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Full vulnerability report · 2026
CVE-2026-42027High confidence

Apache OpenNLP: Arbitrary Class Instantiation via Model Manifest in ExtensionLoader

Apache Software Foundation · Apache OpenNLP

9.8CriticalCVSS 3.1
Recommended action
Patch only the product branches with a verified fix

Critical technical impact with a remotely reachable, unauthenticated path; no CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded. Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 2 structured product or package states remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.

Fix availability varies by product
R
Operational reassessment

Published severity in operational context

Open reassessment dashboard →
Published severityCriticalOperational priority:Critical, unchanged from published severity.unchanged

Evidence used

  • No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
  • The selected CVSS metric records a network-reachable, unauthenticated path with no user interaction.
  • EPSS is 1.27% for the current model date.

Compensating controls

  • Validate the affected product branch and deploy the verified fixed release.
  • Restrict the affected network interface to trusted sources where business-safe.
  • Monitor vendor guidance and exploitation sources for a material change.

Verification

  1. Confirm that the asset runs Apache Software Foundation Apache OpenNLP and falls inside the recorded affected range.
  2. Verify the installed build against the product-specific fixed version after deployment.
  3. Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
  4. Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
Mitigation target: Within 3 daysRemediation target: Within 90 days

This automated reassessment organises public evidence. It does not know asset exposure, business impact or control effectiveness and does not replace CVSS or a human risk decision.

Cross-source reconciliation

Remediation availability differs by product scope

Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 2 structured product or package states remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.

Distribution package intelligence

Release-specific package status

Debian, ubuntu findings are scoped to the named distribution, release and source package. An absent finding does not mean a package is unaffected.

5 package states
Package result overrides the generic status

BlackTree has verified remediation for at least one product or source, but the relevant distribution still reports no fixed package for 2 affected package states shown here. Treat those rows as affected with no fix until that distribution publishes a fixed version.

Repository candidate not checked

A published vendor fix does not prove that a matching update is enabled and installable on a particular asset. Confirm the local package candidate before scheduling remediation.

Distribution releaseSource packageVendor stateFixed versionEvidence
Debian trixietrixie · sourceapache-opennlpAffected, no fix publishedDebian currently tracks this release as open.Not published in this feedDebian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 6 Oct 2026
Debian bookwormbookworm · sourceapache-opennlpAffected, no fix publishedDebian currently tracks this release as open.Not published in this feedDebian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 6 Oct 2026
Debian forkyforky · sourceapache-opennlpVendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release.2.5.9-1Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 6 Oct 2026
Debian sidsid · sourceapache-opennlpVendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release.2.5.9-1Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 6 Oct 2026
Ubuntu 24.04 LTSnoble · standard archiveapache-opennlpUnder evaluationCanonical reports that the package might be affected and still needs evaluation or fixing.Not published in this feedCanonical Ubuntu Security ↗Source updated 6 Oct 2026
Open-source package ranges6 source-attributed ranges

These OSV and GitHub advisory ranges apply only to the named package and ecosystem. A listed fixed version is not a universal product patch or proof that an update is installed.

Ecosystem and packageAffected rangeFirst fixed versionEvidence
Mavenorg.apache.opennlp:opennlp-toolsECOSYSTEM: introduced 2.0.0; fixed 2.5.92.5.9OSV record ↗aggregator derived · 9 Sep 2026
Mavenorg.apache.opennlp:opennlp-toolsECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.0.0-M1; fixed 3.0.0-M33.0.0-M3OSV record ↗aggregator derived · 9 Sep 2026
Mavenorg.apache.opennlp:opennlp-toolsECOSYSTEM: introduced 0; fixed 1.9.51.9.5OSV record ↗aggregator derived · 9 Sep 2026
mavenorg.apache.opennlp:opennlp-tools>= 3.0.0-M1, < 3.0.0-M33.0.0-M3GitHub advisory ↗github reviewed aggregator · 9 Sep 2026
mavenorg.apache.opennlp:opennlp-tools>= 2.0.0, < 2.5.92.5.9GitHub advisory ↗github reviewed aggregator · 9 Sep 2026
mavenorg.apache.opennlp:opennlp-tools< 1.9.51.9.5GitHub advisory ↗github reviewed aggregator · 9 Sep 2026
Direct vendor intelligence

Authoritative vendor CSAF and VEX advisories

Structured product status and remediation from the issuing vendor. Product-state explanations are always visible; large lists can be searched or downloaded.

