Chi Client IP Spoofing in ClientIPFromXFF via X-Forwarded-For
go-chi · chi
6.3MediumCVSS 4.0
Recommended action
Patch only the product branches with a verified fix
Medium technical severity with public exploit material referenced by a structured source; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance. Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 31 structured product or package states remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
Published severityMedium→Operational priority:High, raised one band.upgradedsince 21 Oct 2026
Evidence used
No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
A structured source references public exploit or proof-of-concept material.
The selected CVSS metric records a network-reachable, unauthenticated path with no user interaction.
EPSS is 0.13% for the current model date.
Compensating controls
Apply the linked authoritative mitigation while planning the permanent fix.
Restrict the affected network interface to trusted sources where business-safe.
Increase monitoring for the attack path and post-exploitation behaviour described in the report.
Verification
Confirm that the asset runs go-chi chi and falls inside the recorded affected range.
Recheck the vendor advisory before scheduling a change because no verified fixed version is currently retained.
Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
Cross-source reconciliation
Remediation availability differs by product scope
Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 31 structured product or package states remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
Red Hat Product Security: 27 affected or under-investigation product states without a fixed product state in the same current advisory
Debian Security Tracker: 4 affected package states with no published fix
Distribution package intelligence
Release-specific package status
Debian, ubuntu findings are scoped to the named distribution, release and source package. An absent finding does not mean a package is unaffected.
5 package states
Package result overrides the generic status
BlackTree has verified remediation for at least one product or source, but the relevant distribution still reports no fixed package for 4 affected package states shown here. Treat those rows as affected with no fix until that distribution publishes a fixed version.
Repository candidate not checked
A published vendor fix does not prove that a matching update is enabled and installable on a particular asset. Confirm the local package candidate before scheduling remediation.
Distribution release
Source package
Vendor state
Fixed version
Evidence
Debian trixietrixie · source
golang-github-go-chi-chi
Affected, no fix publishedDebian currently tracks this release as open.
Open-source package ranges1 source-attributed range
These OSV and GitHub advisory ranges apply only to the named package and ecosystem. A listed fixed version is not a universal product patch or proof that an update is installed.
Structured product status and remediation from the issuing vendor. Product-state explanations are always visible; large lists can be searched or downloaded.
1 current
CVE-2026-114437 · CSAF 2.0 · revision 3 · finalRed Hat Product Securitygithub.com/go-chi/chi: chi: client IP spoofing via unverified direct connection in ClientIPFromXFF middleware
27 known affected
The vendor explicitly identifies these products as affected by this CVE.
openshift-logging/opa-openshift-rhel9 as a component of Logging Subsystem for Red Hat OpenShift
multicluster-engine/managedcluster-import-controller-rhel9 as a component of Multicluster Engine for Kubernetes
openshift-pipelines-client.src as a component of OpenShift Pipelines
openshift-serverless-1/kn-plugin-event-sender-rhel9 as a component of OpenShift Serverless
rhacm2/observatorium-rhel9 as a component of Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes 2
osbuild-composer as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8
osbuild-composer-core as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8
osbuild-composer-dnf-json as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8
osbuild-composer-worker as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8
osbuild-composer.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8
cri-o as a component of Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4
cri-o.src as a component of Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4
Summary
A flaw was found in chi. The ClientIPFromXFF middleware evaluates IP addresses in the X-Forwarded-For (XFF) HTTP header, but fails to verify that the direct incoming network connection originates from a trusted IP address range. A remote attacker who can connect directly to the server can exploit this flaw by supplying a forged proxy address in the header. This allows the attacker to spoof their client IP address, potentially bypassing IP-based access controls and security logging.
Remediation
Restrict network exposure so that the application only accepts connections from trusted reverse proxies or load balancers, preventing direct client reachability: 1. Configure firewall rules on the host to only allow traffic from trusted proxy IP addresses to the application port: ``` firewall-cmd --permanent --zone=trusted --add-source= firewall-cmd --permanent --remove-port= /tcp firewall-cmd --reload ``` 2. In OpenShift or Kubernetes environments, apply an Ingress NetworkPolicy ensuring pod endpoints only accept traffic from designated ingress router controllers. 3. Configure the upstream reverse proxy (e.g., Envoy, HAProxy, or NGINX) to strip or sanitize incoming X-Forwarded-For headers from untrusted external clients before routing requests to backend services. Caveats: Restricting direct access may interrupt client traffic if services were previously exposed directly without a proxy. Reloading firewalld with `firewall-cmd --reload` will briefly reapply filtering rules and may affect active network sessions.
Optional official sources
National CERT insights ?CERT means Computer Emergency Response Team; CSIRT is the closely related term Computer Security Incident Response Team.
Choose official national sources for this report. Each advisory shows its original language. Your selection is remembered on this device and included in shared links.
Official European source
ENISA European Vulnerability Database
Official EUVD identifiers, advisory evidence and known-exploited context. Missing fields are not treated as evidence of low risk.
1 current
ENISA EUVD identifier
EUVD-2026-107261
No EUVD known-exploited evidence
In the Golang Chi web framework, the ClientIPFromXFF middleware skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP.
