Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- EPSS is 0.20% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE Intelligencesiderolabs · omni
Official source article: GitHub GHSA-HQRF-67PM-WGFQ ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.
Low technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
These OSV and GitHub advisory ranges apply only to the named package and ecosystem. A listed fixed version is not a universal product patch or proof that an update is installed.
| Ecosystem and package | Affected range | First fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| gogithub.com/siderolabs/omni | < 0.48.0 | 0.48.0 | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 23 Oct 2025 |
Low technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
Patch availableOmni manages Kubernetes on bare metal, virtual machines, or in a cloud. Prior to version 0.48.0, Omni Wireguard SideroLink has the potential to escape. Omni and each Talos machine establish a peer-to-peer (P2P) SideroLink connection using WireGuard to mutually authenticate and authorize access. The WireGuard interface on Omni is configured to ensure that the source IP address of an incoming packet matches the IPv6 address assigned to the Talos peer. However, it performs no validation on the packet's destination address. The Talos end of the SideroLink connection cannot be considered a trusted environment. Workloads running on Kubernetes, especially those configured with host networking, could gain direct access to this link. Therefore, a malicious workload could theoretically send arbitrary packets over the SideroLink interface. This issue has been patched in version 0.48.0.
Omni manages Kubernetes on bare metal, virtual machines, or in a cloud. Prior to version 0.48.0, Omni Wireguard SideroLink has the potential to escape. Omni and each Talos machine establish a peer-to-peer (P2P) SideroLink connection using WireGuard to mutually authenticate and authorize access. The WireGuard interface on Omni is configured to ensure that the source IP address of an incoming packet matches the IPv6 address assigned to the Talos peer. However, it performs no validation on the packet's destination address. The Talos end of the SideroLink connection cannot be considered a trusted environment. Workloads running on Kubernetes, especially those configured with host networking, could gain direct access to this link. Therefore, a malicious workload could theoretically send arbitrary packets over the SideroLink interface. This issue has been patched in version 0.48.0.
The application performs an authorisation check, but it does not correctly enforce the required permission boundary.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with elevated privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
Omni manages Kubernetes on bare metal, virtual machines, or in a cloud. Prior to version 0.48.0, Omni Wireguard SideroLink has the potential to escape. Omni and each Talos machine establish a peer-to-peer (P2P) SideroLink connection using WireGuard to mutually authenticate and authorize access. The WireGuard interface on Omni is configured to ensure that the source IP address of an incoming packet matches the IPv6 address assigned to the Talos peer. However, it performs no validation on the packet's destination address. The Talos end of the SideroLink connection cannot be considered a trusted environment. Workloads running on Kubernetes, especially those configured with host networking, could gain direct access to this link. Therefore, a malicious workload could theoretically send arbitrary packets over the SideroLink interface. This issue has been patched in version 0.48.0.
The application performs an authorisation check, but it does not correctly enforce the required permission boundary.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with elevated privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization. The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:UCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 4.0: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 24 Sept 2025 · Last source change 24 Sept 2025, 20:09 UTC · CWE-863 · Incorrect Authorization
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.