Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- The selected CVSS metric records a network-reachable, unauthenticated path with no user interaction.
- EPSS is 0.49% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE IntelligenceFull vulnerability report · 2026
CVE-2026-2673High confidence
OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may choose unexpected key agreement group
OpenSSL · OpenSSL
6.5MediumCVSS 3.1
Patch only the product branches with a verified fix
Fix availability varies by productMedium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority. Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 1 structured product or package state remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
R
Open reassessment dashboard →Operational reassessment
Published severity in operational context
Published severityMedium→Operational priority:Medium, unchanged from published severity.unchanged
Compensating controls
- Validate the affected product branch and deploy the verified fixed release.
- Restrict the affected network interface to trusted sources where business-safe.
- Monitor vendor guidance and exploitation sources for a material change.
Verification
- Confirm that the asset runs OpenSSL OpenSSL and falls inside the recorded affected range.
- Verify the installed build against the product-specific fixed version after deployment.
- Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
- Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
Remediation availability differs by product scope
Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 1 structured product or package state remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
- Siemens ProductCERT: 1 affected or under-investigation product state without a fixed product state in the same current advisory
Distribution package intelligence
6 package statesRelease-specific package status
Alpine, Debian findings are scoped to the named distribution, release and source package. An absent finding does not mean a package is unaffected.
Repository candidate not checked
A published vendor fix does not prove that a matching update is enabled and installable on a particular asset. Confirm the local package candidate before scheduling remediation.
| Distribution release | Source package | Vendor state | Fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alpine v3.23v3.23 · main | openssl | Vendor fix publishedAlpine records a security fix at this version. An absent entry does not mean the package is unaffected. | 3.5.6-r0 | Alpine Security Database ↗Source updated 3 Oct 2026 |
| Alpine v3.22v3.22 · main | openssl | Vendor fix publishedAlpine records a security fix at this version. An absent entry does not mean the package is unaffected. | 3.5.6-r0 | Alpine Security Database ↗Source updated 3 Oct 2026 |
| Debian trixietrixie · source | openssl | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 3.5.5-1~deb13u2 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 6 Oct 2026 |
| Debian bookwormbookworm · source | openssl | Not affectedDebian marks this release not affected (fixed-version marker 0). | Not published in this feed | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 6 Oct 2026 |
| Debian forkyforky · source | openssl | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 3.6.2-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 6 Oct 2026 |
| Debian sidsid · source | openssl | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 3.6.2-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 6 Oct 2026 |
Direct vendor intelligence
2 currentAuthoritative vendor CSAF and VEX advisories
Structured product status and remediation from the issuing vendor. Product-state explanations are always visible; large lists can be searched or downloaded.
CVE-2026-2673 · CSAF 2.0 · revision 3 · finalRed Hat Product Securityopenssl: OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may choose unexpected key agreement group
The vendor explicitly identifies these products as affected by this CVE.
- openssl-fips-provider as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9
- openssl-fips-provider-so as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9
- openssl-fips-provider.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9
- jbcs-httpd24-openssl.src as a component of Red Hat JBoss Web Server 5
- Summary
- A key group selection preference flaw has been discovered in OpenSSL. An OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may fail to negotiate the expected preferred key exchange group when its key exchange group configuration includes the default by using the "DEFAULT" keyword. A less preferred key exchange may be used even when a more preferred group is supported by both client and server, if the group was not included among the client's initial predicated keyshares. This will sometimes be the case with the new hybrid post-quantum groups, if the client chooses to defer their use until specifically requested by the server. No OpenSSL FIPS modules are affected by this issue, the code in question lies outside the FIPS boundary.
- Remediation
- For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258
SSA-032379 · CSAF 2.0 · revision 1 · interimSiemens ProductCERTSSA-032379: Multiple Vulnerabilities in SIMATIC CN 4100 Before V5.0
The vendor explicitly identifies these products as affected by this CVE.