This issue affects chi before 5.4.0.
EUVD state
Present in the current official mapping
Known exploitation
Not present in the current ENISA EUVD known-exploited dataset. This is not proof of no exploitation.
ENISA score
6.3 · CVSS 4.0
Advisory evidence
No linked advisory details stored yet
Recommended actionPatch only the product branches with a verified fix
Medium technical severity with public exploit material referenced by a structured source; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance. Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 31 structured product or package states remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
Fix availability varies by product
01
What, why and how
In the Golang Chi web framework, the ClientIPFromXFF middleware skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP.
This issue affects chi before 5.4.0.
What
In the Golang Chi web framework, the ClientIPFromXFF middleware skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP.
This issue affects chi before 5.4.0.
Why
The product has two different sources of the same data or information, but it uses the source that has less support for verification, is less trusted, or is less resistant to attack.
How
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
What
In the Golang Chi web framework, the ClientIPFromXFF middleware skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP.
This issue affects chi before 5.4.0.
Why
The product has two different sources of the same data or information, but it uses the source that has less support for verification, is less trusted, or is less resistant to attack.
How
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
02
Exploit reality and attack path
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
Observed exploitation ?Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No confirmed evidence
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
Public PoC / exploit material ?Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.Reference recorded
CISA Vulnrichment records proof-of-concept exploitation in its SSVC data. BlackTree has not independently executed or validated exploit material.
Likely attack path
a network path → Use of Less Trusted Source → cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor
Attack surface
Network
Privileges required
None: unauthenticated exploitation is possible
User interaction
None
Attack complexity
High: exploitation depends on specific conditions
Security boundary
Not a CVSS 4.0 base metric
Weakness ?CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness.
CWE-348: Use of Less Trusted Source. The product has two different sources of the same data or information, but it uses the source that has less support for verification, is less trusted, or is less resistant to attack.
CVSS vector ?CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity.
Common Vulnerability Scoring System 4.0: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
AVNetworkAttack vector: The vulnerable component can be reached over a network.ACHighAttack complexity: Successful exploitation depends on specific conditions outside the attacker's direct control.ATNoneAttack requirements: No additional deployment or execution condition is required.PRNonePrivileges required: The attacker does not need an account or existing privileges.UINoneUser interaction: No action by another user is required.VCLowVulnerable-system confidentiality: A successful attack can cause a limited loss.VILowVulnerable-system integrity: A successful attack can cause a limited loss.VANoneVulnerable-system availability: No direct loss is represented by this metric.SCNoneSubsequent-system confidentiality: No direct loss is represented by this metric.SINoneSubsequent-system integrity: No direct loss is represented by this metric.SANoneSubsequent-system availability: No direct loss is represented by this metric.
Post-exploitation / living off the land
No specific living-off-the-land technique is confirmed in the structured sources. Monitor normal administration tools for activity inconsistent with the affected service's baseline.
In the Golang Chi web framework, the ClientIPFromXFF middleware skips any X-Forwarded-For entry in a configured trusted CIDR but never verifies that the direct TCP peer in http.Request.RemoteAddr belongs to that CIDR. A client that can reach the Go server directly can therefore append a trusted-looking proxy address and choose the client IP returned by middleware.GetClientIP.
This issue affects chi before 5.4.0.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Status ?Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change.
Use the product-specific evidence above. Patch only products with a verified fixed release, and keep every affected or under-investigation state without a matching fix in the remediation queue.
Workaround
Restrict network exposure so that the application only accepts connections from trusted reverse proxies or load balancers, preventing direct client reachability: 1. Configure firewall rules on the host to only allow traffic from trusted proxy IP addresses to the application port: ``` firewall-cmd --permanent --zone=trusted --add-source= firewall-cmd --permanent --remove-port= /tcp firewall-cmd --reload ``` 2. In OpenShift or Kubernetes environments, apply an Ingress NetworkPolicy ensuring pod endpoints only accept traffic from designated ingress router controllers. 3. Configure the upstream reverse proxy (e.g., Envoy, HAProxy, or NGINX) to strip or sanitize incoming X-Forwarded-For headers from untrusted external clients before routing requests to backend services. Caveats: Restricting direct access may interrupt client traffic if services were previously exposed directly without a proxy. Reloading firewalld with `firewall-cmd --reload` will briefly reapply filtering rules and may affect active network sessions.
04
Evidence and provenance
Published 21 Oct 2026 · Last source change 21 Oct 2026, 17:19 UTC · CWE-348 · Use of Less Trusted Source
CVE recordCVE.org · 5.2
CVSS sourceCNA
EPSS source ?The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.FIRST · tracked since 2026-10-22
European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2026-107261
Product sourceVendor CSAF · Red Hat Product Security
Remediation sourceVendor CSAF · Red Hat Product Security
CWE sourceCNA
NVD statusNVD not scheduled
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
CVE
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
CVSS
Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
EPSS
Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
CWE
Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
CNA
CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
CISA ADP
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
NVD
National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
CERT / CSIRT
A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
PoC
Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
CSAF
Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
LoTL
Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.