Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- EPSS is 0.27% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE Intelligencerevmakx · InfiniteWP Client
Medium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
Medium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
Fix not verifiedThe InfiniteWP Client plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the get_comments action in versions up to, and including, 1.13.9. This is due to insufficient escaping on the array-key names supplied in the JSON request body before use in a SQL statement: IWP_MMB_Comment::get_comments() calls extract() on $args (which silently skips keys that are not valid PHP variable names) but a second foreach($args as $checkbox => $checkbox_val) processes every key, strips the 'iwp_get_comments_' prefix with str_replace(), wraps the remainder in single quotes, and imploded it into an IN(...) clause that is executed via $wpdb->get_results() with no prepare(). Because the request body is read from php://input and JSON-decoded, wp_magic_quotes() never touches the data, so quote characters in keys pass through unaltered. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level access and above (an administrator can register their own public key via add_site using the plugin's WP-admin-generated activation_key and then issue signed get_comments requests), to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database.
The InfiniteWP Client plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the get_comments action in versions up to, and including, 1.13.9. This is due to insufficient escaping on the array-key names supplied in the JSON request body before use in a SQL statement: IWP_MMB_Comment::get_comments() calls extract() on $args (which silently skips keys that are not valid PHP variable names) but a second foreach($args as $checkbox => $checkbox_val) processes every key, strips the 'iwp_get_comments_' prefix with str_replace(), wraps the remainder in single quotes, and imploded it into an IN(...) clause that is executed via $wpdb->get_results() with no prepare(). Because the request body is read from php://input and JSON-decoded, wp_magic_quotes() never touches the data, so quote characters in keys pass through unaltered. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level access and above (an administrator can register their own public key via add_site using the plugin's WP-admin-generated activation_key and then issue signed get_comments requests), to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database.
Attacker-controlled data is not kept separate from SQL query syntax, allowing the intended database operation to be changed.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may obtain information outside the intended access boundary.
The InfiniteWP Client plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to SQL Injection via the get_comments action in versions up to, and including, 1.13.9. This is due to insufficient escaping on the array-key names supplied in the JSON request body before use in a SQL statement: IWP_MMB_Comment::get_comments() calls extract() on $args (which silently skips keys that are not valid PHP variable names) but a second foreach($args as $checkbox => $checkbox_val) processes every key, strips the 'iwp_get_comments_' prefix with str_replace(), wraps the remainder in single quotes, and imploded it into an IN(...) clause that is executed via $wpdb->get_results() with no prepare(). Because the request body is read from php://input and JSON-decoded, wp_magic_quotes() never touches the data, so quote characters in keys pass through unaltered. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level access and above (an administrator can register their own public key via add_site using the plugin's WP-admin-generated activation_key and then issue signed get_comments requests), to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database.
Attacker-controlled data is not kept separate from SQL query syntax, allowing the intended database operation to be changed.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may obtain information outside the intended access boundary.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection'). The product constructs all or part of an SQL command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended SQL command when it is sent to a downstream component. Without sufficient removal or quoting of SQL syntax in user-controllable inputs, the generated SQL query can cause those inputs to be interpreted as SQL instead of ordinary user data.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 18 Sept 2026 · Last source change 18 Sept 2026, 14:31 UTC · CWE-89 · Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.