Cosign verification accepts any valid Rekor entry under certain conditions
sigstore · cosign
Official source article: GitHub GHSA-WHQX-F9J3-CH6M ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.
5.5MediumCVSS 3.1
Recommended action
Patch only the product branches with a verified fix
Medium technical severity with public exploit material referenced by a structured source; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance. Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 36 structured product or package states remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
Published severityMedium→Operational priority:Medium, unchanged from published severity.unchanged
Evidence used
No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
A structured source references public exploit or proof-of-concept material.
Exploitation requires an existing local or physical foothold with privileges.
EPSS is 0.11% for the current model date.
Compensating controls
Validate the affected product branch and deploy the verified fixed release.
Restrict local access and enforce least privilege on affected hosts.
Increase monitoring for the attack path and post-exploitation behaviour described in the report.
Verification
Confirm that the asset runs sigstore cosign and falls inside the recorded affected range.
Verify the installed build against the product-specific fixed version after deployment.
Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
Cross-source reconciliation
Remediation availability differs by product scope
Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 36 structured product or package states remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
Red Hat Product Security: 35 affected or under-investigation product states without a fixed product state in the same current advisory
Debian Security Tracker: 1 affected package state with no published fix
Distribution package intelligence
Release-specific package status
Alpine, Debian findings are scoped to the named distribution, release and source package. An absent finding does not mean a package is unaffected.
4 package states
Package result overrides the generic status
BlackTree has verified remediation for at least one product or source, but the relevant distribution still reports no fixed package for 1 affected package state shown here. Treat those rows as affected with no fix until that distribution publishes a fixed version.
Repository candidate not checked
A published vendor fix does not prove that a matching update is enabled and installable on a particular asset. Confirm the local package candidate before scheduling remediation.
Distribution release
Source package
Vendor state
Fixed version
Evidence
Alpine v3.23v3.23 · community
cosign
Vendor fix publishedAlpine records a security fix at this version. An absent entry does not mean the package is unaffected.
These OSV and GitHub advisory ranges apply only to the named package and ecosystem. A listed fixed version is not a universal product patch or proof that an update is installed.
Structured product status and remediation from the issuing vendor. Product-state explanations are always visible; large lists can be searched or downloaded.
1 current
CVE-2026-22703 · CSAF 2.0 · revision 3 · finalRed Hat Product Securitygithub.com/sigstore/cosign: Cosign verification accepts any valid Rekor entry under certain conditions
35 known affected
The vendor explicitly identifies these products as affected by this CVE.
openshift-pipelines-client.src as a component of OpenShift Pipelines
openshift-pipelines/pipelines-chains-controller-rhel8 as a component of OpenShift Pipelines
openshift-pipelines/pipelines-chains-controller-rhel9 as a component of OpenShift Pipelines
openshift-pipelines/pipelines-cli-tkn-rhel8 as a component of OpenShift Pipelines
openshift-pipelines/pipelines-cli-tkn-rhel9 as a component of OpenShift Pipelines
openshift-pipelines/pipelines-opc-rhel9 as a component of OpenShift Pipelines
openshift-pipelines/pipelines-operator-bundle as a component of OpenShift Pipelines
openshift-pipelines/pipelines-operator-proxy-rhel8 as a component of OpenShift Pipelines
openshift-pipelines/pipelines-operator-proxy-rhel9 as a component of OpenShift Pipelines
openshift-pipelines/pipelines-operator-webhook-rhel8 as a component of OpenShift Pipelines
openshift-pipelines/pipelines-operator-webhook-rhel9 as a component of OpenShift Pipelines
openshift-pipelines/pipelines-rhel8-operator as a component of OpenShift Pipelines
Summary
A data verification flaw has been discovered in the golang cosign library. A Cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify an artifact even if the embedded Rekor entry does not reference the artifact's digest, signature or public key. When verifying a Rekor entry, Cosign verifies the Rekor entry signature, and also compares the artifact's digest, the user's public key from either a Fulcio certificate or provided by the user, and the artifact signature to the Rekor entry contents. Without these comparisons, Cosign would accept any response from Rekor as valid. A malicious actor that has compromised a user's identity or signing key could construct a valid Cosign bundle by including any arbitrary Rekor entry, thus preventing the user from being able to audit the signing event. This vulnerability only affects users that provide a trusted root via --trusted-root or when fetched automatically from a TUF repository, when no trusted key material is provided via SIGSTORE_REKOR_PUBLIC_KEY. When using the default flag values in Cosign v3 to sign and verify (--use-signing-config=true and --new-bundle-format=true for signing, --new-bundle-format=true for verification), users are unaffected. Cosign v2 users are affected using the default flag values.
Remediation
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base or stability.
Optional official sources
National CERT insights ?CERT means Computer Emergency Response Team; CSIRT is the closely related term Computer Security Incident Response Team.
Choose official national sources for this report. Each advisory shows its original language. Your selection is remembered on this device and included in shared links.
Official European source
ENISA European Vulnerability Database
Official EUVD identifiers, advisory evidence and known-exploited context. Missing fields are not treated as evidence of low risk.
1 current
ENISA EUVD identifier
EUVD-2026-1868
No EUVD known-exploited evidence
ENISA has published the identifier mapping but no EUVD description has been stored yet.
