BlackTreeCVE Intelligence
← Back to the CVE catalogue
Full vulnerability report · 2025
CVE-2025-53627High confidence

Meshtastic firmware allows forged DMs with no PKC to show up as encrypted

meshtastic · firmware

Official source article: GitHub GHSA-377P-PRWP-4HWF ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.

5.3MediumCVSS 3.1
Recommended action
Within 7 days

Medium technical severity with public exploit material referenced by a structured source; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.

Fix not verified
R
Operational reassessment

Published severity in operational context

Open reassessment dashboard →
Published severityMediumOperational priority:High, raised one band.upgradedsince 29 Dec 2025

Evidence used

  • No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
  • A structured source references public exploit or proof-of-concept material.
  • The selected CVSS metric records a network-reachable, unauthenticated path with no user interaction.
  • EPSS is 0.20% for the current model date.

Compensating controls

  • Restrict the affected network interface to trusted sources where business-safe.
  • Increase monitoring for the attack path and post-exploitation behaviour described in the report.

Verification

  1. Confirm that the asset runs meshtastic firmware and falls inside the recorded affected range.
  2. Recheck the vendor advisory before scheduling a change because no verified fixed version is currently retained.
  3. Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
  4. Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
Mitigation target: Within 30 daysRemediation target: Within 180 days

This automated reassessment organises public evidence. It does not know asset exposure, business impact or control effectiveness and does not replace CVSS or a human risk decision.

Optional official sources

National CERT insights
?CERT means Computer Emergency Response Team; CSIRT is the closely related term Computer Security Incident Response Team.

Choose official national sources for this report. Each advisory shows its original language. Your selection is remembered on this device and included in shared links.

Official European source

ENISA European Vulnerability Database

Official EUVD identifiers, advisory evidence and known-exploited context. Missing fields are not treated as evidence of low risk.

1 current
ENISA EUVD identifier

EUVD-2025-205605

No EUVD known-exploited evidence

ENISA has published the identifier mapping but no EUVD description has been stored yet.

EUVD state
Present in the current official mapping
Known exploitation
Not present in the current ENISA EUVD known-exploited dataset. This is not proof of no exploitation.
ENISA score
Not supplied in the stored EUVD record
Advisory evidence
No linked advisory details stored yet
Recommended actionWithin 7 days

Medium technical severity with public exploit material referenced by a structured source; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.

Fix not verified
01

What, why and how

Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. The Meshtastic firmware (starting from version 2.5) introduces asymmetric encryption (PKI) for direct messages, but when the `pki_encrypted` flag is missing, the firmware silently falls back to legacy AES-256-CTR channel encryption. This was an intentional decision to maintain backwards compatibility. However, the end-user applications, like Web app, iOS/Android app, and applications built on top of Meshtastic using the SDK, did not have a way to differentiate between end-to-end encrypted DMs and the legacy DMs. This creates a downgrade attack path where adversaries who know a shared channel key can craft and inject spoofed direct messages that are displayed as if they were PKC encrypted. Users are not given any feedback of whether a direct message was decrypted with PKI or with legacy symmetric encryption, undermining the expected security guarantees of the PKI rollout. Version 2.7.15 fixes this issue.

What

Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. The Meshtastic firmware (starting from version 2.5) introduces asymmetric encryption (PKI) for direct messages, but when the `pki_encrypted` flag is missing, the firmware silently falls back to legacy AES-256-CTR channel encryption. This was an intentional decision to maintain backwards compatibility. However, the end-user applications, like Web app, iOS/Android app, and applications built on top of Meshtastic using the SDK, did not have a way to differentiate between end-to-end encrypted DMs and the legacy DMs. This creates a downgrade attack path where adversaries who know a shared channel key can craft and inject spoofed direct messages that are displayed as if they were PKC encrypted. Users are not given any feedback of whether a direct message was decrypted with PKI or with legacy symmetric encryption, undermining the expected security guarantees of the PKI rollout. Version 2.7.15 fixes this issue.

Why

The product receives input that is expected to be of a certain type, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input is actually of the expected type.

How

An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.

What

Meshtastic is an open source mesh networking solution. The Meshtastic firmware (starting from version 2.5) introduces asymmetric encryption (PKI) for direct messages, but when the `pki_encrypted` flag is missing, the firmware silently falls back to legacy AES-256-CTR channel encryption. This was an intentional decision to maintain backwards compatibility. However, the end-user applications, like Web app, iOS/Android app, and applications built on top of Meshtastic using the SDK, did not have a way to differentiate between end-to-end encrypted DMs and the legacy DMs. This creates a downgrade attack path where adversaries who know a shared channel key can craft and inject spoofed direct messages that are displayed as if they were PKC encrypted. Users are not given any feedback of whether a direct message was decrypted with PKI or with legacy symmetric encryption, undermining the expected security guarantees of the PKI rollout. Version 2.7.15 fixes this issue.

Why

The product receives input that is expected to be of a certain type, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input is actually of the expected type.

How

An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.

02

Exploit reality and attack path

CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.

