Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- The selected CVSS metric records a network-reachable, unauthenticated path with no user interaction.
- EPSS is 0.46% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE IntelligenceFull vulnerability report · 2026
CVE-2026-48702High confidence
Rekor has an OOM Condition due to Unbounded gzip Decompression in Alpine APK Parsing Logic
sigstore · rekor
Official source article: GitHub GHSA-47Q9-M4WW-924M ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.
7.5HighCVSS 3.1
Patch only the product branches with a verified fix
Fix availability varies by productHigh technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance. Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 1 structured product or package state remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
R
Open reassessment dashboard →Operational reassessment
Published severity in operational context
Published severityHigh→Operational priority:High, unchanged from published severity.unchanged
Compensating controls
- Validate the affected product branch and deploy the verified fixed release.
- Restrict the affected network interface to trusted sources where business-safe.
- Monitor vendor guidance and exploitation sources for a material change.
Verification
- Confirm that the asset runs sigstore rekor and falls inside the recorded affected range.
- Verify the installed build against the product-specific fixed version after deployment.
- Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
- Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
Remediation availability differs by product scope
Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 1 structured product or package state remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
- Debian Security Tracker: 1 affected package state with no published fix
Distribution package intelligence
3 package statesRelease-specific package status
Debian findings are scoped to the named distribution, release and source package. An absent finding does not mean a package is unaffected.
Package result overrides the generic status
BlackTree has verified remediation for at least one product or source, but the relevant distribution still reports no fixed package for 1 affected package state shown here. Treat those rows as affected with no fix until that distribution publishes a fixed version.
Repository candidate not checked
A published vendor fix does not prove that a matching update is enabled and installable on a particular asset. Confirm the local package candidate before scheduling remediation.
| Distribution release | Source package | Vendor state | Fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debian trixietrixie · source | rekor | Affected, no fix publishedDebian currently tracks this release as open. | Not published in this feed | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 6 Oct 2026 |
| Debian forkyforky · source | rekor | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 1.5.2-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 6 Oct 2026 |
| Debian sidsid · source | rekor | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 1.5.2-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 6 Oct 2026 |
Open-source package ranges2 source-attributed ranges
These OSV and GitHub advisory ranges apply only to the named package and ecosystem. A listed fixed version is not a universal product patch or proof that an update is installed.
| Ecosystem and package | Affected range | First fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gogithub.com/sigstore/rekor | SEMVER: introduced 0.3.0; fixed 1.5.2 | 1.5.2 | OSV record ↗aggregator derived · 10 Sep 2026 |
| gogithub.com/sigstore/rekor | >= 0.3.0, < 1.5.2 | 1.5.2 | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 25 Jun 2026 |
Direct vendor intelligence
1 currentAuthoritative vendor CSAF and VEX advisories
Structured product status and remediation from the issuing vendor. Product-state explanations are always visible; large lists can be searched or downloaded.
CVE-2026-48702 · CSAF 2.0 · revision 3 · finalRed Hat Product Securitygithub.com/sigstore/rekor: Rekor: Denial of Service due to unbounded gzip decompression in Alpine APK parsing
The vendor explicitly identifies these products as affected by this CVE.
- multicluster-engine/assisted-service-9-rhel9 as a component of Multicluster Engine for Kubernetes
- rekor as a component of Red Hat Trusted Artifact Signer
- Summary
- A flaw was found in Rekor. The `Package.Unmarshal()` function, which processes Alpine Package Keep (APK) files, decompresses gzip streams without limiting the total decompressed size. A remote attacker can exploit this by crafting a malicious APK file with a high compression ratio, causing the server to consume excessive memory. This leads to a Denial of Service (DoS) through an out-of-memory (OOM) error, and can be triggered via unauthenticated API endpoints.
- Remediation
- For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://images.redhat.com/
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance. Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 1 structured product or package state remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
Fix availability varies by product01
What, why and how
Rekor is a software supply chain transparency log. Starting in version 0.3.0 and prior to version 1.5.2, the `Package.Unmarshal()` function in `pkg/types/alpine/apk.go` decompresses the signature and control gzip members of an APK file into in-memory buffers without bounding the total decompressed size. The existing `max_apk_metadata_size` check (default 1MB) is only applied to individual tar entry header sizes after decompression completes, so it does not prevent a decompression bomb from consuming unbounded heap memory. An attacker can craft a gzip stream that compresses at a ~1000:1 ratio (e.g., 2MB compressed zeros → 2GB decompressed). When submitted as spec.package.content in an Alpine `ProposedEntry`, the server decompresses the full payload into memory during request processing, triggering a fatal Go runtime out-of-memory error or OS OOM-kill that cannot be caught by the server's recover() middleware. This is reachable via two unauthenticated endpoints, `POST /api/v1/log/entries (createLogEntry)` and `POST /api/v1/log/entries/retrieve (searchLogQuery)`. Both invoke `V001Entry.Canonicalize()` → `fetchExternalEntities()` → `apk.Unmarshal(packageData)`, which performs the unbounded decompression. Version 1.5.2 patches the issue. There is no effective workaround. Setting `max_request_body_size` reduces but does not eliminate exposure due to the ~1000:1 compression ratio (a 1MB body limit still allows ~1GB heap allocation). Setting `max_apk_metadata_size` has no effect on this vulnerability since the check is applied after decompression.
