Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- A structured source references public exploit or proof-of-concept material.
- EPSS is 0.38% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE IntelligenceFull vulnerability report · 2026
CVE-2026-55177High confidence
CloudTAK: Authenticated full-read SSRF in /api/esri* routes — user-controlled URL fetched with no IP-classification guard
dfpc-coe · CloudTAK
Official source article: GitHub GHSA-R95Q-FP26-H3HC ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.
7.6HighCVSS 4.0
Within 7 days
Fix not verifiedHigh technical severity with public exploit material referenced by a structured source; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
R
Open reassessment dashboard →Operational reassessment
Published severity in operational context
Published severityHigh→Operational priority:Critical, raised one band.upgradedsince 30 Sep 2026
Compensating controls
- Restrict the affected network interface to trusted sources where business-safe.
- Increase monitoring for the attack path and post-exploitation behaviour described in the report.
Verification
- Confirm that the asset runs dfpc-coe CloudTAK and falls inside the recorded affected range.
- Recheck the vendor advisory before scheduling a change because no verified fixed version is currently retained.
- Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
- Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
High technical severity with public exploit material referenced by a structured source; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
Fix not verified01
What, why and how
CloudTAK is a browser-based Common Operating Picture and situational awareness tool compatible with TAK. Prior to version 13.10.0, every route in the ESRI helper family (api/routes/esri.ts) takes a fully attacker-controlled URL from the request (POST /api/esri body url, and the portal / server / layer query parameters on the GET /api/esri/* routes) and passes it into EsriBase / EsriProxyPortal / EsriProxyServer / EsriProxyLayer in api/lib/esri.ts, which fetch it with the bare fetch from @tak-ps/etl. No IP / DNS / hostname classification is applied at any point, so the destination is never validated against private, loopback, or link-local ranges. Any authenticated user (the routes only require Auth.is_auth(config, req, { anyResources: true }), i.e. any token, not an admin) can therefore make the CloudTAK server issue arbitrary outbound GET/POST requests to internal addresses such as the cloud instance-metadata service (169.254.169.254), loopback admin ports (127.0.0.1:<port>), and other hosts reachable only from inside the deployment VPC. This is a full-read SSRF, not blind: on success the upstream JSON body is returned to the caller via res.json(...), and on failure the upstream error string is reflected verbatim as ESRI Server Error: <message>. An attacker can read cloud metadata (and the temporary IAM credentials the instance role exposes), enumerate internal services, and exfiltrate their response bodies. The sniff() URL classifier provides no protection: it only pattern-matches the pathname (/rest, /arcgis/rest, /sharing/rest), so a URL like http://169.254.169.254/arcgis/rest or http://127.0.0.1:8500/rest passes sniff() and is fetched. This issue has been patched in version 13.10.0.
What
CloudTAK is a browser-based Common Operating Picture and situational awareness tool compatible with TAK. Prior to version 13.10.0, every route in the ESRI helper family (api/routes/esri.ts) takes a fully attacker-controlled URL from the request (POST /api/esri body url, and the portal / server / layer query parameters on the GET /api/esri/* routes) and passes it into EsriBase / EsriProxyPortal / EsriProxyServer / EsriProxyLayer in api/lib/esri.ts, which fetch it with the bare fetch from @tak-ps/etl. No IP / DNS / hostname classification is applied at any point, so the destination is never validated against private, loopback, or link-local ranges. Any authenticated user (the routes only require Auth.is_auth(config, req, { anyResources: true }), i.e. any token, not an admin) can therefore make the CloudTAK server issue arbitrary outbound GET/POST requests to internal addresses such as the cloud instance-metadata service (169.254.169.254), loopback admin ports (127.0.0.1:<port>), and other hosts reachable only from inside the deployment VPC. This is a full-read SSRF, not blind: on success the upstream JSON body is returned to the caller via res.json(...), and on failure the upstream error string is reflected verbatim as ESRI Server Error: <message>. An attacker can read cloud metadata (and the temporary IAM credentials the instance role exposes), enumerate internal services, and exfiltrate their response bodies. The sniff() URL classifier provides no protection: it only pattern-matches the pathname (/rest, /arcgis/rest, /sharing/rest), so a URL like http://169.254.169.254/arcgis/rest or http://127.0.0.1:8500/rest passes sniff() and is fetched. This issue has been patched in version 13.10.0.
Why
The server follows an attacker-influenced destination, allowing requests to systems or services the attacker cannot reach directly.
