Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- EPSS is 0.34% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE Intelligenceangular · angular
Official source article: GitHub GHSA-68X2-MX4Q-78M7 ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
These OSV and GitHub advisory ranges apply only to the named package and ecosystem. A listed fixed version is not a universal product patch or proof that an update is installed.
| Ecosystem and package | Affected range | First fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm@angular/platform-server | >= 16.0.0-next.0, < 18.2.14 | 18.2.14 | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 10 Sep 2025 |
| npm@angular/platform-server | >= 20.0.0-next.0, < 20.3.0 | 20.3.0 | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 10 Sep 2025 |
| npm@angular/platform-server | >= 19.0.0-next.0, < 19.2.15 | 19.2.15 | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 10 Sep 2025 |
| npm@angular/platform-server | >= 21.0.0-next.0, < 21.0.0-next.3 | 21.0.0-next.3 | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 10 Sep 2025 |
| npm@angular/ssr | >= 17.0.0-next.0, < 18.2.21 | 18.2.21 | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 10 Sep 2025 |
| npm@angular/ssr | >= 19.0.0-next.0, < 19.2.16 | 19.2.16 | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 10 Sep 2025 |
| npm@angular/ssr | >= 20.0.0-next.0, < 20.3.0 | 20.3.0 | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 10 Sep 2025 |
| npm@angular/ssr | >= 21.0.0-next.0, < 21.0.0-next.3 | 21.0.0-next.3 | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 10 Sep 2025 |
| npm@nguniversal/common | >= 16.0.0-next.0, <= 16.2.0 | Not stated | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 10 Sep 2025 |
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
Fix not verifiedAngular is a development platform for building mobile and desktop web applications using TypeScript/JavaScript and other languages. Angular uses a DI container (the "platform injector") to hold request-specific state during server-side rendering. For historical reasons, the container was stored as a JavaScript module-scoped global variable. When multiple requests are processed concurrently, they could inadvertently share or overwrite the global injector state. In practical terms, this can lead to one request responding with data meant for a completely different request, leaking data or tokens included on the rendered page or in response headers. As long as an attacker had network access to send any traffic that received a rendered response, they may have been able to send a large number of requests and then inspect the responses for information leaks. The APIs `bootstrapApplication`, `getPlatform`, and `destroyPlatform` were vulnerable and required SSR-only breaking changes. The issue has been patched in all active release lines as well as in the v21 prerelease. Patched packages include `@angular/platform-server` 21.0.0-next.3, 20.3.0, 19.2.15, and 18.2.14 and `@angular/ssr` 21.0.0-next.3, 20.3.0, 19.2.16, and 18.2.21. Several workarounds are available. Disable SSR via Server Routes or builder options, remove any asynchronous behavior from custom `bootstrap` functions, remove uses of `getPlatform()` in application code, and/or ensure that the server build defines `ngJitMode` as false.
Angular is a development platform for building mobile and desktop web applications using TypeScript/JavaScript and other languages. Angular uses a DI container (the "platform injector") to hold request-specific state during server-side rendering. For historical reasons, the container was stored as a JavaScript module-scoped global variable. When multiple requests are processed concurrently, they could inadvertently share or overwrite the global injector state. In practical terms, this can lead to one request responding with data meant for a completely different request, leaking data or tokens included on the rendered page or in response headers. As long as an attacker had network access to send any traffic that received a rendered response, they may have been able to send a large number of requests and then inspect the responses for information leaks. The APIs `bootstrapApplication`, `getPlatform`, and `destroyPlatform` were vulnerable and required SSR-only breaking changes. The issue has been patched in all active release lines as well as in the v21 prerelease. Patched packages include `@angular/platform-server` 21.0.0-next.3, 20.3.0, 19.2.15, and 18.2.14 and `@angular/ssr` 21.0.0-next.3, 20.3.0, 19.2.16, and 18.2.21. Several workarounds are available. Disable SSR via Server Routes or builder options, remove any asynchronous behavior from custom `bootstrap` functions, remove uses of `getPlatform()` in application code, and/or ensure that the server build defines `ngJitMode` as false.
The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation when the stated preconditions are met. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
Angular is a development platform for building mobile and desktop web applications using TypeScript/JavaScript and other languages. Angular uses a DI container (the "platform injector") to hold request-specific state during server-side rendering. For historical reasons, the container was stored as a JavaScript module-scoped global variable. When multiple requests are processed concurrently, they could inadvertently share or overwrite the global injector state. In practical terms, this can lead to one request responding with data meant for a completely different request, leaking data or tokens included on the rendered page or in response headers. As long as an attacker had network access to send any traffic that received a rendered response, they may have been able to send a large number of requests and then inspect the responses for information leaks. The APIs `bootstrapApplication`, `getPlatform`, and `destroyPlatform` were vulnerable and required SSR-only breaking changes. The issue has been patched in all active release lines as well as in the v21 prerelease. Patched packages include `@angular/platform-server` 21.0.0-next.3, 20.3.0, 19.2.15, and 18.2.14 and `@angular/ssr` 21.0.0-next.3, 20.3.0, 19.2.16, and 18.2.21. Several workarounds are available. Disable SSR via Server Routes or builder options, remove any asynchronous behavior from custom `bootstrap` functions, remove uses of `getPlatform()` in application code, and/or ensure that the server build defines `ngJitMode` as false.
The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation when the stated preconditions are met. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition'). The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 4.0: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 10 Sept 2025 · Last source change 10 Sept 2025, 20:25 UTC · CWE-362 · Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.