1 current
CVE-2026-42027 · CSAF 2.0 · revision 3 · finalRed Hat Product SecurityApache OpenNLP: Apache OpenNLP: Arbitrary Class Loading via Model Manifest
2 known affected

The vendor explicitly identifies these products as affected by this CVE.

  • opennlp-tools as a component of Red Hat Fuse 7
  • rhoai/odh-workbench-jupyter-trustyai-cpu-py312-rhel9 as a component of Red Hat OpenShift AI (RHOAI)
Summary
A flaw was found in Apache OpenNLP. An attacker, by providing a specially crafted model archive, can exploit a vulnerability in the ExtensionLoader component. This allows the attacker to force the system to load and initialize any class present on the classpath, executing its static initializer. While not direct remote code execution, this could lead to unintended actions such as network communication or file system operations, depending on the classes available in the environment.
Remediation
For Red Hat OpenShift AI 2.25.11 see the following documentation, which will be updated shortly for this release, for important instructions on how to upgrade your cluster and fully apply this errata update: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_openshift_ai/
Optional official sources

National CERT insights
?CERT means Computer Emergency Response Team; CSIRT is the closely related term Computer Security Incident Response Team.

Choose official national sources for this report. Each advisory shows its original language. Your selection is remembered on this device and included in shared links.

Official European source

ENISA European Vulnerability Database

Official EUVD identifiers, advisory evidence and known-exploited context. Missing fields are not treated as evidence of low risk.

1 current
ENISA EUVD identifier

EUVD-2026-27005

No EUVD known-exploited evidence

Arbitrary Class Instantiation via Model Manifest in Apache OpenNLP ExtensionLoader Versions Affected: before 1.9.5, before 2.5.9, before 3.0.0-M3 Description:  The ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(Class, String) method loads a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invokes its no-arg constructor, with the class name sourced from the manifest.properties entry of a model archive. The existing isAssignableFrom check correctly rejects classes that are not subtypes of the expected extension interface (BaseToolFactory for factory=, ArtifactSerializer for serializer-class-*), but the check runs after Class.forName() has already loaded and initialized the named class. Class.forName() with default initialization semantics executes the target class's static initializer before returning, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive can cause the static initializer of any class on the classpath to run during model loading, regardless of whether that class passes the subsequent type check. Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer (for example, JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, or filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not a drop-in remote code execution; however, the attack surface grows as third-party model distribution becomes more common (community model repositories, Hugging Face-style sharing), where users routinely load model files from origins they do not control. A secondary, narrower vector affects deployments that ship legitimate BaseToolFactory or ArtifactSerializer subclasses with side-effecting no-arg constructors: a malicious manifest can name such a class and force its constructor to run during model load. Mitigation:  * 2.x users should upgrade to 2.5.9. * 3.x users should upgrade to 3.0.0-M3. Note: The fix introduces a package-prefix allowlist that is consulted before Class.forName() is invoked, so the static initializer of a disallowed class is never executed. Classes under the opennlp. prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing factories or serializers outside opennlp.* must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure that all model files are sourced from trusted origins and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors, particularly any that perform JNDI lookups, network requests, or filesystem operations during class initialization.

EUVD state
Present in the current official mapping
Known exploitation
Not present in the current ENISA EUVD known-exploited dataset. This is not proof of no exploitation.
ENISA score
9.8 · CVSS 3.1
Advisory evidence
No linked advisory details stored yet
Recommended actionPatch only the product branches with a verified fix

Critical technical impact with a remotely reachable, unauthenticated path; no CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded. Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 2 structured product or package states remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.

