Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- The selected CVSS metric records a network-reachable, unauthenticated path with no user interaction.
- EPSS is 0.41% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE Intelligencemisp · misp
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
Patch availableMISP contained multiple mass assignment vulnerabilities in the handling of collections, tag collections, event delegations, and shadow attributes. Several controller actions accepted user-supplied fields that should have remained server-controlled, including record identifiers and ownership-related fields such as id, org_id, orgc_id, and user_id. An authenticated attacker with access to the affected endpoints could craft requests containing protected fields in order to alter object ownership, redirect an update to another record, overwrite existing event delegation requests, or modify shadow attribute proposals belonging to another organization. This could result in unauthorized modification of MISP objects and, depending on object visibility and sharing configuration, unauthorized access to or transfer of sensitive threat intelligence data. The issue was fixed by explicitly pinning ownership and identity fields to their stored values during edit operations and by removing user-supplied primary keys from create-only save paths. Affected components: * CollectionsController::edit() * EventDelegationsController::delegateEvent() * ShadowAttributesController::edit() * TagCollectionsController::edit()915 * TagCollectionsController::editWithTags() Attack requirements: The attacker must be authenticated and able to reach the affected MISP endpoints. No user interaction is required.
MISP contained multiple mass assignment vulnerabilities in the handling of collections, tag collections, event delegations, and shadow attributes. Several controller actions accepted user-supplied fields that should have remained server-controlled, including record identifiers and ownership-related fields such as id, org_id, orgc_id, and user_id. An authenticated attacker with access to the affected endpoints could craft requests containing protected fields in order to alter object ownership, redirect an update to another record, overwrite existing event delegation requests, or modify shadow attribute proposals belonging to another organization. This could result in unauthorized modification of MISP objects and, depending on object visibility and sharing configuration, unauthorized access to or transfer of sensitive threat intelligence data. The issue was fixed by explicitly pinning ownership and identity fields to their stored values during edit operations and by removing user-supplied primary keys from create-only save paths. Affected components: * CollectionsController::edit() * EventDelegationsController::delegateEvent() * ShadowAttributesController::edit() * TagCollectionsController::edit()915 * TagCollectionsController::editWithTags() Attack requirements: The attacker must be authenticated and able to reach the affected MISP endpoints. No user interaction is required.
The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
MISP contained multiple mass assignment vulnerabilities in the handling of collections, tag collections, event delegations, and shadow attributes. Several controller actions accepted user-supplied fields that should have remained server-controlled, including record identifiers and ownership-related fields such as id, org_id, orgc_id, and user_id. An authenticated attacker with access to the affected endpoints could craft requests containing protected fields in order to alter object ownership, redirect an update to another record, overwrite existing event delegation requests, or modify shadow attribute proposals belonging to another organization. This could result in unauthorized modification of MISP objects and, depending on object visibility and sharing configuration, unauthorized access to or transfer of sensitive threat intelligence data. The issue was fixed by explicitly pinning ownership and identity fields to their stored values during edit operations and by removing user-supplied primary keys from create-only save paths. Affected components: * CollectionsController::edit() * EventDelegationsController::delegateEvent() * ShadowAttributesController::edit() * TagCollectionsController::edit()915 * TagCollectionsController::editWithTags() Attack requirements: The attacker must be authenticated and able to reach the affected MISP endpoints. No user interaction is required.
The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key. The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 4.0: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 12 Jun 2026 · Last source change 15 Jun 2026, 18:20 UTC · CWE-639 · Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.