Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- The selected CVSS metric records a network-reachable, unauthenticated path with no user interaction.
- EPSS is 0.67% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE IntelligenceRooCodeInc · Roo-Code
Official source article: GitHub GHSA-5X8H-M52G-5V54 ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
Patch availableRoo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent. The project-specific MCP configuration for the Roo Code agent is stored in the `.roo/mcp.json` file within the VS Code workspace. Because the MCP configuration format allows for execution of arbitrary commands, prior to version 3.20.3, it would have been possible for an attacker with access to craft a prompt to ask the agent to write a malicious command to the MCP configuration file. If the user had opted-in to auto-approving file writes within the project, this would have led to arbitrary command execution. This issue is of moderate severity, since it requires the attacker to already be able to submit prompts to the agent (for instance through a prompt injection attack), for the user to have MCP enabled (on by default), and for the user to have enabled auto-approved file writes (off by default). Version 3.20.3 fixes the issue by adding an additional layer of opt-in configuration for auto-approving writing to Roo's configuration files, including all files within the `.roo/` folder.
Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent. The project-specific MCP configuration for the Roo Code agent is stored in the `.roo/mcp.json` file within the VS Code workspace. Because the MCP configuration format allows for execution of arbitrary commands, prior to version 3.20.3, it would have been possible for an attacker with access to craft a prompt to ask the agent to write a malicious command to the MCP configuration file. If the user had opted-in to auto-approving file writes within the project, this would have led to arbitrary command execution. This issue is of moderate severity, since it requires the attacker to already be able to submit prompts to the agent (for instance through a prompt injection attack), for the user to have MCP enabled (on by default), and for the user to have enabled auto-approved file writes (off by default). Version 3.20.3 fixes the issue by adding an additional layer of opt-in configuration for auto-approving writing to Roo's configuration files, including all files within the `.roo/` folder.
Untrusted input reaches a command interpreter without sufficient validation or separation from command syntax.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
Roo Code is an AI-powered autonomous coding agent. The project-specific MCP configuration for the Roo Code agent is stored in the `.roo/mcp.json` file within the VS Code workspace. Because the MCP configuration format allows for execution of arbitrary commands, prior to version 3.20.3, it would have been possible for an attacker with access to craft a prompt to ask the agent to write a malicious command to the MCP configuration file. If the user had opted-in to auto-approving file writes within the project, this would have led to arbitrary command execution. This issue is of moderate severity, since it requires the attacker to already be able to submit prompts to the agent (for instance through a prompt injection attack), for the user to have MCP enabled (on by default), and for the user to have enabled auto-approved file writes (off by default). Version 3.20.3 fixes the issue by adding an additional layer of opt-in configuration for auto-approving writing to Roo's configuration files, including all files within the `.roo/` folder.
Untrusted input reaches a command interpreter without sufficient validation or separation from command syntax.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
CWE-77: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection'). The product constructs all or part of a command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended command when it is sent to a downstream component.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 27 Jun 2025 · Last source change 3 Jul 2025, 14:27 UTC · CWE-77 · Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection')
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.