What
Rekor is a software supply chain transparency log. Starting in version 0.3.0 and prior to version 1.5.2, the `Package.Unmarshal()` function in `pkg/types/alpine/apk.go` decompresses the signature and control gzip members of an APK file into in-memory buffers without bounding the total decompressed size. The existing `max_apk_metadata_size` check (default 1MB) is only applied to individual tar entry header sizes after decompression completes, so it does not prevent a decompression bomb from consuming unbounded heap memory. An attacker can craft a gzip stream that compresses at a ~1000:1 ratio (e.g., 2MB compressed zeros → 2GB decompressed). When submitted as spec.package.content in an Alpine `ProposedEntry`, the server decompresses the full payload into memory during request processing, triggering a fatal Go runtime out-of-memory error or OS OOM-kill that cannot be caught by the server's recover() middleware. This is reachable via two unauthenticated endpoints, `POST /api/v1/log/entries (createLogEntry)` and `POST /api/v1/log/entries/retrieve (searchLogQuery)`. Both invoke `V001Entry.Canonicalize()` → `fetchExternalEntities()` → `apk.Unmarshal(packageData)`, which performs the unbounded decompression. Version 1.5.2 patches the issue. There is no effective workaround. Setting `max_request_body_size` reduces but does not eliminate exposure due to the ~1000:1 compression ratio (a 1MB body limit still allows ~1GB heap allocation). Setting `max_apk_metadata_size` has no effect on this vulnerability since the check is applied after decompression.
Why
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
How
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
What
Rekor is a software supply chain transparency log. Starting in version 0.3.0 and prior to version 1.5.2, the `Package.Unmarshal()` function in `pkg/types/alpine/apk.go` decompresses the signature and control gzip members of an APK file into in-memory buffers without bounding the total decompressed size. The existing `max_apk_metadata_size` check (default 1MB) is only applied to individual tar entry header sizes after decompression completes, so it does not prevent a decompression bomb from consuming unbounded heap memory. An attacker can craft a gzip stream that compresses at a ~1000:1 ratio (e.g., 2MB compressed zeros → 2GB decompressed). When submitted as spec.package.content in an Alpine `ProposedEntry`, the server decompresses the full payload into memory during request processing, triggering a fatal Go runtime out-of-memory error or OS OOM-kill that cannot be caught by the server's recover() middleware. This is reachable via two unauthenticated endpoints, `POST /api/v1/log/entries (createLogEntry)` and `POST /api/v1/log/entries/retrieve (searchLogQuery)`. Both invoke `V001Entry.Canonicalize()` → `fetchExternalEntities()` → `apk.Unmarshal(packageData)`, which performs the unbounded decompression. Version 1.5.2 patches the issue. There is no effective workaround. Setting `max_request_body_size` reduces but does not eliminate exposure due to the ~1000:1 compression ratio (a 1MB body limit still allows ~1GB heap allocation). Setting `max_apk_metadata_size` has no effect on this vulnerability since the check is applied after decompression.
Why
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
How
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
02
Exploit reality and attack path
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
Observed exploitation No confirmed evidence
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
Public PoC / exploit material None recorded
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
- Likely attack path
- a network path → Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling → cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor
- Attack surface
- Network
- Privileges required
- None: unauthenticated exploitation is possible
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
- Security boundary
- Unchanged: impact remains within the vulnerable component's security authority
- Weakness
?
CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness. - CWE-770 ↗
CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling. The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
- CVSS vector
?
CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity. CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
AVNetworkAttack vector: The vulnerable component can be reached over a network.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.PRNonePrivileges required: The attacker does not need an account or existing privileges.UINoneUser interaction: No action by another user is required.SUnchangedScope: The security impact remains within the vulnerable component's authority.CNoneConfidentiality impact: No direct loss is represented by this metric.INoneIntegrity impact: No direct loss is represented by this metric.AHighAvailability impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.- Post-exploitation / living off the land
- No specific living-off-the-land technique is confirmed in the structured sources. Monitor normal administration tools for activity inconsistent with the affected service's baseline.
