FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 has out-of-bounds memory access because it incorrectly parses BGP path attributes with the extended length flag set

FastNetMon Community Edition through 1.2.9 has out-of-bounds memory access because it incorrectly parses BGP path attributes with the extended length flag set. In src/bgp_protocol.hpp, the parse_raw_bgp_attribute() function correctly identifies when extended_length_bit is set and sets length_of_length_field to 2, but then reads only a single byte for the attribute value length (attribute_value_length = value[2] at line 173). Per RFC 4271 Section 4.3, when the Extended Length bit is set, the Attribute Length field is two octets and the value should be read as a 16-bit big-endian integer from value[2] and value[3]. As a result, any attribute longer than 255 bytes has its length silently truncated to the low byte (e.g., 300 bytes = 0x012C is read as 0x2C = 44 bytes). The remaining 256 bytes are then misinterpreted as subsequent attributes, causing cascading parse failures and potential out-of-bounds memory access.

The product parses a formatted message or structure, but it does not handle or incorrectly handles a length field that is inconsistent with the actual length of the associated data.

An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.