Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- The selected CVSS metric records a network-reachable, unauthenticated path with no user interaction.
- EPSS is 0.65% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE IntelligenceFull vulnerability report · 2025
CVE-2025-47934High confidence
OpenPGP.js's message signature verification can be spoofed
openpgpjs · openpgpjs
Official source article: GitHub GHSA-8QFF-QR5Q-5PR8 ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.
8.7HighCVSS 4.0
Within 7 days
Fix not verifiedHigh technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
R
Open reassessment dashboard →Operational reassessment
Published severity in operational context
Published severityHigh→Operational priority:High, unchanged from published severity.unchanged
Compensating controls
- Restrict the affected network interface to trusted sources where business-safe.
- Monitor vendor guidance and exploitation sources for a material change.
Verification
- Confirm that the asset runs openpgpjs openpgpjs and falls inside the recorded affected range.
- Recheck the vendor advisory before scheduling a change because no verified fixed version is currently retained.
- Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
- Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
Open-source package ranges4 source-attributed ranges
These OSV and GitHub advisory ranges apply only to the named package and ecosystem. A listed fixed version is not a universal product patch or proof that an update is installed.
| Ecosystem and package | Affected range | First fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| npmopenpgp | >= 5.0.1, <= 5.11.2 | 5.11.3 | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 19 May 2025 |
| npmopenpgp | >= 6.0.0-alpha.0, <= 6.1.0 | 6.1.1 | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 19 May 2025 |
| npmopenpgp | SEMVER: introduced 5.0.1; fixed 5.11.3 | 5.11.3 | OSV record ↗aggregator derived · 10 Sep 2026 |
| npmopenpgp | SEMVER: introduced 6.0.0-alpha.0; fixed 6.1.1 | 6.1.1 | OSV record ↗aggregator derived · 10 Sep 2026 |
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
Fix not verified01
What, why and how
OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. Startinf in version 5.0.1 and prior to versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1, a maliciously modified message can be passed to either `openpgp.verify` or `openpgp.decrypt`, causing these functions to return a valid signature verification result while returning data that was not actually signed. This flaw allows signature verifications of inline (non-detached) signed messages (using `openpgp.verify`) and signed-and-encrypted messages (using `openpgp.decrypt` with `verificationKeys`) to be spoofed, since both functions return extracted data that may not match the data that was originally signed. Detached signature verifications are not affected, as no signed data is returned in that case. In order to spoof a message, the attacker needs a single valid message signature (inline or detached) as well as the plaintext data that was legitimately signed, and can then construct an inline-signed message or signed-and-encrypted message with any data of the attacker's choice, which will appear as legitimately signed by affected versions of OpenPGP.js. In other words, any inline-signed message can be modified to return any other data (while still indicating that the signature was valid), and the same is true for signed+encrypted messages if the attacker can obtain a valid signature and encrypt a new message (of the attacker's choice) together with that signature. The issue has been patched in versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1. Some workarounds are available. When verifying inline-signed messages, extract the message and signature(s) from the message returned by `openpgp.readMessage`, and verify the(/each) signature as a detached signature by passing the signature and a new message containing only the data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`. When decrypting and verifying signed+encrypted messages, decrypt and verify the message in two steps, by first calling `openpgp.decrypt` without `verificationKeys`, and then passing the returned signature(s) and a new message containing the decrypted data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`.
What
OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. Startinf in version 5.0.1 and prior to versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1, a maliciously modified message can be passed to either `openpgp.verify` or `openpgp.decrypt`, causing these functions to return a valid signature verification result while returning data that was not actually signed. This flaw allows signature verifications of inline (non-detached) signed messages (using `openpgp.verify`) and signed-and-encrypted messages (using `openpgp.decrypt` with `verificationKeys`) to be spoofed, since both functions return extracted data that may not match the data that was originally signed. Detached signature verifications are not affected, as no signed data is returned in that case. In order to spoof a message, the attacker needs a single valid message signature (inline or detached) as well as the plaintext data that was legitimately signed, and can then construct an inline-signed message or signed-and-encrypted message with any data of the attacker's choice, which will appear as legitimately signed by affected versions of OpenPGP.js. In other words, any inline-signed message can be modified to return any other data (while still indicating that the signature was valid), and the same is true for signed+encrypted messages if the attacker can obtain a valid signature and encrypt a new message (of the attacker's choice) together with that signature. The issue has been patched in versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1. Some workarounds are available. When verifying inline-signed messages, extract the message and signature(s) from the message returned by `openpgp.readMessage`, and verify the(/each) signature as a detached signature by passing the signature and a new message containing only the data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`. When decrypting and verifying signed+encrypted messages, decrypt and verify the message in two steps, by first calling `openpgp.decrypt` without `verificationKeys`, and then passing the returned signature(s) and a new message containing the decrypted data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`.
