Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- A structured source references public exploit or proof-of-concept material.
- EPSS is 0.25% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE Intelligencenezhahq · nezha
Official source article: GitHub GHSA-6X26-5727-RRM9 ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.
Medium technical severity with public exploit material referenced by a structured source; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
These OSV and GitHub advisory ranges apply only to the named package and ecosystem. A listed fixed version is not a universal product patch or proof that an update is installed.
| Ecosystem and package | Affected range | First fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| gogithub.com/naiba/nezha | >= 0.20.0 | Not stated | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 26 Jun 2026 |
| gogithub.com/nezhahq/nezha | >= 0.20.0, < 2.0.10 | 2.0.10 | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 26 Jun 2026 |
Medium technical severity with public exploit material referenced by a structured source; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
Fix not verifiedNezha Monitoring is a self-hostable, lightweight, servers and websites monitoring and O&M tool. From version 0.20.0 to before version 2.0.10, an authenticated Nezha dashboard user can create or update a DDNS profile with provider webhook and configure an arbitrary webhook_url, HTTP method, request body, and headers. When DDNS is triggered for a server that uses that profile, the dashboard process sends the configured request with utils.HttpClient without the SSRF protections used by notification webhooks. This allows a low-privileged authenticated user who controls an owned server/DDNS profile to make the dashboard host issue HTTP requests to loopback or internal network services. The response body is not returned to the attacker in the confirmed path, so this is a blind SSRF / internal state-changing request primitive. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.10.
Nezha Monitoring is a self-hostable, lightweight, servers and websites monitoring and O&M tool. From version 0.20.0 to before version 2.0.10, an authenticated Nezha dashboard user can create or update a DDNS profile with provider webhook and configure an arbitrary webhook_url, HTTP method, request body, and headers. When DDNS is triggered for a server that uses that profile, the dashboard process sends the configured request with utils.HttpClient without the SSRF protections used by notification webhooks. This allows a low-privileged authenticated user who controls an owned server/DDNS profile to make the dashboard host issue HTTP requests to loopback or internal network services. The response body is not returned to the attacker in the confirmed path, so this is a blind SSRF / internal state-changing request primitive. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.10.
The server follows an attacker-influenced destination, allowing requests to systems or services the attacker cannot reach directly.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
Nezha Monitoring is a self-hostable, lightweight, servers and websites monitoring and O&M tool. From version 0.20.0 to before version 2.0.10, an authenticated Nezha dashboard user can create or update a DDNS profile with provider webhook and configure an arbitrary webhook_url, HTTP method, request body, and headers. When DDNS is triggered for a server that uses that profile, the dashboard process sends the configured request with utils.HttpClient without the SSRF protections used by notification webhooks. This allows a low-privileged authenticated user who controls an owned server/DDNS profile to make the dashboard host issue HTTP requests to loopback or internal network services. The response body is not returned to the attacker in the confirmed path, so this is a blind SSRF / internal state-changing request primitive. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.10.
The server follows an attacker-influenced destination, allowing requests to systems or services the attacker cannot reach directly.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
CISA Vulnrichment records proof-of-concept exploitation in its SSVC data. BlackTree has not independently executed or validated exploit material.
CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 12 Jun 2026 · Last source change 15 Jun 2026, 12:58 UTC · CWE-918 · Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.