Oc: oc: symlink/hardlink target validation bypass in oc image extract allows file write outside destination

A flaw was found in the OpenShift client oc. When extracting container image layers with oc image extract, the application fails to properly sanitize symbolic and hard link targets pointing to absolute paths or to sibling directories of the extraction destination. An attacker who supplies a malicious container image can exploit this vulnerability by embedding links, and a chained file entry, that reference locations outside the intended extraction directory. This allows the attacker to write attacker-controlled content to arbitrary locations on the host filesystem with the privileges of the user running the command, potentially leading to file modification outside the destination directory.

The product, when opening a file or directory, does not sufficiently account for when the file is a symbolic link that resolves to a target outside of the intended control sphere. This could allow an attacker to cause the product to operate on unauthorized files.

An attacker operating through local access may attempt exploitation without authentication after a user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.