Observed exploitation
?Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.
No confirmed evidence

No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.

Public PoC / exploit material
?Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.
Reference recorded

A structured CVE source labels at least one public reference as exploit material. BlackTree has not independently validated that it is safe, reliable or weaponised.

Likely attack path
a network path → Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input → cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor
Attack surface
Network
Privileges required
None: unauthenticated exploitation is possible
User interaction
None
Attack complexity
Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
Security boundary
Unchanged: impact remains within the vulnerable component's security authority
Weakness
?CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness.
CWE-1287 ↗

CWE-1287: Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input. The product receives input that is expected to be of a certain type, but it does not validate or incorrectly validates that the input is actually of the expected type.

CVSS vector
?CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Common Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.

AVNetworkAttack vector: The vulnerable component can be reached over a network.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.PRNonePrivileges required: The attacker does not need an account or existing privileges.UINoneUser interaction: No action by another user is required.SUnchangedScope: The security impact remains within the vulnerable component's authority.CNoneConfidentiality impact: No direct loss is represented by this metric.ILowIntegrity impact: A successful attack can cause a limited loss.ANoneAvailability impact: No direct loss is represented by this metric.
Post-exploitation / living off the land
No specific living-off-the-land technique is confirmed in the structured sources. Monitor normal administration tools for activity inconsistent with the affected service's baseline.
NetworkUnauthenticatedCWE-1287Public exploit reference
A

Official authority intelligence

Only matched European and national findings are included. Language selectors and unavailable sources are omitted.

Cyber Security Agency of Singapore · English · CSA-SB-20251231Security Bulletin 31 Dec 2025

The Cyber Security Agency of Singapore included this CVE in its official Security Bulletin 31 Dec 2025, published on 31 December 2025. Open the linked bulletin for the product, severity and reference information published in that issue.

Official advisory ↗
JVN iPedia · Japanese · JVNDB-2025-026149meshtasticのMeshtastic Firmwareにおける指定されたタイプの入力に対する不適切な検証に関する脆弱性

Meshtasticはオープンソースのメッシュネットワーキングソリューションです。Meshtasticのファームウェア（バージョン2.5以降）は、ダイレクトメッセージに対して非対称暗号（PKI）を導入しましたが、`pki_encrypted`フラグがない場合、ファームウェアは静かにレガシーのAES-256-CTRチャネル暗号にフォールバックします。これは下位互換性を維持するための意図的な決定でした。しかし、Webアプリ、iOS/Androidアプリ、およびMeshtasticのSDKを使って構築されたアプリケーションなどのエンドユーザー向けアプリケーションは、エンドツーエンド暗号化されたDMとレガシーDMを区別する方法を持っていませんでした。これにより、共有チャネル鍵を知る攻撃者が、PKC暗号化されたかのように表示される偽のダイレクトメッセージを作成・注入できるダウングレード攻撃の経路が生まれました。ユーザーは、ダイレクトメッセージがPKIで復号されたのかレガシー対称暗号で復号されたのかのフィードバックを受け取ることができず、PKI展開による想定されるセキュリティ保証が損なわれる状況でした。この問題はバージョン2.7.15で修正されました。

Official advisory ↗
03

Patch and workaround

Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.

Status
?Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change.
Fix not verified
Affected
firmware: >= 2.5, < 2.7.15
Fixed
No fixed version is explicitly recorded in the structured CVE data.
Action
No verified patch reference is present in the current structured sources. Check the vendor advisory before making a change.
Workaround
No verified workaround is recorded. If business-safe, reduce exposure to the affected interface and allow only trusted sources until authoritative guidance is available.
04

Evidence and provenance

Published 29 Dec 2025 · Last source change 29 Dec 2025, 16:52 UTC · CWE-1287 · Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input

CVE recordCVE.org · 5.2
CVSS sourceCNA
EPSS source
?The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.
FIRST · tracked since 2026-08-14
European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2025-205605
Product sourceCNA
Remediation sourceCVE/CNA references
CWE sourceCNA
NVD statusNVD enriched

Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.

Material change intelligence

What changed after publication

View recent updates ↗
  1. Affected versionsThe structured affected or fixed version information changed.
    Before
    >= 2.5, < 2.7.15 · Fixed: No fixed version is explicitly recorded in the structured CVE data.
    After
    firmware: >= 2.5, < 2.7.15 · Fixed: No fixed version is explicitly recorded in the structured CVE data.
    CNA ↗
Material fields only · duplicate refreshes suppressed · history retained for the configured operational retention period
CVE published
ENISA EUVD · EUVD-2025-205605↗CISA Vulnrichment SSVC evidence↗Public exploit reference · GitHub GHSA-377P-PRWP-4HWF↗Official CVE record (CNA and ADP data)↗NVD record↗
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
CVE
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
CVSS
Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
EPSS
Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
CWE
Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
CNA
CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
CISA ADP
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
NVD
National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
CERT / CSIRT
A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
PoC
Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
CSAF
Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
LoTL
Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.
Free version - for non-commercial use only.CVE-2025-53627 · cve.blacktree.nl