Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- EPSS is 0.19% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE Intelligencejgraph · drawio-desktop
Official source article: GitHub GHSA-FJGC-8XGJ-RVH4 ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.
Medium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
Medium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
Patch availabledraw.io Desktop is the official Electron build of draw.io. Prior to 31.4.4, draw.io Desktop is vulnerable to arbitrary local-file disclosure through the Electron main process's read-side IPC handlers. The readFile, getFileDrafts, getBkpFile, fileStat, isFileWritable, checkFileExists, and watchFile actions operate on a renderer-chosen filesystem path with no blessed-path (assertWritablePath) authorization. The only gates are validateSender — a URL-prefix origin check — plus, for readFile alone, a content "sniff" and a lexical appBaseDir prefix block. The write-side handlers (saveFile, writeFile, saveDraft, deleteFile) are all protected by assertWritablePath; the read side is not. The result is a read/write authorization asymmetry: any frame executing in the app's file:// origin can read the contents of local files that the same origin is explicitly forbidden to write. This issue is fixed in version 31.4.4.
draw.io Desktop is the official Electron build of draw.io. Prior to 31.4.4, draw.io Desktop is vulnerable to arbitrary local-file disclosure through the Electron main process's read-side IPC handlers. The readFile, getFileDrafts, getBkpFile, fileStat, isFileWritable, checkFileExists, and watchFile actions operate on a renderer-chosen filesystem path with no blessed-path (assertWritablePath) authorization. The only gates are validateSender — a URL-prefix origin check — plus, for readFile alone, a content "sniff" and a lexical appBaseDir prefix block. The write-side handlers (saveFile, writeFile, saveDraft, deleteFile) are all protected by assertWritablePath; the read side is not. The result is a read/write authorization asymmetry: any frame executing in the app's file:// origin can read the contents of local files that the same origin is explicitly forbidden to write. This issue is fixed in version 31.4.4.
Attacker-controlled path data is not constrained to the intended directory before the application accesses a file.
An attacker operating through local access may attempt exploitation when the stated preconditions are met. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
draw.io Desktop is the official Electron build of draw.io. Prior to 31.4.4, draw.io Desktop is vulnerable to arbitrary local-file disclosure through the Electron main process's read-side IPC handlers. The readFile, getFileDrafts, getBkpFile, fileStat, isFileWritable, checkFileExists, and watchFile actions operate on a renderer-chosen filesystem path with no blessed-path (assertWritablePath) authorization. The only gates are validateSender — a URL-prefix origin check — plus, for readFile alone, a content "sniff" and a lexical appBaseDir prefix block. The write-side handlers (saveFile, writeFile, saveDraft, deleteFile) are all protected by assertWritablePath; the read side is not. The result is a read/write authorization asymmetry: any frame executing in the app's file:// origin can read the contents of local files that the same origin is explicitly forbidden to write. This issue is fixed in version 31.4.4.
Attacker-controlled path data is not constrained to the intended directory before the application accesses a file.
An attacker operating through local access may attempt exploitation when the stated preconditions are met. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'). The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 4.0: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 22 Oct 2026 · Last source change 22 Oct 2026, 16:35 UTC · CWE-22 · Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.