Fix availability varies by product
01

What, why and how

Arbitrary Class Instantiation via Model Manifest in Apache OpenNLP ExtensionLoader Versions Affected: before 1.9.5, before 2.5.9, before 3.0.0-M3 Description:  The ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(Class, String) method loads a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invokes its no-arg constructor, with the class name sourced from the manifest.properties entry of a model archive. The existing isAssignableFrom check correctly rejects classes that are not subtypes of the expected extension interface (BaseToolFactory for factory=, ArtifactSerializer for serializer-class-*), but the check runs after Class.forName() has already loaded and initialized the named class. Class.forName() with default initialization semantics executes the target class's static initializer before returning, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive can cause the static initializer of any class on the classpath to run during model loading, regardless of whether that class passes the subsequent type check. Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer (for example, JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, or filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not a drop-in remote code execution; however, the attack surface grows as third-party model distribution becomes more common (community model repositories, Hugging Face-style sharing), where users routinely load model files from origins they do not control. A secondary, narrower vector affects deployments that ship legitimate BaseToolFactory or ArtifactSerializer subclasses with side-effecting no-arg constructors: a malicious manifest can name such a class and force its constructor to run during model load. Mitigation:  * 2.x users should upgrade to 2.5.9. * 3.x users should upgrade to 3.0.0-M3. Note: The fix introduces a package-prefix allowlist that is consulted before Class.forName() is invoked, so the static initializer of a disallowed class is never executed. Classes under the opennlp. prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing factories or serializers outside opennlp.* must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure that all model files are sourced from trusted origins and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors, particularly any that perform JNDI lookups, network requests, or filesystem operations during class initialization.

What

Arbitrary Class Instantiation via Model Manifest in Apache OpenNLP ExtensionLoader Versions Affected: before 1.9.5, before 2.5.9, before 3.0.0-M3 Description:  The ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(Class, String) method loads a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invokes its no-arg constructor, with the class name sourced from the manifest.properties entry of a model archive. The existing isAssignableFrom check correctly rejects classes that are not subtypes of the expected extension interface (BaseToolFactory for factory=, ArtifactSerializer for serializer-class-*), but the check runs after Class.forName() has already loaded and initialized the named class. Class.forName() with default initialization semantics executes the target class's static initializer before returning, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive can cause the static initializer of any class on the classpath to run during model loading, regardless of whether that class passes the subsequent type check. Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer (for example, JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, or filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not a drop-in remote code execution; however, the attack surface grows as third-party model distribution becomes more common (community model repositories, Hugging Face-style sharing), where users routinely load model files from origins they do not control. A secondary, narrower vector affects deployments that ship legitimate BaseToolFactory or ArtifactSerializer subclasses with side-effecting no-arg constructors: a malicious manifest can name such a class and force its constructor to run during model load. Mitigation:  * 2.x users should upgrade to 2.5.9. * 3.x users should upgrade to 3.0.0-M3. Note: The fix introduces a package-prefix allowlist that is consulted before Class.forName() is invoked, so the static initializer of a disallowed class is never executed. Classes under the opennlp. prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing factories or serializers outside opennlp.* must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure that all model files are sourced from trusted origins and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors, particularly any that perform JNDI lookups, network requests, or filesystem operations during class initialization.

Why

The product uses external input with reflection to select which classes or code to use, but it does not sufficiently prevent the input from selecting improper classes or code.

How

An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may execute code or commands in the affected security context.