- SIMATIC CN 4100
- Summary
- Issue summary: An OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may fail to negotiate the expected preferred key exchange group when its key exchange group configuration includes the default by using the 'DEFAULT' keyword. Impact summary: A less preferred key exchange may be used even when a more preferred group is supported by both client and server, if the group was not included among the client's initial predicated keyshares. This will sometimes be the case with the new hybrid post-quantum groups, if the client chooses to defer their use until specifically requested by the server. If an OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server's configuration uses the 'DEFAULT' keyword to interpolate the built-in default group list into its own configuration, perhaps adding or removing specific elements, then an implementation defect causes the 'DEFAULT' list to lose its 'tuple' structure, and all server-supported groups were treated as a single sufficiently secure 'tuple', with the server not sending a Hello Retry Request (HRR) even when a group in a more preferred tuple was mutually supported. As a result, the client and server might fail to negotiate a mutually supported post-quantum key agreement group, such as 'X25519MLKEM768', if the client's configuration results in only 'classical' groups (such as 'X25519' being the only ones in the client's initial keyshare prediction). OpenSSL 3.5 and later support a new syntax for selecting the most preferred TLS 1.3 key agreement group on TLS servers. The old syntax had a single 'flat' list of groups, and treated all the supported groups as sufficiently secure. If any of the keyshares predicted by the client were supported by the server the most preferred among these was selected, even if other groups supported by the client, but not included in the list of predicted keyshares would have been more preferred, if included. The new syntax partitions the groups into distinct 'tuples' of roughly equivalent security. Within each tuple the most preferred group included among the client's predicted keyshares is chosen, but if the client supports a group from a more preferred tuple, but did not predict any corresponding keyshares, the server will ask the client to retry the ClientHello (by issuing a Hello Retry Request or HRR) with the most preferred mutually supported group. The above works as expected when the server's configuration uses the built-in default group list, or explicitly defines its own list by directly defining the various desired groups and group 'tuples'. No OpenSSL FIPS modules are affected by this issue, the code in question lies outside the FIPS boundary. OpenSSL 3.6 and 3.5 are vulnerable to this issue. OpenSSL 3.6 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.6.2 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.5 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.5.6 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.4, 3.3, 3.0, 1.0.2 and 1.1.1 are not affected by this issue.
- Remediation
- Update to V5.0 or later version
Medium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority. Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 1 structured product or package state remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
Fix availability varies by product01
What, why and how
Issue summary: An OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may fail to negotiate the expected preferred key exchange group when its key exchange group configuration includes the default by using the 'DEFAULT' keyword. Impact summary: A less preferred key exchange may be used even when a more preferred group is supported by both client and server, if the group was not included among the client's initial predicated keyshares. This will sometimes be the case with the new hybrid post-quantum groups, if the client chooses to defer their use until specifically requested by the server. If an OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server's configuration uses the 'DEFAULT' keyword to interpolate the built-in default group list into its own configuration, perhaps adding or removing specific elements, then an implementation defect causes the 'DEFAULT' list to lose its 'tuple' structure, and all server-supported groups were treated as a single sufficiently secure 'tuple', with the server not sending a Hello Retry Request (HRR) even when a group in a more preferred tuple was mutually supported. As a result, the client and server might fail to negotiate a mutually supported post-quantum key agreement group, such as 'X25519MLKEM768', if the client's configuration results in only 'classical' groups (such as 'X25519' being the only ones in the client's initial keyshare prediction). OpenSSL 3.5 and later support a new syntax for selecting the most preferred TLS 1.3 key agreement group on TLS servers. The old syntax had a single 'flat' list of groups, and treated all the supported groups as sufficiently secure. If any of the keyshares predicted by the client were supported by the server the most preferred among these was selected, even if other groups supported by the client, but not included in the list of predicted keyshares would have been more preferred, if included. The new syntax partitions the groups into distinct 'tuples' of roughly equivalent security. Within each tuple the most preferred group included among the client's predicted keyshares is chosen, but if the client supports a group from a more preferred tuple, but did not predict any corresponding keyshares, the server will ask the client to retry the ClientHello (by issuing a Hello Retry Request or HRR) with the most preferred mutually supported group. The above works as expected when the server's configuration uses the built-in default group list, or explicitly defines its own list by directly defining the various desired groups and group 'tuples'. No OpenSSL FIPS modules are affected by this issue, the code in question lies outside the FIPS boundary. OpenSSL 3.6 and 3.5 are vulnerable to this issue. OpenSSL 3.6 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.6.2 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.5 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.5.6 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.4, 3.3, 3.0, 1.0.2 and 1.1.1 are not affected by this issue.