03
Patch and workaround
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
- Status
?
Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change. - Fix availability varies by product
- Affected
- Fixed
- cosign-main@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
- cosign-main@src as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
- cosign-main@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
- trivy-main@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
- trivy-main@src as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
- trivy-main@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images
- registry.redhat.io/rhtas/rekor-server-rhel9@sha256:18dce4bc83ee2cb8f32fc4262d303841047bdb6c538cc87fc43d7e8e2d6ef39b_amd64 as a component of Red Hat Trusted Artifact Signer 1.3
- registry.redhat.io/rhtas/rekor-server-rhel9@sha256:b0264e38a58995d26b27042c23c023a410c9632f472c56db85db5a5fef96bb85_amd64 as a component of Red Hat Trusted Artifact Signer 1.4
- Action
- Use the product-specific evidence above. Patch only products with a verified fixed release, and keep every affected or under-investigation state without a matching fix in the remediation queue.
- Workaround
- No verified workaround is recorded. If business-safe, reduce exposure to the affected interface and allow only trusted sources until authoritative guidance is available.
04
Evidence and provenance
Published 13 Aug 2026 · Last source change 13 Aug 2026, 15:16 UTC · CWE-770 · Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
CVE recordCVE.org · 5.2
CVSS sourceCNA
EPSS source FIRST · tracked since 2026-08-14
?
The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2026-57928
Product sourceVendor CSAF · Red Hat Product Security
Remediation sourceVendor CSAF · Red Hat Product Security
CWE sourceCNA
NVD statusNVD awaiting enrichment
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
Material change intelligence
View recent updates ↗What changed after publication
- Affected versionsThe structured affected or fixed version information changed.Red Hat Product Security ↗
- Before
- rekor: >= 0.3.0, < 1.5.2 · Fixed: No fixed version is explicitly recorded in the structured CVE data.
- After
- rekor: >= 0.3.0, < 1.5.2 · Fixed: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://images.redhat.com/
- Remediation statusRemediation status changed from Awaiting fix to Patch available.Red Hat Product Security ↗
- Before
- Awaiting fix
- After
- Patch available
- Affected versionsThe structured affected or fixed version information changed.Red Hat Product Security ↗
- Before
- multicluster-engine/assisted-service-9-rhel9 as a component of Multicluster Engine for Kubernetes; rekor as a component of Red Hat Trusted Artifact Signer · Fixed: cosign-main@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images; cosign-main@src as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images; cosign-main@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images; trivy-main@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images; trivy-main@src as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images; trivy-main@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images; registry.redhat.io/rhtas/rekor-server-rhel9@sha256:b0264e38a58995d26b27042c23c023a410c9632f472c56db85db5a5fef96bb85_amd64 as a component of Red Hat Trusted Artifact Signer 1.4
- After
- multicluster-engine/assisted-service-9-rhel9 as a component of Multicluster Engine for Kubernetes; rekor as a component of Red Hat Trusted Artifact Signer · Fixed: cosign-main@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images; cosign-main@src as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images; cosign-main@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images; trivy-main@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images; trivy-main@src as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images; trivy-main@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images; registry.redhat.io/rhtas/rekor-server-rhel9@sha256:18dce4bc83ee2cb8f32fc4262d303841047bdb6c538cc87fc43d7e8e2d6ef39b_amd64 as a component of Red Hat Trusted Artifact Signer 1.3; registry.redhat.io/rhtas/rekor-server-rhel9@sha256:b0264e38a58995d26b27042c23c023a410c9632f472c56db85db5a5fef96bb85_amd64 as a component of Red Hat Trusted Artifact Signer 1.4
- Affected versionsThe structured affected or fixed version information changed.CNA ↗
- Before
- >= 0.3.0, < 1.5.2 · Fixed: No fixed version is explicitly recorded in the structured CVE data.
- After
- rekor: >= 0.3.0, < 1.5.2 · Fixed: No fixed version is explicitly recorded in the structured CVE data.
CVE published
Fixed release recorded from official guidance
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
- CVE
- Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
- CVSS
- Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
- EPSS
- Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
- CWE
- Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
- CNA
- CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
- CISA ADP
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
- NVD
- National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
- CERT / CSIRT
- A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
- PoC
- Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
- CSAF
- Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
- LoTL
- Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.