Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- EPSS is 0.21% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE IntelligencePaymenter · Paymenter
Official source article: GitHub GHSA-PGCQ-8GRM-5RX9 ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.
Medium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
These OSV and GitHub advisory ranges apply only to the named package and ecosystem. A listed fixed version is not a universal product patch or proof that an update is installed.
| Ecosystem and package | Affected range | First fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Packagistpaymenter/paymenter | ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.5.5 | 1.5.5 | OSV record ↗aggregator derived · 10 Sep 2026 |
| composerpaymenter/paymenter | <= 1.5.4 | 1.5.5 | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 30 Jun 2026 |
Medium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
Patch availablePaymenter is a free and open-source webshop solution for management of hosting services. In versions prior to 1.5.5, the credit payment implementation in app/Livewire/Invoices/Show.php executes a pessimistic row lock (lockForUpdate()) outside of an active database transaction. Because MySQL/MariaDB requires an enclosing transaction to enforce row-level locks, the guard is ineffective. Concurrent payment requests can exploit this race condition to read the same credit balance simultaneously, allowing users to pay multiple invoices using the same credit balance. In database systems like MySQL, a row lock only works inside a formal transaction; without one, the lock is completely ignored. Because there is no active lock, two payment requests sent at the exact same millisecond can look at the database at the same time. Both requests see the original credit balance, decide it is sufficient, and approve the payment. Because the payment processes successfully through ExtensionHelper::addPayment(), the application provisions the corresponding services or digital goods, resulting in direct financial or resource loss to the platform. This issue has been fixed in version 1.5.5.
Paymenter is a free and open-source webshop solution for management of hosting services. In versions prior to 1.5.5, the credit payment implementation in app/Livewire/Invoices/Show.php executes a pessimistic row lock (lockForUpdate()) outside of an active database transaction. Because MySQL/MariaDB requires an enclosing transaction to enforce row-level locks, the guard is ineffective. Concurrent payment requests can exploit this race condition to read the same credit balance simultaneously, allowing users to pay multiple invoices using the same credit balance. In database systems like MySQL, a row lock only works inside a formal transaction; without one, the lock is completely ignored. Because there is no active lock, two payment requests sent at the exact same millisecond can look at the database at the same time. Both requests see the original credit balance, decide it is sufficient, and approve the payment. Because the payment processes successfully through ExtensionHelper::addPayment(), the application provisions the corresponding services or digital goods, resulting in direct financial or resource loss to the platform. This issue has been fixed in version 1.5.5.
The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
Paymenter is a free and open-source webshop solution for management of hosting services. In versions prior to 1.5.5, the credit payment implementation in app/Livewire/Invoices/Show.php executes a pessimistic row lock (lockForUpdate()) outside of an active database transaction. Because MySQL/MariaDB requires an enclosing transaction to enforce row-level locks, the guard is ineffective. Concurrent payment requests can exploit this race condition to read the same credit balance simultaneously, allowing users to pay multiple invoices using the same credit balance. In database systems like MySQL, a row lock only works inside a formal transaction; without one, the lock is completely ignored. Because there is no active lock, two payment requests sent at the exact same millisecond can look at the database at the same time. Both requests see the original credit balance, decide it is sufficient, and approve the payment. Because the payment processes successfully through ExtensionHelper::addPayment(), the application provisions the corresponding services or digital goods, resulting in direct financial or resource loss to the platform. This issue has been fixed in version 1.5.5.
The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition'). The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 20 Jul 2026 · Last source change 20 Jul 2026, 21:45 UTC · CWE-362 · Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.