How
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
What
CloudTAK is a browser-based Common Operating Picture and situational awareness tool compatible with TAK. Prior to version 13.10.0, every route in the ESRI helper family (api/routes/esri.ts) takes a fully attacker-controlled URL from the request (POST /api/esri body url, and the portal / server / layer query parameters on the GET /api/esri/* routes) and passes it into EsriBase / EsriProxyPortal / EsriProxyServer / EsriProxyLayer in api/lib/esri.ts, which fetch it with the bare fetch from @tak-ps/etl. No IP / DNS / hostname classification is applied at any point, so the destination is never validated against private, loopback, or link-local ranges. Any authenticated user (the routes only require Auth.is_auth(config, req, { anyResources: true }), i.e. any token, not an admin) can therefore make the CloudTAK server issue arbitrary outbound GET/POST requests to internal addresses such as the cloud instance-metadata service (169.254.169.254), loopback admin ports (127.0.0.1:<port>), and other hosts reachable only from inside the deployment VPC. This is a full-read SSRF, not blind: on success the upstream JSON body is returned to the caller via res.json(...), and on failure the upstream error string is reflected verbatim as ESRI Server Error: <message>. An attacker can read cloud metadata (and the temporary IAM credentials the instance role exposes), enumerate internal services, and exfiltrate their response bodies. The sniff() URL classifier provides no protection: it only pattern-matches the pathname (/rest, /arcgis/rest, /sharing/rest), so a URL like http://169.254.169.254/arcgis/rest or http://127.0.0.1:8500/rest passes sniff() and is fetched. This issue has been patched in version 13.10.0.
Why
The server follows an attacker-influenced destination, allowing requests to systems or services the attacker cannot reach directly.
How
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
02
Exploit reality and attack path
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
Observed exploitation No confirmed evidence
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
Public PoC / exploit material Reference recorded
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.CISA Vulnrichment records proof-of-concept exploitation in its SSVC data. BlackTree has not independently executed or validated exploit material.
- Likely attack path
- a network path → Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) → cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor
- Attack surface
- Network
- Privileges required
- Low: a basic authenticated account is required
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
- Security boundary
- Not a CVSS 4.0 base metric
- Weakness
?
CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness. - CWE-918 ↗
CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.
- CVSS vector
?
CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity. CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 4.0: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
AVNetworkAttack vector: The vulnerable component can be reached over a network.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.ATPresentAttack requirements: A particular deployment or execution condition must be present.PRLowPrivileges required: The attacker needs basic user-level privileges.UINoneUser interaction: No action by another user is required.VCHighVulnerable-system confidentiality: A successful attack can cause a major loss.VIHighVulnerable-system integrity: A successful attack can cause a major loss.VANoneVulnerable-system availability: No direct loss is represented by this metric.SCNoneSubsequent-system confidentiality: No direct loss is represented by this metric.SINoneSubsequent-system integrity: No direct loss is represented by this metric.SANoneSubsequent-system availability: No direct loss is represented by this metric.- Post-exploitation / living off the land
- Stolen credentials, tokens and legitimate administration functions may provide continued access without deploying a large custom toolset.
03
Patch and workaround
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
- Status
?
Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change. - Fix not verified
- Affected
- CloudTAK: < 13.10.0
- Fixed
- No fixed version is explicitly recorded in the structured CVE data.
- Action
- No verified patch reference is present in the current structured sources. Check the vendor advisory before making a change.
- Workaround
- No verified workaround is recorded. If business-safe, reduce exposure to the affected interface and allow only trusted sources until authoritative guidance is available.
04
Evidence and provenance
Published 30 Sept 2026 · Last source change 30 Sept 2026, 19:34 UTC · CWE-918 · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
CVE recordCVE.org · 5.2
CVSS sourceCNA
EPSS source FIRST · tracked since 2026-10-01
?
The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2026-90083
Product sourceCNA
Remediation sourceCVE/CNA references
CWE sourceCNA
NVD statusNVD awaiting enrichment
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
Material change intelligence
View recent updates ↗What changed after publication
- ENISA EUVD mappingEUVD-2026-90083 was added to the official ENISA EUVD mapping for this CVE.ENISA EUVD ↗
- Before
- not recorded
- After
- {"euvdId":"EUVD-2026-90083"}
- Public exploit evidencePublic exploit evidence changed from No public exploit to Public exploit reference.CVE.org ↗
- Before
- No public exploit
- After
- Public exploit reference
- Catalogue recordCVE added to the BlackTree catalogue.CNA ↗
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
- CVE
- Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
- CVSS
- Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
- EPSS
- Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
- CWE
- Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
- CNA
- CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
- CISA ADP
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
- NVD
- National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
- CERT / CSIRT
- A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
- PoC
- Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
- CSAF
- Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
- LoTL
- Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.