What
Issue summary: An OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may fail to negotiate the expected preferred key exchange group when its key exchange group configuration includes the default by using the 'DEFAULT' keyword. Impact summary: A less preferred key exchange may be used even when a more preferred group is supported by both client and server, if the group was not included among the client's initial predicated keyshares. This will sometimes be the case with the new hybrid post-quantum groups, if the client chooses to defer their use until specifically requested by the server. If an OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server's configuration uses the 'DEFAULT' keyword to interpolate the built-in default group list into its own configuration, perhaps adding or removing specific elements, then an implementation defect causes the 'DEFAULT' list to lose its 'tuple' structure, and all server-supported groups were treated as a single sufficiently secure 'tuple', with the server not sending a Hello Retry Request (HRR) even when a group in a more preferred tuple was mutually supported. As a result, the client and server might fail to negotiate a mutually supported post-quantum key agreement group, such as 'X25519MLKEM768', if the client's configuration results in only 'classical' groups (such as 'X25519' being the only ones in the client's initial keyshare prediction). OpenSSL 3.5 and later support a new syntax for selecting the most preferred TLS 1.3 key agreement group on TLS servers. The old syntax had a single 'flat' list of groups, and treated all the supported groups as sufficiently secure. If any of the keyshares predicted by the client were supported by the server the most preferred among these was selected, even if other groups supported by the client, but not included in the list of predicted keyshares would have been more preferred, if included. The new syntax partitions the groups into distinct 'tuples' of roughly equivalent security. Within each tuple the most preferred group included among the client's predicted keyshares is chosen, but if the client supports a group from a more preferred tuple, but did not predict any corresponding keyshares, the server will ask the client to retry the ClientHello (by issuing a Hello Retry Request or HRR) with the most preferred mutually supported group. The above works as expected when the server's configuration uses the built-in default group list, or explicitly defines its own list by directly defining the various desired groups and group 'tuples'. No OpenSSL FIPS modules are affected by this issue, the code in question lies outside the FIPS boundary. OpenSSL 3.6 and 3.5 are vulnerable to this issue. OpenSSL 3.6 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.6.2 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.5 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.5.6 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.4, 3.3, 3.0, 1.0.2 and 1.1.1 are not affected by this issue.
Why
A protocol or its implementation supports interaction between multiple actors and allows those actors to negotiate which algorithm should be used as a protection mechanism such as encryption or authentication, but it does not select the strongest algorithm that is available to both parties.
How
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
What
Issue summary: An OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server may fail to negotiate the expected preferred key exchange group when its key exchange group configuration includes the default by using the 'DEFAULT' keyword. Impact summary: A less preferred key exchange may be used even when a more preferred group is supported by both client and server, if the group was not included among the client's initial predicated keyshares. This will sometimes be the case with the new hybrid post-quantum groups, if the client chooses to defer their use until specifically requested by the server. If an OpenSSL TLS 1.3 server's configuration uses the 'DEFAULT' keyword to interpolate the built-in default group list into its own configuration, perhaps adding or removing specific elements, then an implementation defect causes the 'DEFAULT' list to lose its 'tuple' structure, and all server-supported groups were treated as a single sufficiently secure 'tuple', with the server not sending a Hello Retry Request (HRR) even when a group in a more preferred tuple was mutually supported. As a result, the client and server might fail to negotiate a mutually supported post-quantum key agreement group, such as 'X25519MLKEM768', if the client's configuration results in only 'classical' groups (such as 'X25519' being the only ones in the client's initial keyshare prediction). OpenSSL 3.5 and later support a new syntax for selecting the most preferred TLS 1.3 key agreement group on TLS servers. The old syntax had a single 'flat' list of groups, and treated all the supported groups as sufficiently secure. If any of the keyshares predicted by the client were supported by the server the most preferred among these was selected, even if other groups supported by the client, but not included in the list of predicted keyshares would have been more preferred, if included. The new syntax partitions the groups into distinct 'tuples' of roughly equivalent security. Within each tuple the most preferred group included among the client's predicted keyshares is chosen, but if the client supports a group from a more preferred tuple, but did not predict any corresponding keyshares, the server will ask the client to retry the ClientHello (by issuing a Hello Retry Request or HRR) with the most preferred mutually supported group. The above works as expected when the server's configuration uses the built-in default group list, or explicitly defines its own list by directly defining the various desired groups and group 'tuples'. No OpenSSL FIPS modules are affected by this issue, the code in question lies outside the FIPS boundary. OpenSSL 3.6 and 3.5 are vulnerable to this issue. OpenSSL 3.6 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.6.2 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.5 users should upgrade to OpenSSL 3.5.6 once it is released. OpenSSL 3.4, 3.3, 3.0, 1.0.2 and 1.1.1 are not affected by this issue.
