Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- EPSS is 0.13% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE IntelligenceFull vulnerability report · 2026
CVE-2026-23999High confidence
Fleet: Device lock PIN can be predicted if lock time is known
fleetdm · fleet
Official source article: GitHub GHSA-PPWX-5JQ7-PX2W ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.
0.6LowCVSS 4.0
Scheduled
Fix not verifiedLow technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
R
Open reassessment dashboard →Operational reassessment
Published severity in operational context
Published severityLow→Operational priority:Low, unchanged from published severity.unchanged
Compensating controls
- Restrict local access and enforce least privilege on affected hosts.
- Monitor vendor guidance and exploitation sources for a material change.
Verification
- Confirm that the asset runs fleetdm fleet and falls inside the recorded affected range.
- Recheck the vendor advisory before scheduling a change because no verified fixed version is currently retained.
- Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
- Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
Open-source package ranges1 source-attributed range
These OSV and GitHub advisory ranges apply only to the named package and ecosystem. A listed fixed version is not a universal product patch or proof that an update is installed.
| Ecosystem and package | Affected range | First fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| gogithub.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4 | < 4.80.1 | 4.80.1 | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 10 Mar 2026 |
Low technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
Fix not verified01
What, why and how
Fleet is open source device management software. In versions prior to 4.80.1, Fleet generated device lock and wipe PINs using a predictable algorithm based solely on the current Unix timestamp. Because no secret key or additional entropy was used, the resulting PIN could potentially be derived if the approximate time the device was locked is known. Fleet’s device lock and wipe commands generate a 6-digit PIN that is displayed to administrators for unlocking a device. In affected versions, this PIN was deterministically derived from the current timestamp. An attacker with physical possession of a locked device and knowledge of the approximate time the lock command was issued could theoretically predict the correct PIN within a limited search window. However, successful exploitation is constrained by multiple factors: Physical access to the device is required, the approximate lock time must be known, the operating system enforces rate limiting on PIN entry attempts, attempts would need to be spread over, and device wipe operations would typically complete before sufficient attempts could be made. As a result, this issue does not allow remote exploitation, fleet-wide compromise, or bypass of Fleet authentication controls. Version 4.80.1 contains a patch. No known workarounds are available.
What
Fleet is open source device management software. In versions prior to 4.80.1, Fleet generated device lock and wipe PINs using a predictable algorithm based solely on the current Unix timestamp. Because no secret key or additional entropy was used, the resulting PIN could potentially be derived if the approximate time the device was locked is known. Fleet’s device lock and wipe commands generate a 6-digit PIN that is displayed to administrators for unlocking a device. In affected versions, this PIN was deterministically derived from the current timestamp. An attacker with physical possession of a locked device and knowledge of the approximate time the lock command was issued could theoretically predict the correct PIN within a limited search window. However, successful exploitation is constrained by multiple factors: Physical access to the device is required, the approximate lock time must be known, the operating system enforces rate limiting on PIN entry attempts, attempts would need to be spread over, and device wipe operations would typically complete before sufficient attempts could be made. As a result, this issue does not allow remote exploitation, fleet-wide compromise, or bypass of Fleet authentication controls. Version 4.80.1 contains a patch. No known workarounds are available.
Why
The product uses insufficiently random numbers or values in a security context that depends on unpredictable numbers.
How
An attacker operating through physical access may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
What
Fleet is open source device management software. In versions prior to 4.80.1, Fleet generated device lock and wipe PINs using a predictable algorithm based solely on the current Unix timestamp. Because no secret key or additional entropy was used, the resulting PIN could potentially be derived if the approximate time the device was locked is known. Fleet’s device lock and wipe commands generate a 6-digit PIN that is displayed to administrators for unlocking a device. In affected versions, this PIN was deterministically derived from the current timestamp. An attacker with physical possession of a locked device and knowledge of the approximate time the lock command was issued could theoretically predict the correct PIN within a limited search window. However, successful exploitation is constrained by multiple factors: Physical access to the device is required, the approximate lock time must be known, the operating system enforces rate limiting on PIN entry attempts, attempts would need to be spread over, and device wipe operations would typically complete before sufficient attempts could be made. As a result, this issue does not allow remote exploitation, fleet-wide compromise, or bypass of Fleet authentication controls. Version 4.80.1 contains a patch. No known workarounds are available.
Why
The product uses insufficiently random numbers or values in a security context that depends on unpredictable numbers.
How
An attacker operating through physical access may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
02
Exploit reality and attack path
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
Observed exploitation No confirmed evidence
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
Public PoC / exploit material None recorded
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
- Likely attack path
- physical access → Use of Insufficiently Random Values → cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor
- Attack surface
- Physical
- Privileges required
- None: unauthenticated exploitation is possible
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
- Security boundary
- Not a CVSS 4.0 base metric
- Weakness
?
CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness. - CWE-330 ↗
CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values. The product uses insufficiently random numbers or values in a security context that depends on unpredictable numbers.
- CVSS vector
?
CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity. CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:UCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 4.0: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
AVPhysicalAttack vector: The attacker needs physical access to the vulnerable system.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.ATPresentAttack requirements: A particular deployment or execution condition must be present.PRNonePrivileges required: The attacker does not need an account or existing privileges.UINoneUser interaction: No action by another user is required.VCHighVulnerable-system confidentiality: A successful attack can cause a major loss.VINoneVulnerable-system integrity: No direct loss is represented by this metric.VANoneVulnerable-system availability: No direct loss is represented by this metric.SCNoneSubsequent-system confidentiality: No direct loss is represented by this metric.SINoneSubsequent-system integrity: No direct loss is represented by this metric.SANoneSubsequent-system availability: No direct loss is represented by this metric.- Post-exploitation / living off the land
- No specific living-off-the-land technique is confirmed in the structured sources. Monitor normal administration tools for activity inconsistent with the affected service's baseline.
03
Patch and workaround
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
- Status
?
Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change. - Fix not verified
- Affected
- fleet: < 4.80.1
- Fixed
- No fixed version is explicitly recorded in the structured CVE data.
- Action
- No verified patch reference is present in the current structured sources. Check the vendor advisory before making a change.
- Workaround
- No verified workaround is recorded. Limit untrusted access and use least privilege until authoritative guidance is available.
04
Evidence and provenance
Published 26 Feb 2026 · Last source change 26 Feb 2026, 15:15 UTC · CWE-330 · Use of Insufficiently Random Values
CVE recordCVE.org · 5.2
CVSS sourceCNA
EPSS source FIRST · tracked since 2026-08-14
?
The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2026-8826
Product sourceCNA
Remediation sourceCVE/CNA references
CWE sourceCNA
NVD statusNVD enriched
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
Material change intelligence
View recent updates ↗What changed after publication
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
- CVE
- Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
- CVSS
- Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
- EPSS
- Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
- CWE
- Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
- CNA
- CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
- CISA ADP
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
- NVD
- National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
- CERT / CSIRT
- A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
- PoC
- Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
- CSAF
- Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
- LoTL
- Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.