BlackTreeCVE Intelligence
← Back to the CVE catalogue
Full vulnerability report · 2026
CVE-2026-44894High confidence

Netty's Default QUIC token handler accepts any client-supplied token

netty · netty

Official source article: GitHub GHSA-CMM3-54F8-PX4J ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.

7.5HighCVSS 3.1
Recommended action
Within 7 days

High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.

Fix not verified
R
Operational reassessment

Published severity in operational context

Open reassessment dashboard →
Published severityHighOperational priority:High, unchanged from published severity.unchanged

Evidence used

  • No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
  • The selected CVSS metric records a network-reachable, unauthenticated path with no user interaction.
  • EPSS is 0.19% for the current model date.

Compensating controls

  • Restrict the affected network interface to trusted sources where business-safe.
  • Monitor vendor guidance and exploitation sources for a material change.

Verification

  1. Confirm that the asset runs netty netty and falls inside the recorded affected range.
  2. Recheck the vendor advisory before scheduling a change because no verified fixed version is currently retained.
  3. Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
  4. Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
Mitigation target: Within 30 daysRemediation target: Within 180 days

This automated reassessment organises public evidence. It does not know asset exposure, business impact or control effectiveness and does not replace CVSS or a human risk decision.

Distribution package intelligence

Release-specific package status

Debian, ubuntu findings are scoped to the named distribution, release and source package. An absent finding does not mean a package is unaffected.

5 package states
Repository candidate not checked

A published vendor fix does not prove that a matching update is enabled and installable on a particular asset. Confirm the local package candidate before scheduling remediation.

Distribution releaseSource packageVendor stateFixed versionEvidence
Debian trixietrixie · sourcenettyAffected, no fix publishedDebian currently tracks this release as open.Not published in this feedDebian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 6 Oct 2026
Debian bookwormbookworm · sourcenettyAffected, no fix publishedDebian currently tracks this release as open.Not published in this feedDebian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 6 Oct 2026
Debian forkyforky · sourcenettyAffected, no fix publishedDebian currently tracks this release as open.Not published in this feedDebian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 6 Oct 2026
Debian sidsid · sourcenettyAffected, no fix publishedDebian currently tracks this release as open.Not published in this feedDebian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 6 Oct 2026
Ubuntu 24.04 LTSnoble · esm-appsnettyUnder evaluationCanonical reports that the package might be affected and still needs evaluation or fixing.Not published in this feedCanonical Ubuntu Security ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026
Open-source package ranges2 source-attributed ranges

These OSV and GitHub advisory ranges apply only to the named package and ecosystem. A listed fixed version is not a universal product patch or proof that an update is installed.

Ecosystem and packageAffected rangeFirst fixed versionEvidence
Mavenio.netty:netty-codec-classes-quicECOSYSTEM: introduced 4.2.0.Final; fixed 4.2.15.Final4.2.15.FinalOSV record ↗aggregator derived · 10 Sep 2026
mavenio.netty:netty-codec-classes-quic>= 4.2.0.Final, <= 4.2.14.Final4.2.15.FinalGitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 12 Jun 2026
Optional official sources

National CERT insights
?CERT means Computer Emergency Response Team; CSIRT is the closely related term Computer Security Incident Response Team.

Choose official national sources for this report. Each advisory shows its original language. Your selection is remembered on this device and included in shared links.

Official European source

ENISA European Vulnerability Database

Official EUVD identifiers, advisory evidence and known-exploited context. Missing fields are not treated as evidence of low risk.

1 current
ENISA EUVD identifier

EUVD-2026-36435

No EUVD known-exploited evidence

ENISA has published the identifier mapping but no EUVD description has been stored yet.

EUVD state
Present in the current official mapping
Known exploitation
Not present in the current ENISA EUVD known-exploited dataset. This is not proof of no exploitation.
ENISA score
Not supplied in the stored EUVD record
Advisory evidence
No linked advisory details stored yet
Recommended actionWithin 7 days

High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.