Why
A protocol or its implementation supports interaction between multiple actors and allows those actors to negotiate which algorithm should be used as a protection mechanism such as encryption or authentication, but it does not select the strongest algorithm that is available to both parties.
How
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
02
Exploit reality and attack path
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
Observed exploitation No confirmed evidence
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
Public PoC / exploit material None recorded
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
- Likely attack path
- a network path → Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation ('Algorithm Downgrade') → cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor
- Attack surface
- Network
- Privileges required
- None: unauthenticated exploitation is possible
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
- Security boundary
- Unchanged: impact remains within the vulnerable component's security authority
- Weakness
?
CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness. - CWE-757 ↗
CWE-757: Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation ('Algorithm Downgrade'). A protocol or its implementation supports interaction between multiple actors and allows those actors to negotiate which algorithm should be used as a protection mechanism such as encryption or authentication, but it does not select the strongest algorithm that is available to both parties.
- CVSS vector
?
CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity. CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:LCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
AVNetworkAttack vector: The vulnerable component can be reached over a network.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.PRNonePrivileges required: The attacker does not need an account or existing privileges.UINoneUser interaction: No action by another user is required.SUnchangedScope: The security impact remains within the vulnerable component's authority.CNoneConfidentiality impact: No direct loss is represented by this metric.ILowIntegrity impact: A successful attack can cause a limited loss.ALowAvailability impact: A successful attack can cause a limited loss.- Post-exploitation / living off the land
- No specific living-off-the-land technique is confirmed in the structured sources. Monitor normal administration tools for activity inconsistent with the affected service's baseline.
03
Patch and workaround
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
- Status
?
Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change. - Fix availability varies by product
- Affected
- Fixed
- openssl-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10)
- openssl-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10)
- openssl-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10)
- openssl-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10)
- openssl-debugsource-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10)
- openssl-debugsource-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10)
- openssl-debugsource-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10)
- openssl-debugsource-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10)
- openssl-devel-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10)
- openssl-devel-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10)
- openssl-devel-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10)
- openssl-devel-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10)
- openssl-libs-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10)
- openssl-libs-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10)
- openssl-libs-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10)
- openssl-libs-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10)
- openssl-perl-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10)
- openssl-perl-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10)
- openssl-perl-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10)
- openssl-perl-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10)
- openssl-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-3.el9_8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 9)
- openssl-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-3.el9_8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 9)
- openssl-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-3.el9_8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 9)
- openssl-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-3.el9_8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 9)
- openssl-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-3.el9_8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 9)
- openssl-debugsource-1:3.5.5-3.el9_8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 9)
- openssl-debugsource-1:3.5.5-3.el9_8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 9)
- openssl-debugsource-1:3.5.5-3.el9_8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 9)
- openssl-debugsource-1:3.5.5-3.el9_8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 9)
- openssl-debugsource-1:3.5.5-3.el9_8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 9)
- and 65 more
- Action
- Use the product-specific evidence above. Patch only products with a verified fixed release, and keep every affected or under-investigation state without a matching fix in the remediation queue.
- Workaround
- No verified workaround is recorded. If business-safe, reduce exposure to the affected interface and allow only trusted sources until authoritative guidance is available.
