Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- A structured source references public exploit or proof-of-concept material.
- EPSS is 0.59% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE Intelligenceactualbudget · actual
Official source article: GitHub GHSA-PRP4-2F49-FCGP ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.
High technical severity with public exploit material referenced by a structured source; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
These OSV and GitHub advisory ranges apply only to the named package and ecosystem. A listed fixed version is not a universal product patch or proof that an update is installed.
| Ecosystem and package | Affected range | First fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm@actual-app/sync-server | < 26.4.0 | 26.4.0 | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 27 Apr 2026 |
High technical severity with public exploit material referenced by a structured source; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
Mitigation availableActual is a local-first personal finance tool. Prior to version 26.4.0, any authenticated user (including `BASIC` role) can escalate to `ADMIN` on servers migrated from password authentication to OpenID Connect. Three weaknesses combine: `POST /account/change-password` has no authorization check, allowing any session to overwrite the password hash; the inactive password `auth` row is never removed on migration; and the login endpoint accepts a client-supplied `loginMethod` that bypasses the server's active auth configuration. Together these allow an attacker to set a known password and authenticate as the anonymous admin account created during the multiuser migration. The three weaknesses form a single, sequential exploit chain — none produces privilege escalation on its own. Missing authorization on POST /change-password allows overwriting a password hash, but only matters if there is an orphaned row to target. Orphaned password row persisting after migration provides the target row, but is harmless without the ability to authenticate using it. Client-controlled loginMethod: "password" allows forcing password-based auth, but is useless without a known hash established by step 1. All three must be chained in sequence to achieve the impact. No single weakness independently results in privilege escalation. The single root cause is the missing authorization check on /change-password; the other two are preconditions that make it exploitable. Version 26.4.0 contains a fix.
Actual is a local-first personal finance tool. Prior to version 26.4.0, any authenticated user (including `BASIC` role) can escalate to `ADMIN` on servers migrated from password authentication to OpenID Connect. Three weaknesses combine: `POST /account/change-password` has no authorization check, allowing any session to overwrite the password hash; the inactive password `auth` row is never removed on migration; and the login endpoint accepts a client-supplied `loginMethod` that bypasses the server's active auth configuration. Together these allow an attacker to set a known password and authenticate as the anonymous admin account created during the multiuser migration. The three weaknesses form a single, sequential exploit chain — none produces privilege escalation on its own. Missing authorization on POST /change-password allows overwriting a password hash, but only matters if there is an orphaned row to target. Orphaned password row persisting after migration provides the target row, but is harmless without the ability to authenticate using it. Client-controlled loginMethod: "password" allows forcing password-based auth, but is useless without a known hash established by step 1. All three must be chained in sequence to achieve the impact. No single weakness independently results in privilege escalation. The single root cause is the missing authorization check on /change-password; the other two are preconditions that make it exploitable. Version 26.4.0 contains a fix.
The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may gain additional privileges.
Actual is a local-first personal finance tool. Prior to version 26.4.0, any authenticated user (including `BASIC` role) can escalate to `ADMIN` on servers migrated from password authentication to OpenID Connect. Three weaknesses combine: `POST /account/change-password` has no authorization check, allowing any session to overwrite the password hash; the inactive password `auth` row is never removed on migration; and the login endpoint accepts a client-supplied `loginMethod` that bypasses the server's active auth configuration. Together these allow an attacker to set a known password and authenticate as the anonymous admin account created during the multiuser migration. The three weaknesses form a single, sequential exploit chain — none produces privilege escalation on its own. Missing authorization on POST /change-password allows overwriting a password hash, but only matters if there is an orphaned row to target. Orphaned password row persisting after migration provides the target row, but is harmless without the ability to authenticate using it. Client-controlled loginMethod: "password" allows forcing password-based auth, but is useless without a known hash established by step 1. All three must be chained in sequence to achieve the impact. No single weakness independently results in privilege escalation. The single root cause is the missing authorization check on /change-password; the other two are preconditions that make it exploitable. Version 26.4.0 contains a fix.
The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may gain additional privileges.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
A structured CVE source labels at least one public reference as exploit material. BlackTree has not independently validated that it is safe, reliable or weaponised.
CWE-284: Improper Access Control. The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 24 Apr 2026 · Last source change 25 Apr 2026, 01:44 UTC · CWE-284 · Improper Access Control
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.