Fix not verified
01

What, why and how

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. NoQuicTokenHandler is the tokenHandler used when the application does not set one. Prior to version 4.2.15.Final, its writeToken() returns false (server will not send Retry — acceptable), but validateToken() unconditionally `return 0`. In QuicheQuicServerCodec.handlePacket(), a non-negative return from validateToken() is interpreted as 'token is valid, ODCID starts at offset 0', causing the server to call quiche_accept as if the client's address had been validated by a Retry round-trip. Per RFC 9000 §8.1, a validated address lifts the 3× anti-amplification send limit. Thus any attacker who includes ANY non-empty token bytes in an Initial packet — with a spoofed victim source IP — causes the Netty server to treat the victim as validated and reflect full-size handshake flights (certificates, etc.) toward it without the 3× cap. The correct 'no token handler' semantics would be to return -1 (invalid) so the normal un-validated path and amplification limit apply. Version 4.2.15.Final patches the issue.

What

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. NoQuicTokenHandler is the tokenHandler used when the application does not set one. Prior to version 4.2.15.Final, its writeToken() returns false (server will not send Retry — acceptable), but validateToken() unconditionally `return 0`. In QuicheQuicServerCodec.handlePacket(), a non-negative return from validateToken() is interpreted as 'token is valid, ODCID starts at offset 0', causing the server to call quiche_accept as if the client's address had been validated by a Retry round-trip. Per RFC 9000 §8.1, a validated address lifts the 3× anti-amplification send limit. Thus any attacker who includes ANY non-empty token bytes in an Initial packet — with a spoofed victim source IP — causes the Netty server to treat the victim as validated and reflect full-size handshake flights (certificates, etc.) toward it without the 3× cap. The correct 'no token handler' semantics would be to return -1 (invalid) so the normal un-validated path and amplification limit apply. Version 4.2.15.Final patches the issue.

Why

The product establishes a communication channel to handle an incoming request that has been initiated by an actor, but it does not properly verify that the request is coming from the expected origin.

How

An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.

What

Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. NoQuicTokenHandler is the tokenHandler used when the application does not set one. Prior to version 4.2.15.Final, its writeToken() returns false (server will not send Retry — acceptable), but validateToken() unconditionally `return 0`. In QuicheQuicServerCodec.handlePacket(), a non-negative return from validateToken() is interpreted as 'token is valid, ODCID starts at offset 0', causing the server to call quiche_accept as if the client's address had been validated by a Retry round-trip. Per RFC 9000 §8.1, a validated address lifts the 3× anti-amplification send limit. Thus any attacker who includes ANY non-empty token bytes in an Initial packet — with a spoofed victim source IP — causes the Netty server to treat the victim as validated and reflect full-size handshake flights (certificates, etc.) toward it without the 3× cap. The correct 'no token handler' semantics would be to return -1 (invalid) so the normal un-validated path and amplification limit apply. Version 4.2.15.Final patches the issue.

Why

The product establishes a communication channel to handle an incoming request that has been initiated by an actor, but it does not properly verify that the request is coming from the expected origin.

How

An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.

02

Exploit reality and attack path

CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.

Observed exploitation
?Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.
No confirmed evidence

No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.

Public PoC / exploit material
?Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.
None recorded

No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.

Likely attack path
a network path → Improper Verification of Source of a Communication Channel → cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor
Attack surface
Network
Privileges required
None: unauthenticated exploitation is possible
User interaction
None
Attack complexity
Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
Security boundary
Unchanged: impact remains within the vulnerable component's security authority
Weakness
?CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness.
CWE-940 ↗

CWE-940: Improper Verification of Source of a Communication Channel. The product establishes a communication channel to handle an incoming request that has been initiated by an actor, but it does not properly verify that the request is coming from the expected origin.

CVSS vector
?CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Common Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.

