Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- The selected CVSS metric records a network-reachable, unauthenticated path with no user interaction.
- EPSS is 0.14% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE Intelligencejmlepisto · clatter
Official source article: GitHub GHSA-253Q-9Q78-63X4 ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
These OSV and GitHub advisory ranges apply only to the named package and ecosystem. A listed fixed version is not a universal product patch or proof that an update is installed.
| Ecosystem and package | Affected range | First fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| rustclatter | < 2.2.0 | 2.2.0 | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 28 Jan 2026 |
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
Patch availableClatter is a no_std compatible, pure Rust implementation of the Noise protocol framework with post-quantum support. Versiosn prior to2.2.0 have a protocol compliance vulnerability. The library allowed post-quantum handshake patterns that violated the PSK validity rule (Noise Protocol Framework Section 9.3). This could allow PSK-derived keys to be used for encryption without proper randomization by self-chosen ephemeral randomness, weakening security guarantees and potentially allowing catastrophic key reuse. Affected default patterns include `noise_pqkk_psk0`, `noise_pqkn_psk0`, `noise_pqnk_psk0`, `noise_pqnn_psk0``, and some hybrid variants. Users of these patterns may have been using handshakes that do not meet the intended security properties. The issue is fully patched and released in Clatter v2.2.0. The fixed version includes runtime checks to detect offending handshake patterns. As a workaround, avoid using offending `*_psk0` variants of post-quantum patterns. Review custom handshake patterns carefully.
Clatter is a no_std compatible, pure Rust implementation of the Noise protocol framework with post-quantum support. Versiosn prior to2.2.0 have a protocol compliance vulnerability. The library allowed post-quantum handshake patterns that violated the PSK validity rule (Noise Protocol Framework Section 9.3). This could allow PSK-derived keys to be used for encryption without proper randomization by self-chosen ephemeral randomness, weakening security guarantees and potentially allowing catastrophic key reuse. Affected default patterns include `noise_pqkk_psk0`, `noise_pqkn_psk0`, `noise_pqnk_psk0`, `noise_pqnn_psk0``, and some hybrid variants. Users of these patterns may have been using handshakes that do not meet the intended security properties. The issue is fully patched and released in Clatter v2.2.0. The fixed version includes runtime checks to detect offending handshake patterns. As a workaround, avoid using offending `*_psk0` variants of post-quantum patterns. Review custom handshake patterns carefully.
The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
Clatter is a no_std compatible, pure Rust implementation of the Noise protocol framework with post-quantum support. Versiosn prior to2.2.0 have a protocol compliance vulnerability. The library allowed post-quantum handshake patterns that violated the PSK validity rule (Noise Protocol Framework Section 9.3). This could allow PSK-derived keys to be used for encryption without proper randomization by self-chosen ephemeral randomness, weakening security guarantees and potentially allowing catastrophic key reuse. Affected default patterns include `noise_pqkk_psk0`, `noise_pqkn_psk0`, `noise_pqnk_psk0`, `noise_pqnn_psk0``, and some hybrid variants. Users of these patterns may have been using handshakes that do not meet the intended security properties. The issue is fully patched and released in Clatter v2.2.0. The fixed version includes runtime checks to detect offending handshake patterns. As a workaround, avoid using offending `*_psk0` variants of post-quantum patterns. Review custom handshake patterns carefully.
The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm. The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:UCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 4.0: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 27 Jan 2026 · Last source change 28 Jan 2026, 15:10 UTC · CWE-327 · Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.