Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- EPSS is 0.33% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE IntelligenceO2 UK · O2
Low technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
Low technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
Fix not verifiedO2 UK before 2025-05-19 allows subscribers to determine the Cell ID of other subscribers by initiating an IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) call and then reading the utran-cell-id-3gpp field of a Cellular-Network-Info SIP header, aka an ECI (E-UTRAN Cell Identity) leak. The Cell ID might be usable to identify a cell location via crowdsourced data, and might correspond to a small physical area (e.g., if the called party is in a city centre). Removal of the Cellular-Network-Info header is mentioned in section 4.4.19 of ETSI TS 124 229.
O2 UK before 2025-05-19 allows subscribers to determine the Cell ID of other subscribers by initiating an IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) call and then reading the utran-cell-id-3gpp field of a Cellular-Network-Info SIP header, aka an ECI (E-UTRAN Cell Identity) leak. The Cell ID might be usable to identify a cell location via crowdsourced data, and might correspond to a small physical area (e.g., if the called party is in a city centre). Removal of the Cellular-Network-Info header is mentioned in section 4.4.19 of ETSI TS 124 229.
The code transmits data to another actor, but a portion of the data includes sensitive information that should not be accessible to that actor.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
O2 UK before 2025-05-19 allows subscribers to determine the Cell ID of other subscribers by initiating an IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) call and then reading the utran-cell-id-3gpp field of a Cellular-Network-Info SIP header, aka an ECI (E-UTRAN Cell Identity) leak. The Cell ID might be usable to identify a cell location via crowdsourced data, and might correspond to a small physical area (e.g., if the called party is in a city centre). Removal of the Cellular-Network-Info header is mentioned in section 4.4.19 of ETSI TS 124 229.
The code transmits data to another actor, but a portion of the data includes sensitive information that should not be accessible to that actor.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
CWE-201: Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data. The code transmits data to another actor, but a portion of the data includes sensitive information that should not be accessible to that actor.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 18 May 2025 · Last source change 19 May 2025, 20:06 UTC · CWE-201 · Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.