AVNetworkAttack vector: The vulnerable component can be reached over a network.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.PRNonePrivileges required: The attacker does not need an account or existing privileges.UINoneUser interaction: No action by another user is required.SUnchangedScope: The security impact remains within the vulnerable component's authority.CNoneConfidentiality impact: No direct loss is represented by this metric.IHighIntegrity impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.ANoneAvailability impact: No direct loss is represented by this metric.
Post-exploitation / living off the land
Stolen credentials, tokens and legitimate administration functions may provide continued access without deploying a large custom toolset.
NetworkUnauthenticatedCWE-940
A

Official authority intelligence

Only matched European and national findings are included. Language selectors and unavailable sources are omitted.

BSI · German · WID-SEC-2026-1814Netty: Mehrere Schwachstellen

Ein entfernter, anonymer Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen in Netty ausnutzen, um Sicherheitsvorkehrungen zu umgehen, Daten zu manipulieren, vertrauliche Informationen offenzulegen oder einen Denial-of-Service-Zustand herbeizuführen.

Official advisory ↗
JVN iPedia · Japanese · JVNDB-2026-019799Nettyにおける通信チャネルの送信元の不適切な検証に関する脆弱性

Nettyは、プロトコルサーバーおよびクライアントの開発のためのネットワークアプリケーションフレームワークです。NoQuicTokenHandlerは、アプリケーションがトークンハンドラーを設定しない場合に使用されるtokenHandlerです。バージョン4.2.15.Final以前では、そのwriteToken()はfalseを返し(サーバーはRetryを送信しない—許容される)、validateToken()は無条件に`return 0`を返していました。QuicheQuicServerCodec.handlePacket()では、validateToken()からの0以上の返り値が「トークンは有効で、ODCIDがオフセット0から始まる」と解釈され、サーバーはクライアントのアドレスがRetryラウンドトリップによって検証されたかのようにquiche_acceptを呼び出します。RFC 9000 §8.1によると、検証されたアドレスは3倍のアンチアンプリフィケーション送信制限を解除します。したがって、攻撃者が初期パケットに任意の非空トークンバイトを含めて被害者の送信元IPを偽装し送信すると、Nettyサーバーは被害者を検証済みとみなして3倍の制限なしにフルサイズのハンドシェイクフライト(証明書など)を反射します。正しい「トークンなしハンドラー」の意味は、-1(無効)を返して通常の未検証パスとアンプリフィケーション制限を適用することです。この問題はバージョン4.2.15.Finalで修正されました。

Official advisory ↗
03

Patch and workaround

Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.

Status
?Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change.
Fix not verified
Affected
netty: >= 4.2.0.Final, < 4.2.15.Final
Fixed
No fixed version is explicitly recorded in the structured CVE data.
Action
No verified patch reference is present in the current structured sources. Check the vendor advisory before making a change.
Workaround
No verified workaround is recorded. If business-safe, reduce exposure to the affected interface and allow only trusted sources until authoritative guidance is available.
04

Evidence and provenance

Published 12 Jun 2026 · Last source change 15 Jul 2026, 00:53 UTC · CWE-940 · Improper Verification of Source of a Communication Channel

CVE recordCVE.org · 5.2
CVSS sourceCNA
EPSS source
?The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.
FIRST · tracked since 2026-08-14
European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2026-36435
Product sourceCNA
Remediation sourceCVE/CNA references
CWE sourceCNA
NVD statusNVD modified after enrichment

Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.

Material change intelligence

What changed after publication

View recent updates ↗

No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.

Material fields only · duplicate refreshes suppressed · history retained for the configured operational retention period
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
CVE
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
CVSS
Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
EPSS
Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
CWE
Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
CNA
CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
CISA ADP
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
NVD
National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
CERT / CSIRT
A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
PoC
Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
CSAF
Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
LoTL
Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.
Free version - for non-commercial use only.CVE-2026-44894 · cve.blacktree.nl