04
Evidence and provenance
Published 13 Mar 2026 · Last source change 18 May 2026, 19:23 UTC · CWE-757 · Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation ('Algorithm Downgrade')
CVE recordCVE.org · 5.2
CVSS sourceCISA ADP
EPSS source FIRST · tracked since 2026-08-14
?
The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2026-12033
Product sourceVendor CSAF · Red Hat Product Security
Remediation sourceVendor CSAF · Red Hat Product Security
CWE sourceCNA
NVD statusNVD enriched
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
Material change intelligence
View recent updates ↗What changed after publication
- Affected versionsThe structured affected or fixed version information changed.Red Hat Product Security ↗
- Before
- 3.6.0 < 3.6.2; 3.5.0 < 3.5.6 · Fixed: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://images.redhat.com/
- After
- 3.6.0 < 3.6.2; 3.5.0 < 3.5.6 · Fixed: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258
- Vendor guidanceAuthoritative vendor guidance changed from remediation: access.redhat.com/CVE-2026-2673 to remediation: access.redhat.com/CVE-2026-2673.Red Hat Product Security ↗
- Before
- remediation: access.redhat.com/CVE-2026-2673
- After
- remediation: access.redhat.com/CVE-2026-2673
- Affected versionsThe structured affected or fixed version information changed.Red Hat Product Security ↗
- Before
- openssl as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10; openssl-devel as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10; openssl-libs as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10; openssl-perl as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10; openssl.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10; openssl as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9; openssl-devel as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9; openssl-fips-provider as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9; openssl-fips-provider-so as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9; openssl-fips-provider.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9; openssl-libs as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9; openssl-perl as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9; openssl.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9; jbcs-httpd24-openssl.src as a component of Red Hat JBoss Web Server 5 · Fixed: openssl-main@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images; openssl-main@src as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images; openssl-main@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images; Red Hat JBoss Web Server 6.2.4; Red Hat JBoss Web Server 7.0.0
- After
- openssl-fips-provider as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9; openssl-fips-provider-so as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9; openssl-fips-provider.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9; jbcs-httpd24-openssl.src as a component of Red Hat JBoss Web Server 5 · Fixed: openssl-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10); openssl-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10); openssl-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10); openssl-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10); openssl-debugsource-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10); openssl-debugsource-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10); openssl-debugsource-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10); openssl-debugsource-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10); openssl-devel-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10); openssl-devel-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10); openssl-devel-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10); openssl-devel-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10); openssl-libs-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10); openssl-libs-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10); openssl-libs-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10); openssl-libs-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10); openssl-perl-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10); openssl-perl-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10); openssl-perl-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10); openssl-perl-1:3.5.5-2.el10_2.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10); openssl-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-3.el9_8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 9); openssl-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-3.el9_8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 9); openssl-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-3.el9_8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 9); openssl-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-3.el9_8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 9); openssl-debuginfo-1:3.5.5-3.el9_8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 9); openssl-debugsource-1:3.5.5-3.el9_8.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 9); openssl-debugsource-1:3.5.5-3.el9_8.i686 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 9); openssl-debugsource-1:3.5.5-3.el9_8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 9); openssl-debugsource-1:3.5.5-3.el9_8.s390x as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 9); openssl-debugsource-1:3.5.5-3.el9_8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 9); and 65 more
- Affected versionsThe structured affected or fixed version information changed.Red Hat Product Security ↗
- Before
- 3.6.0 < 3.6.2; 3.5.0 < 3.5.6 · Fixed: An authoritative update reference is available, but the fixed version is not recorded in the structured CVE fields. Check the linked vendor advisory for the applicable release.
- After
- 3.6.0 < 3.6.2; 3.5.0 < 3.5.6 · Fixed: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://images.redhat.com/
CVE published
Fixed release or patch reference recorded
Fixed release recorded from official guidance
Fixed release recorded from official guidance
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
- CVE
- Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
- CVSS
- Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
- EPSS
- Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
- CWE
- Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
- CNA
- CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
- CISA ADP
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
- NVD
- National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
- CERT / CSIRT
- A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
- PoC
- Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
- CSAF
- Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
- LoTL
- Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.