Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- The selected CVSS metric records a network-reachable, unauthenticated path with no user interaction.
- EPSS is 0.59% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE Intelligencecontinuwuity · continuwuity
Official source article: GitHub GHSA-22FW-4JQ7-G8R8 ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.
Critical technical impact with a remotely reachable, unauthenticated path; no CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
Critical technical impact with a remotely reachable, unauthenticated path; no CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
Fix not verifiedConduit is a chat server powered by Matrix. A vulnerability that affects a number of Conduit-derived homeservers allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to force the target server to cryptographically sign arbitrary membership events. Affected products include Conduit prior to version 0.10.10, continuwuity prior to version 0.5.0, Grapevine prior to commit `9a50c244`, and tuwunel prior to version 1.4.8. The flaw exists because the server fails to validate the origin of a signing request, provided the event's state_key is a valid user ID belonging to the target server. Attackers can forge "leave" events for any user on the target server. This forcibly removes users (including admins and bots) from rooms. This allows denial of service and/or the removal of technical protections for a room (including policy servers, if all users on the policy server are removed). Attackers can forge "invite" events from a victim user to themselves, provided they have an account on a server where there is an account that has the power level to send invites. This allows the attacker to join private or invite-only rooms accessible by the victim, exposing confidential conversation history and room state. Attackers can forge "ban" events from a victim user to any user below the victim user's power level, provided the victim has the power level to issue bans AND the target of the ban resides on the same server as the victim. This allows the attacker to ban anyone in a room who is on the same server as the vulnerable one, however cannot exploit this to ban users on other servers or the victim themself. Conduit fixes the issue in version 0.10.10. continuwuity fixes the issue in commits `7fa4fa98` and `b2bead67`, released in 0.5.0. tuwunel fixes the issue in commit `dc9314de1f8a6e040c5aa331fe52efbe62e6a2c3`, released in 1.4.8. Grapevine fixes the issue in commit `9a50c2448abba6e2b7d79c64243bb438b351616c`. As a workaround, block access to the `PUT /_matrix/federation/v2/invite/{roomId}/{eventId}` endpoint using your reverse proxy.
Conduit is a chat server powered by Matrix. A vulnerability that affects a number of Conduit-derived homeservers allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to force the target server to cryptographically sign arbitrary membership events. Affected products include Conduit prior to version 0.10.10, continuwuity prior to version 0.5.0, Grapevine prior to commit `9a50c244`, and tuwunel prior to version 1.4.8. The flaw exists because the server fails to validate the origin of a signing request, provided the event's state_key is a valid user ID belonging to the target server. Attackers can forge "leave" events for any user on the target server. This forcibly removes users (including admins and bots) from rooms. This allows denial of service and/or the removal of technical protections for a room (including policy servers, if all users on the policy server are removed). Attackers can forge "invite" events from a victim user to themselves, provided they have an account on a server where there is an account that has the power level to send invites. This allows the attacker to join private or invite-only rooms accessible by the victim, exposing confidential conversation history and room state. Attackers can forge "ban" events from a victim user to any user below the victim user's power level, provided the victim has the power level to issue bans AND the target of the ban resides on the same server as the victim. This allows the attacker to ban anyone in a room who is on the same server as the vulnerable one, however cannot exploit this to ban users on other servers or the victim themself. Conduit fixes the issue in version 0.10.10. continuwuity fixes the issue in commits `7fa4fa98` and `b2bead67`, released in 0.5.0. tuwunel fixes the issue in commit `dc9314de1f8a6e040c5aa331fe52efbe62e6a2c3`, released in 1.4.8. Grapevine fixes the issue in commit `9a50c2448abba6e2b7d79c64243bb438b351616c`. As a workaround, block access to the `PUT /_matrix/federation/v2/invite/{roomId}/{eventId}` endpoint using your reverse proxy.
The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may disrupt the affected service.
Conduit is a chat server powered by Matrix. A vulnerability that affects a number of Conduit-derived homeservers allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to force the target server to cryptographically sign arbitrary membership events. Affected products include Conduit prior to version 0.10.10, continuwuity prior to version 0.5.0, Grapevine prior to commit `9a50c244`, and tuwunel prior to version 1.4.8. The flaw exists because the server fails to validate the origin of a signing request, provided the event's state_key is a valid user ID belonging to the target server. Attackers can forge "leave" events for any user on the target server. This forcibly removes users (including admins and bots) from rooms. This allows denial of service and/or the removal of technical protections for a room (including policy servers, if all users on the policy server are removed). Attackers can forge "invite" events from a victim user to themselves, provided they have an account on a server where there is an account that has the power level to send invites. This allows the attacker to join private or invite-only rooms accessible by the victim, exposing confidential conversation history and room state. Attackers can forge "ban" events from a victim user to any user below the victim user's power level, provided the victim has the power level to issue bans AND the target of the ban resides on the same server as the victim. This allows the attacker to ban anyone in a room who is on the same server as the vulnerable one, however cannot exploit this to ban users on other servers or the victim themself. Conduit fixes the issue in version 0.10.10. continuwuity fixes the issue in commits `7fa4fa98` and `b2bead67`, released in 0.5.0. tuwunel fixes the issue in commit `dc9314de1f8a6e040c5aa331fe52efbe62e6a2c3`, released in 1.4.8. Grapevine fixes the issue in commit `9a50c2448abba6e2b7d79c64243bb438b351616c`. As a workaround, block access to the `PUT /_matrix/federation/v2/invite/{roomId}/{eventId}` endpoint using your reverse proxy.
The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may disrupt the affected service.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
CWE-20: Improper Input Validation. The product receives input or data, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the properties that are required to process the data safely and correctly.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:L/SA:LCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 4.0: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 23 Dec 2025 · Last source change 26 Dec 2025, 20:49 UTC · CWE-20 · Improper Input Validation
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.