What

Arbitrary Class Instantiation via Model Manifest in Apache OpenNLP ExtensionLoader Versions Affected: before 1.9.5, before 2.5.9, before 3.0.0-M3 Description:  The ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(Class, String) method loads a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invokes its no-arg constructor, with the class name sourced from the manifest.properties entry of a model archive. The existing isAssignableFrom check correctly rejects classes that are not subtypes of the expected extension interface (BaseToolFactory for factory=, ArtifactSerializer for serializer-class-*), but the check runs after Class.forName() has already loaded and initialized the named class. Class.forName() with default initialization semantics executes the target class's static initializer before returning, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive can cause the static initializer of any class on the classpath to run during model loading, regardless of whether that class passes the subsequent type check. Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer (for example, JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, or filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not a drop-in remote code execution; however, the attack surface grows as third-party model distribution becomes more common (community model repositories, Hugging Face-style sharing), where users routinely load model files from origins they do not control. A secondary, narrower vector affects deployments that ship legitimate BaseToolFactory or ArtifactSerializer subclasses with side-effecting no-arg constructors: a malicious manifest can name such a class and force its constructor to run during model load. Mitigation:  * 2.x users should upgrade to 2.5.9. * 3.x users should upgrade to 3.0.0-M3. Note: The fix introduces a package-prefix allowlist that is consulted before Class.forName() is invoked, so the static initializer of a disallowed class is never executed. Classes under the opennlp. prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing factories or serializers outside opennlp.* must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure that all model files are sourced from trusted origins and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors, particularly any that perform JNDI lookups, network requests, or filesystem operations during class initialization.

Why

The product uses external input with reflection to select which classes or code to use, but it does not sufficiently prevent the input from selecting improper classes or code.

How

An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may execute code or commands in the affected security context.

02

Exploit reality and attack path

CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.

Observed exploitation
?Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.
No confirmed evidence

No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.

Public PoC / exploit material
?Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.
None recorded

No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.

Likely attack path
a network path → Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection') → execute code or commands in the affected security context
Attack surface
Network
Privileges required
None: unauthenticated exploitation is possible
User interaction
None
Attack complexity
Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
Security boundary
Unchanged: impact remains within the vulnerable component's security authority
Weakness
?CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness.
CWE-470 ↗

CWE-470: Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection'). The product uses external input with reflection to select which classes or code to use, but it does not sufficiently prevent the input from selecting improper classes or code.

CVSS vector
?CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Common Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.

AVNetworkAttack vector: The vulnerable component can be reached over a network.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.PRNonePrivileges required: The attacker does not need an account or existing privileges.UINoneUser interaction: No action by another user is required.SUnchangedScope: The security impact remains within the vulnerable component's authority.CHighConfidentiality impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.IHighIntegrity impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.AHighAvailability impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.
Post-exploitation / living off the land
After compromise, an attacker may use built-in shells, scripting engines, scheduled tasks and native network utilities for discovery, persistence or movement. This is a plausible LoTL path, not evidence that it has occurred for every attack.
NetworkUnauthenticatedRemote code executionCWE-470
A

Official authority intelligence

Only matched European and national findings are included. Language selectors and unavailable sources are omitted.

ENISA EUVD · EUVD-2026-27005Official EUVD mapping

Arbitrary Class Instantiation via Model Manifest in Apache OpenNLP ExtensionLoader Versions Affected: before 1.9.5, before 2.5.9, before 3.0.0-M3 Description:  The ExtensionLoader.instantiateExtension(Class, String) method loads a class by its fully-qualified name via Class.forName() and invokes its no-arg constructor, with the class name sourced from the manifest.properties entry of a model archive. The existing isAssignableFrom check correctly rejects classes that are not subtypes of the expected extension interface (BaseToolFactory for factory=, ArtifactSerializer for serializer-class-*), but the check runs after Class.forName() has already loaded and initialized the named class. Class.forName() with default initialization semantics executes the target class's static initializer before returning, so an attacker who can supply a crafted model archive can cause the static initializer of any class on the classpath to run during model loading, regardless of whether that class passes the subsequent type check. Exploitation requires a class with attacker-useful side effects in its static initializer (for example, JNDI lookup, outbound network I/O, or filesystem access) to be present on the classpath, so this is not a drop-in remote code execution; however, the attack surface grows as third-party model distribution becomes more common (community model repositories, Hugging Face-style sharing), where users routinely load model files from origins they do not control. A secondary, narrower vector affects deployments that ship legitimate BaseToolFactory or ArtifactSerializer subclasses with side-effecting no-arg constructors: a malicious manifest can name such a class and force its constructor to run during model load. Mitigation:  * 2.x users should upgrade to 2.5.9. * 3.x users should upgrade to 3.0.0-M3. Note: The fix introduces a package-prefix allowlist that is consulted before Class.forName() is invoked, so the static initializer of a disallowed class is never executed. Classes under the opennlp. prefix remain permitted by default. Deployments that load models referencing factories or serializers outside opennlp.* must opt those packages in, either programmatically via ExtensionLoader.registerAllowedPackage(String) before the first model load, or by setting the OPENNLP_EXT_ALLOWED_PACKAGES system property to a comma-separated list of allowed package prefixes. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should ensure that all model files are sourced from trusted origins and should audit their classpath for classes with side-effecting static initializers or constructors, particularly any that perform JNDI lookups, network requests, or filesystem operations during class initialization.