EUVD state
Present in the current official mapping
Known exploitation
Not present in the current ENISA EUVD known-exploited dataset. This is not proof of no exploitation.
ENISA score
Not supplied in the stored EUVD record
Advisory evidence
No linked advisory details stored yet
Recommended actionPatch only the product branches with a verified fix
Medium technical severity with public exploit material referenced by a structured source; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance. Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 36 structured product or package states remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
Fix availability varies by product
01
What, why and how
Cosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. Prior to versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4, Cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify an artifact even if the embedded Rekor entry does not reference the artifact's digest, signature or public key. When verifying a Rekor entry, Cosign verifies the Rekor entry signature, and also compares the artifact's digest, the user's public key from either a Fulcio certificate or provided by the user, and the artifact signature to the Rekor entry contents. Without these comparisons, Cosign would accept any response from Rekor as valid. A malicious actor that has compromised a user's identity or signing key could construct a valid Cosign bundle by including any arbitrary Rekor entry, thus preventing the user from being able to audit the signing event. This issue has been patched in versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4.
What
Cosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. Prior to versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4, Cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify an artifact even if the embedded Rekor entry does not reference the artifact's digest, signature or public key. When verifying a Rekor entry, Cosign verifies the Rekor entry signature, and also compares the artifact's digest, the user's public key from either a Fulcio certificate or provided by the user, and the artifact signature to the Rekor entry contents. Without these comparisons, Cosign would accept any response from Rekor as valid. A malicious actor that has compromised a user's identity or signing key could construct a valid Cosign bundle by including any arbitrary Rekor entry, thus preventing the user from being able to audit the signing event. This issue has been patched in versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4.
Why
The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
How
An attacker operating through local access may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
What
Cosign provides code signing and transparency for containers and binaries. Prior to versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4, Cosign bundle can be crafted to successfully verify an artifact even if the embedded Rekor entry does not reference the artifact's digest, signature or public key. When verifying a Rekor entry, Cosign verifies the Rekor entry signature, and also compares the artifact's digest, the user's public key from either a Fulcio certificate or provided by the user, and the artifact signature to the Rekor entry contents. Without these comparisons, Cosign would accept any response from Rekor as valid. A malicious actor that has compromised a user's identity or signing key could construct a valid Cosign bundle by including any arbitrary Rekor entry, thus preventing the user from being able to audit the signing event. This issue has been patched in versions 2.6.2 and 3.0.4.
Why
The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
How
An attacker operating through local access may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
02
Exploit reality and attack path
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
Observed exploitation ?Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No confirmed evidence
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
Public PoC / exploit material ?Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.Reference recorded
A structured CVE source labels at least one public reference as exploit material. BlackTree has not independently validated that it is safe, reliable or weaponised.
Likely attack path
local access → Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity → cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor
Attack surface
Local
Privileges required
Low: a basic authenticated account is required
User interaction
None
Attack complexity
Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
Security boundary
Unchanged: impact remains within the vulnerable component's security authority
Weakness ?CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness.
CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity. The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
CVSS vector ?CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Common Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
AVLocalAttack vector: The attacker needs local access to the vulnerable system.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.PRLowPrivileges required: The attacker needs basic user-level privileges.UINoneUser interaction: No action by another user is required.SUnchangedScope: The security impact remains within the vulnerable component's authority.CNoneConfidentiality impact: No direct loss is represented by this metric.IHighIntegrity impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.ANoneAvailability impact: No direct loss is represented by this metric.
Post-exploitation / living off the land
The issue can support a local privilege or sandbox boundary transition; normal system utilities may then be available in the gained context.
CWE-345Public exploit reference
A
Official authority intelligence
Only matched European and national findings are included. Language selectors and unavailable sources are omitted.
ENISA EUVD · EUVD-2026-1868Official EUVD mapping
0 linked advisory records.
Official EUVD record ↗Cyber Security Agency of Singapore · English · CSA-SB-20260114Security Bulletin 14 Jan 2026
The Cyber Security Agency of Singapore included this CVE in its official Security Bulletin 14 Jan 2026, published on 14 January 2026. Open the linked bulletin for the product, severity and reference information published in that issue.
Official advisory ↗CERT-FR · French · CERTFR-2026-AVI-0315Multiples vulnérabilités dans les produits VMware
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Status ?Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change.
Use the product-specific evidence above. Patch only products with a verified fixed release, and keep every affected or under-investigation state without a matching fix in the remediation queue.
Workaround
Mitigation for this issue is either not available or the currently available options do not meet the Red Hat Product Security criteria comprising ease of use and deployment, applicability to widespread installation base or stability.
04
Evidence and provenance
Published 10 Jan 2026 · Last source change 12 Jan 2026, 16:43 UTC · CWE-345 · Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
CVE recordCVE.org · 5.2
CVSS sourceCNA
EPSS source ?The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.FIRST · tracked since 2026-08-14
European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2026-1868
Product sourceVendor CSAF · Red Hat Product Security
Remediation sourceVendor CSAF · Red Hat Product Security
CWE sourceCNA
NVD statusNVD enriched
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
CVE
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
CVSS
Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
EPSS
Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
CWE
Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
CNA
CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
CISA ADP
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
NVD
National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
CERT / CSIRT
A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
PoC
Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
CSAF
Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
LoTL
Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.