Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- The selected CVSS metric records a network-reachable, unauthenticated path with no user interaction.
- EPSS is 0.43% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE Intelligenceoauth2-proxy · oauth2-proxy
Official source article: GitHub GHSA-PXQ7-H93F-9JRG ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
These OSV and GitHub advisory ranges apply only to the named package and ecosystem. A listed fixed version is not a universal product patch or proof that an update is installed.
| Ecosystem and package | Affected range | First fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| gogithub.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 | >= 7.5.0, < 7.15.2 | 7.15.2 | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 24 Apr 2026 |
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
Fix not verifiedOAuth2 Proxy is a reverse proxy that provides authentication using OAuth2 providers. Versions 7.5.0 through 7.15.1 have a configuration-dependent authentication bypass. Deployments are affected when all of the following are true: Use of `skip_auth_routes` or the legacy `skip_auth_regex`; use of patterns that can be widened by attacker-controlled suffixes, such as `^/foo/.*/bar$` causing potential exposure of `/foo/secret`; and protected upstream applications that interpret `#` as a fragment delimiter or otherwise route the request to the protected base path. In deployments that rely on these settings, an unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted request containing a number sign in the path, including the browser-safe encoded form `%23`, so that OAuth2 Proxy matches a public allowlist rule while the backend serves a protected resource. Deployments that do not use these skip-auth options, or that only allow exact public paths with tightly scoped method and path rules, are not affected. A fix has been implemented in version 7.15.2 to normalize request paths more conservatively before skip-auth matching so fragment content does not influence allowlist decisions. Users who cannot upgrade immediately can reduce exposure by tightening or removing `skip_auth_routes` and `skip_auth_regex` rules, especially patterns that use broad wildcards across path segments. Recommended mitigations include replacing broad rules with exact, anchored public paths and explicit HTTP methods; rejecting requests whose path contains `%23` or `#` at the ingress, load balancer, or WAF level; and/or avoiding placing sensitive application paths behind broad `skip_auth_routes` rules.
OAuth2 Proxy is a reverse proxy that provides authentication using OAuth2 providers. Versions 7.5.0 through 7.15.1 have a configuration-dependent authentication bypass. Deployments are affected when all of the following are true: Use of `skip_auth_routes` or the legacy `skip_auth_regex`; use of patterns that can be widened by attacker-controlled suffixes, such as `^/foo/.*/bar$` causing potential exposure of `/foo/secret`; and protected upstream applications that interpret `#` as a fragment delimiter or otherwise route the request to the protected base path. In deployments that rely on these settings, an unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted request containing a number sign in the path, including the browser-safe encoded form `%23`, so that OAuth2 Proxy matches a public allowlist rule while the backend serves a protected resource. Deployments that do not use these skip-auth options, or that only allow exact public paths with tightly scoped method and path rules, are not affected. A fix has been implemented in version 7.15.2 to normalize request paths more conservatively before skip-auth matching so fragment content does not influence allowlist decisions. Users who cannot upgrade immediately can reduce exposure by tightening or removing `skip_auth_routes` and `skip_auth_regex` rules, especially patterns that use broad wildcards across path segments. Recommended mitigations include replacing broad rules with exact, anchored public paths and explicit HTTP methods; rejecting requests whose path contains `%23` or `#` at the ingress, load balancer, or WAF level; and/or avoiding placing sensitive application paths behind broad `skip_auth_routes` rules.
The product requires authentication, but the product has an alternate path or channel that does not require authentication.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may bypass an access boundary or take over an account.
OAuth2 Proxy is a reverse proxy that provides authentication using OAuth2 providers. Versions 7.5.0 through 7.15.1 have a configuration-dependent authentication bypass. Deployments are affected when all of the following are true: Use of `skip_auth_routes` or the legacy `skip_auth_regex`; use of patterns that can be widened by attacker-controlled suffixes, such as `^/foo/.*/bar$` causing potential exposure of `/foo/secret`; and protected upstream applications that interpret `#` as a fragment delimiter or otherwise route the request to the protected base path. In deployments that rely on these settings, an unauthenticated attacker can send a crafted request containing a number sign in the path, including the browser-safe encoded form `%23`, so that OAuth2 Proxy matches a public allowlist rule while the backend serves a protected resource. Deployments that do not use these skip-auth options, or that only allow exact public paths with tightly scoped method and path rules, are not affected. A fix has been implemented in version 7.15.2 to normalize request paths more conservatively before skip-auth matching so fragment content does not influence allowlist decisions. Users who cannot upgrade immediately can reduce exposure by tightening or removing `skip_auth_routes` and `skip_auth_regex` rules, especially patterns that use broad wildcards across path segments. Recommended mitigations include replacing broad rules with exact, anchored public paths and explicit HTTP methods; rejecting requests whose path contains `%23` or `#` at the ingress, load balancer, or WAF level; and/or avoiding placing sensitive application paths behind broad `skip_auth_routes` rules.
The product requires authentication, but the product has an alternate path or channel that does not require authentication.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may bypass an access boundary or take over an account.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
CWE-288: Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel. The product requires authentication, but the product has an alternate path or channel that does not require authentication.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 21 Apr 2026 · Last source change 22 Apr 2026, 13:13 UTC · CWE-288 · Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.