awaiting fix to Mitigation available.
    Before
    Awaiting fix
    After
    Mitigation available
    Canadian Centre for Cyber Security ↗
Material fields only · duplicate refreshes suppressed · history retained for the configured operational retention period
CVE published
Fixed release or patch reference recorded
ENISA EUVD · EUVD-2026-56948↗CVE authority or vendor reference · GitHub GHSA-8CVP-M7PG-QRP7↗Official CVE record (CNA and ADP data)↗NVD record↗
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
CVE
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
CVSS
Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
EPSS
Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
CWE
Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
CNA
CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
CISA ADP
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
NVD
National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
CERT / CSIRT
A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
PoC
Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
CSAF
Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
LoTL
Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.
Free version - for non-commercial use only.CVE-2026-55676 · cve.blacktree.nl