Official EUVD record ↗
Cyber Security Agency of Singapore · English · CSA-SB-20260506Security Bulletin 06 May 2026

The Cyber Security Agency of Singapore included this CVE in its official Security Bulletin 06 May 2026, published on 6 May 2026. Open the linked bulletin for the product, severity and reference information published in that issue.

Official advisory ↗
CERT-FR · French · CERTFR-2026-AVI-1206Multiples vulnérabilités dans les produits IBM

d?id=CVE-2026-41846 Référence CVE CVE-2026-41848 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-41848 Référence CVE CVE-2026-41850 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-41850 Référence CVE CVE-2026-41851 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-41851 Référence CVE CVE-2026-41852 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-41852 Référence CVE CVE-2026-41853 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-41853 Référence CVE CVE-2026-41854 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-41854 Référence CVE CVE-2026-41907 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-41907 Référence CVE CVE-2026-41988 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-41988 Référence CVE CVE-2026-42027 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-42027 Référence CVE CVE-2026-42033 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-42033 Référence CVE CVE-2026-42034 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-42034 Référence CVE CVE-2026-42035 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-42035 Référence CVE CVE-2026-42036 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-42036 Référence CVE CVE-2026-42037 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-42037 Référence CVE CVE-2026-42038 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-42038 Référence CVE CVE-2026-42039 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-42039 Référence CVE CVE-2026-42040 https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=

Official advisory ↗
JVN iPedia · Japanese · JVNDB-2026-014662Apache Software FoundationのApache OpenNLPにおけるクラスまたはコードを選択する外部から制御された入力の使用に関する脆弱性

Apache OpenNLP ExtensionLoaderのモデルマニフェストを介した任意のクラスインスタンス化の脆弱性により、悪意のあるモデルアーカイブがクラスパス上の任意のクラスのstatic初期化子を実行させる可能性があります。この脆弱性は、期待される拡張インターフェースのタイプチェックがクラスの読み込みと初期化の後に行われるために発生します。攻撃により、JNDIルックアップや外部ネットワークアクセスなどの副作用を伴う初期化子が実行され、悪用される恐れがあります。影響を受けるバージョンには2.5.9未満および3.0.0-M3未満が含まれます。対策としては、影響を受けるバージョンからそれぞれ2.5.9および3.0.0-M3へのアップグレードを推奨するとともに、信頼できる起源からのモデルのみを使用し、クラスパスに副作用を持つクラスが存在しないかを監査することが重要です。修正では、クラス読み込み前にパッケージの許可リストをチェックし、許可されていないクラスの初期化を防ぐ仕組みが導入されています。

Official advisory ↗
03

Patch and workaround

Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.

