BlackTreeCVE Intelligencez-libs · Zen-C
Medium technical severity with public exploit material referenced by a structured source; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
Medium technical severity with public exploit material referenced by a structured source; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
Patch availableZen C is a systems programming language that compiles to human-readable GNU C/C11. Prior to version 0.4.2, a command injection vulnerability (CWE-78) in the Zen C compiler allows local attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands by providing a specially crafted output filename via the `-o` command-line argument. The vulnerability existed in the `main` application logic (specifically in `src/main.c`), where the compiler constructed a shell command string to invoke the backend C compiler. This command string was built by concatenating various arguments, including the user-controlled output filename, and was subsequently executed using the `system()` function. Because `system()` invokes a shell to parse and execute the command, shell metacharacters within the output filename were interpreted by the shell, leading to arbitrary command execution. An attacker who can influence the command-line arguments passed to the `zc` compiler (like through a build script or a CI/CD pipeline configuration) can execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the user running the compiler. The vulnerability has been fixed in version 0.4.2 by removing `system()` calls, implementing `ArgList`, and internal argument handling. Users are advised to update to Zen C version v0.4.2 or later.
Zen C is a systems programming language that compiles to human-readable GNU C/C11. Prior to version 0.4.2, a command injection vulnerability (CWE-78) in the Zen C compiler allows local attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands by providing a specially crafted output filename via the `-o` command-line argument. The vulnerability existed in the `main` application logic (specifically in `src/main.c`), where the compiler constructed a shell command string to invoke the backend C compiler. This command string was built by concatenating various arguments, including the user-controlled output filename, and was subsequently executed using the `system()` function. Because `system()` invokes a shell to parse and execute the command, shell metacharacters within the output filename were interpreted by the shell, leading to arbitrary command execution. An attacker who can influence the command-line arguments passed to the `zc` compiler (like through a build script or a CI/CD pipeline configuration) can execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the user running the compiler. The vulnerability has been fixed in version 0.4.2 by removing `system()` calls, implementing `ArgList`, and internal argument handling. Users are advised to update to Zen C version v0.4.2 or later.
Untrusted input is incorporated into an operating-system command without safe parameter handling.
An attacker operating through local access may attempt exploitation without authentication after a user interaction. If successful, the issue may execute code or commands in the affected security context.
Zen C is a systems programming language that compiles to human-readable GNU C/C11. Prior to version 0.4.2, a command injection vulnerability (CWE-78) in the Zen C compiler allows local attackers to execute arbitrary shell commands by providing a specially crafted output filename via the `-o` command-line argument. The vulnerability existed in the `main` application logic (specifically in `src/main.c`), where the compiler constructed a shell command string to invoke the backend C compiler. This command string was built by concatenating various arguments, including the user-controlled output filename, and was subsequently executed using the `system()` function. Because `system()` invokes a shell to parse and execute the command, shell metacharacters within the output filename were interpreted by the shell, leading to arbitrary command execution. An attacker who can influence the command-line arguments passed to the `zc` compiler (like through a build script or a CI/CD pipeline configuration) can execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the user running the compiler. The vulnerability has been fixed in version 0.4.2 by removing `system()` calls, implementing `ArgList`, and internal argument handling. Users are advised to update to Zen C version v0.4.2 or later.
Untrusted input is incorporated into an operating-system command without safe parameter handling.
An attacker operating through local access may attempt exploitation without authentication after a user interaction. If successful, the issue may execute code or commands in the affected security context.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
A structured CVE source labels at least one public reference as exploit material. BlackTree has not independently validated that it is safe, reliable or weaponised.
CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection'). The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:LCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 26 Feb 2026 · Last source change 2 Mar 2026, 20:48 UTC · CWE-78 · Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.