Why
The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data.
How
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
What
OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. Startinf in version 5.0.1 and prior to versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1, a maliciously modified message can be passed to either `openpgp.verify` or `openpgp.decrypt`, causing these functions to return a valid signature verification result while returning data that was not actually signed. This flaw allows signature verifications of inline (non-detached) signed messages (using `openpgp.verify`) and signed-and-encrypted messages (using `openpgp.decrypt` with `verificationKeys`) to be spoofed, since both functions return extracted data that may not match the data that was originally signed. Detached signature verifications are not affected, as no signed data is returned in that case. In order to spoof a message, the attacker needs a single valid message signature (inline or detached) as well as the plaintext data that was legitimately signed, and can then construct an inline-signed message or signed-and-encrypted message with any data of the attacker's choice, which will appear as legitimately signed by affected versions of OpenPGP.js. In other words, any inline-signed message can be modified to return any other data (while still indicating that the signature was valid), and the same is true for signed+encrypted messages if the attacker can obtain a valid signature and encrypt a new message (of the attacker's choice) together with that signature. The issue has been patched in versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1. Some workarounds are available. When verifying inline-signed messages, extract the message and signature(s) from the message returned by `openpgp.readMessage`, and verify the(/each) signature as a detached signature by passing the signature and a new message containing only the data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`. When decrypting and verifying signed+encrypted messages, decrypt and verify the message in two steps, by first calling `openpgp.decrypt` without `verificationKeys`, and then passing the returned signature(s) and a new message containing the decrypted data (created using `openpgp.createMessage`) to `openpgp.verify`.
Why
The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data.
How
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
02
Exploit reality and attack path
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
Observed exploitation No confirmed evidence
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
Public PoC / exploit material None recorded
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
- Likely attack path
- a network path → Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature → cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor
- Attack surface
- Network
- Privileges required
- None: unauthenticated exploitation is possible
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
- Security boundary
- Not a CVSS 4.0 base metric
- Weakness
?
CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness. - CWE-347 ↗
CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature. The product does not verify, or incorrectly verifies, the cryptographic signature for data.
- CVSS vector
?
CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity. CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 4.0: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
AVNetworkAttack vector: The vulnerable component can be reached over a network.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.ATNoneAttack requirements: No additional deployment or execution condition is required.PRNonePrivileges required: The attacker does not need an account or existing privileges.UINoneUser interaction: No action by another user is required.VCNoneVulnerable-system confidentiality: No direct loss is represented by this metric.VIHighVulnerable-system integrity: A successful attack can cause a major loss.VANoneVulnerable-system availability: No direct loss is represented by this metric.SCNoneSubsequent-system confidentiality: No direct loss is represented by this metric.SINoneSubsequent-system integrity: No direct loss is represented by this metric.SANoneSubsequent-system availability: No direct loss is represented by this metric.- Post-exploitation / living off the land
- No specific living-off-the-land technique is confirmed in the structured sources. Monitor normal administration tools for activity inconsistent with the affected service's baseline.
03
Patch and workaround
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
- Status
?
Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change. - Fix not verified
- Affected
- openpgpjs: >= 5.0.1, < 5.11.3, >= 6.0.0-alpha.0, < 6.1.1
- Fixed
- No fixed version is explicitly recorded in the structured CVE data.
- Action
- No verified patch reference is present in the current structured sources. Check the vendor advisory before making a change.
- Workaround
- No verified workaround is recorded. If business-safe, reduce exposure to the affected interface and allow only trusted sources until authoritative guidance is available.
04
Evidence and provenance
Published 19 May 2025 · Last source change 20 May 2025, 13:02 UTC · CWE-347 · Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature
CVE recordCVE.org · 5.1
CVSS sourceCNA
EPSS source FIRST · tracked since 2026-08-14
?
The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2025-15798
Product sourceCNA
Remediation sourceCVE/CNA references
CWE sourceCNA
NVD statusNVD not scheduled
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
Material change intelligence
View recent updates ↗What changed after publication
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
- CVE
- Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
- CVSS
- Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
- EPSS
- Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
- CWE
- Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
- CNA
- CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
- CISA ADP
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
- NVD
- National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
- CERT / CSIRT
- A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
- PoC
- Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
- CSAF
- Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
- LoTL
- Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.