Status
?Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change.
Fix availability varies by product
Affected
Fixed
Action
Use the product-specific evidence above. Patch only products with a verified fixed release, and keep every affected or under-investigation state without a matching fix in the remediation queue.
Workaround
No verified workaround is recorded. If business-safe, reduce exposure to the affected interface and allow only trusted sources until authoritative guidance is available.
04

Evidence and provenance

Published 4 May 2026 · Last source change 9 Sept 2026, 12:04 UTC · CWE-470 · Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection')

CVE recordCVE.org · 5.2
CVSS sourceCISA ADP
EPSS source
?The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.
FIRST · tracked since 2026-08-14
European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2026-27005
Product sourceVendor CSAF · Red Hat Product Security
Remediation sourceVendor CSAF · Red Hat Product Security
CWE sourceCNA
NVD statusNVD modified after enrichment

Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.

Material change intelligence

What changed after publication

View recent updates ↗
  1. Vendor guidanceAuthoritative vendor guidance changed: added remediation: lists.apache.org/ltlo4powjfc0w2w2yyl1o5tc7q1gcb2y.
    Before
    vendor advisory: lists.apache.org/ltlo4powjfc0w2w2yyl1o5tc7q1gcb2y
    After
    remediation: lists.apache.org/ltlo4powjfc0w2w2yyl1o5tc7q1gcb2y · vendor advisory: lists.apache.org/ltlo4powjfc0w2w2yyl1o5tc7q1gcb2y
    security@apache.org ↗
  2. Affected versionsThe structured affected or fixed version information changed.
    Before
    Apache OpenNLP: 2.0 < 2.5.9, 3.0.0-M1 < 3.0.0-M3, < 1.9.5 · Fixed: No fixed version is explicitly recorded in the structured CVE data.
    After
    Apache OpenNLP: 2.0 < 2.5.9, 3.0.0-M1 < 3.0.0-M3, < 1.9.5 · Fixed: RHSA-2026:65126: Red Hat OpenShift AI 2.25
    CNA ↗
  3. Remediation statusRemediation status changed from Awaiting fix to Patch available.
    Before
    Awaiting fix
    After
    Patch available
    security@apache.org ↗
  4. Vendor guidanceAuthoritative vendor guidance changed: removed vendor advisory: access.redhat.com/RHSA-2026:65126.
    Before
    vendor advisory: access.redhat.com/RHSA-2026:65126 · vendor advisory: lists.apache.org/ltlo4powjfc0w2w2yyl1o5tc7q1gcb2y
    After
    vendor advisory: lists.apache.org/ltlo4powjfc0w2w2yyl1o5tc7q1gcb2y
    security@apache.org ↗
  5. Vendor guidanceAuthoritative vendor guidance changed: added vendor advisory: access.redhat.com/RHSA-2026:65126.
    Before
    vendor advisory: lists.apache.org/ltlo4powjfc0w2w2yyl1o5tc7q1gcb2y
    After
    vendor advisory: access.redhat.com/RHSA-2026:65126 · vendor advisory: lists.apache.org/ltlo4powjfc0w2w2yyl1o5tc7q1gcb2y
    security@apache.org ↗
  6. Affected versionsThe structured affected or fixed version information changed.
    Before
    2.0 < 2.5.9; 3.0.0-M1 < 3.0.0-M3; < 1.9.5 · Fixed: No fixed version is explicitly recorded in the structured CVE data.
    After
    Apache OpenNLP: 2.0 < 2.5.9, 3.0.0-M1 < 3.0.0-M3, < 1.9.5 · Fixed: No fixed version is explicitly recorded in the structured CVE data.
    CNA ↗
Material fields only · duplicate refreshes suppressed · history retained for the configured operational retention period
CVE published
Fixed release or patch reference recorded
ENISA EUVD · EUVD-2026-27005↗Vendor CSAF · Red Hat Product Security↗CVE authority or vendor reference↗Official CVE record (CNA and ADP data)↗NVD record↗
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
CVE
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
CVSS
Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
EPSS
Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
CWE
Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
CNA
CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
CISA ADP
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
NVD
National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
CERT / CSIRT
A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
PoC
Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
CSAF
Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
LoTL
Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.
Free version - for non-commercial use only.CVE-2026-42027 · cve.blacktree.nl