Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- A structured source references public exploit or proof-of-concept material.
- EPSS is 0.38% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE Intelligencepinchtab · pinchtab
Official source article: GitHub GHSA-MRQC-3276-74F8 ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.
Medium technical severity with public exploit material referenced by a structured source; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
These OSV and GitHub advisory ranges apply only to the named package and ecosystem. A listed fixed version is not a universal product patch or proof that an update is installed.
| Ecosystem and package | Affected range | First fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| gogithub.com/pinchtab/pinchtab | >= 0.7.8, < 0.8.4 | 0.8.4 | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 27 Mar 2026 |
Medium technical severity with public exploit material referenced by a structured source; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
Mitigation availablePinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.7.8` through `v0.8.3` accepted the API token from a `token` URL query parameter in addition to the `Authorization` header. When a valid API credential is sent in the URL, it can be exposed through request URIs recorded by intermediaries or client-side tooling, such as reverse proxy access logs, browser history, shell history, clipboard history, and tracing systems that capture full URLs. This issue is an unsafe credential transport pattern rather than a direct authentication bypass. It only affects deployments where a token is configured and a client actually uses the query-parameter form. PinchTab's security guidance already recommended `Authorization: Bearer <token>`, but `v0.8.3` still accepted `?token=` and included first-party flows that generated and consumed URLs containing the token. This was addressed in v0.8.4 by removing query-string token authentication and requiring safer header- or session-based authentication flows.
PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.7.8` through `v0.8.3` accepted the API token from a `token` URL query parameter in addition to the `Authorization` header. When a valid API credential is sent in the URL, it can be exposed through request URIs recorded by intermediaries or client-side tooling, such as reverse proxy access logs, browser history, shell history, clipboard history, and tracing systems that capture full URLs. This issue is an unsafe credential transport pattern rather than a direct authentication bypass. It only affects deployments where a token is configured and a client actually uses the query-parameter form. PinchTab's security guidance already recommended `Authorization: Bearer <token>`, but `v0.8.3` still accepted `?token=` and included first-party flows that generated and consumed URLs containing the token. This was addressed in v0.8.4 by removing query-string token authentication and requiring safer header- or session-based authentication flows.
The web application uses an HTTP method to process a request, but the request includes sensitive information in the query string.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication after a user interaction. If successful, the issue may bypass an access boundary or take over an account.
PinchTab is a standalone HTTP server that gives AI agents direct control over a Chrome browser. PinchTab `v0.7.8` through `v0.8.3` accepted the API token from a `token` URL query parameter in addition to the `Authorization` header. When a valid API credential is sent in the URL, it can be exposed through request URIs recorded by intermediaries or client-side tooling, such as reverse proxy access logs, browser history, shell history, clipboard history, and tracing systems that capture full URLs. This issue is an unsafe credential transport pattern rather than a direct authentication bypass. It only affects deployments where a token is configured and a client actually uses the query-parameter form. PinchTab's security guidance already recommended `Authorization: Bearer <token>`, but `v0.8.3` still accepted `?token=` and included first-party flows that generated and consumed URLs containing the token. This was addressed in v0.8.4 by removing query-string token authentication and requiring safer header- or session-based authentication flows.
The web application uses an HTTP method to process a request, but the request includes sensitive information in the query string.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication after a user interaction. If successful, the issue may bypass an access boundary or take over an account.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
A structured CVE source labels at least one public reference as exploit material. BlackTree has not independently validated that it is safe, reliable or weaponised.
CWE-598: Use of HTTP Request With Sensitive Query String. The web application uses an HTTP method to process a request, but the request includes sensitive information in the query string.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 26 Mar 2026 · Last source change 30 Mar 2026, 14:54 UTC · CWE-598 · Use of HTTP Request With Sensitive Query String
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.