Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- EPSS is 0.38% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE IntelligenceDyson · MQTT server
Low technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
Low technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
Fix not verifiedThe Dyson MQTT server (2022 and possibly later) allows publications and subscriptions by a client that has the correct values of AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, AWS_SESSION_TOKEN, and device serial number, even if a device (such as a Pure Hot+Cool device) has been removed and is not visible in the supported MyDyson app. This could allow an unexpected actor to obtain control and set the room temperature (up to 37 Celsius) if ownership of the device is transferred without wiping the device. NOTE: the Supplier's position is that this is a potential vulnerability that dates back 4 years ago in 2022 and "we are unable to replicate that anymore." Based on the submitted report, in order to leverage this issue, an attacker needs to own a Dyson device with full privileges, sniff for the AWS credentials, and then transfer ownership of that Dyson device to the victim. Even if these steps were successfully accomplished, the attacker only acquires the ability to configure the Dyson device within its safe operating range, and does not acquire the ability to execute code on the device or obtain sensitive information.
The Dyson MQTT server (2022 and possibly later) allows publications and subscriptions by a client that has the correct values of AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, AWS_SESSION_TOKEN, and device serial number, even if a device (such as a Pure Hot+Cool device) has been removed and is not visible in the supported MyDyson app. This could allow an unexpected actor to obtain control and set the room temperature (up to 37 Celsius) if ownership of the device is transferred without wiping the device. NOTE: the Supplier's position is that this is a potential vulnerability that dates back 4 years ago in 2022 and "we are unable to replicate that anymore." Based on the submitted report, in order to leverage this issue, an attacker needs to own a Dyson device with full privileges, sniff for the AWS credentials, and then transfer ownership of that Dyson device to the victim. Even if these steps were successfully accomplished, the attacker only acquires the ability to configure the Dyson device within its safe operating range, and does not acquire the ability to execute code on the device or obtain sensitive information.
The product protects a primary channel, but it does not use the same level of protection for an alternate channel.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with elevated privileges. If successful, the issue may execute code or commands in the affected security context.
The Dyson MQTT server (2022 and possibly later) allows publications and subscriptions by a client that has the correct values of AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, AWS_SESSION_TOKEN, and device serial number, even if a device (such as a Pure Hot+Cool device) has been removed and is not visible in the supported MyDyson app. This could allow an unexpected actor to obtain control and set the room temperature (up to 37 Celsius) if ownership of the device is transferred without wiping the device. NOTE: the Supplier's position is that this is a potential vulnerability that dates back 4 years ago in 2022 and "we are unable to replicate that anymore." Based on the submitted report, in order to leverage this issue, an attacker needs to own a Dyson device with full privileges, sniff for the AWS credentials, and then transfer ownership of that Dyson device to the victim. Even if these steps were successfully accomplished, the attacker only acquires the ability to configure the Dyson device within its safe operating range, and does not acquire the ability to execute code on the device or obtain sensitive information.
The product protects a primary channel, but it does not use the same level of protection for an alternate channel.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with elevated privileges. If successful, the issue may execute code or commands in the affected security context.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
CWE-420: Unprotected Alternate Channel. The product protects a primary channel, but it does not use the same level of protection for an alternate channel.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 29 Oct 2025 · Last source change 13 Jan 2026, 21:16 UTC · CWE-420 · Unprotected Alternate Channel
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.