BlackTreeIndependent security intelligenceApache Software Foundation · Apache CloudStack
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
Fix not verifiedA privilege escalation vulnerability exists in Apache CloudStack versions 4.10.0.0 through 4.20.0.0 where a malicious Domain Admin user in the ROOT domain can reset the password of user-accounts of Admin role type. This operation is not appropriately restricted and allows the attacker to assume control over higher-privileged user-accounts. A malicious Domain Admin attacker can impersonate an Admin user-account and gain access to sensitive APIs and resources that could result in the compromise of resource integrity and confidentiality, data loss, denial of service, and availability of infrastructure managed by CloudStack. Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache CloudStack 4.19.3.0 or 4.20.1.0, which fixes the issue with the following: * Strict validation on Role Type hierarchy: the caller's user-account role must be equal to or higher than the target user-account's role. * API privilege comparison: the caller must possess all privileges of the user they are operating on. * Two new domain-level settings (restricted to the default Admin): - role.types.allowed.for.operations.on.accounts.of.same.role.type: Defines which role types are allowed to act on users of the same role type. Default: "Admin, DomainAdmin, ResourceAdmin". - allow.operations.on.users.in.same.account: Allows/disallows user operations within the same account. Default: true.
A privilege escalation vulnerability exists in Apache CloudStack versions 4.10.0.0 through 4.20.0.0 where a malicious Domain Admin user in the ROOT domain can reset the password of user-accounts of Admin role type. This operation is not appropriately restricted and allows the attacker to assume control over higher-privileged user-accounts. A malicious Domain Admin attacker can impersonate an Admin user-account and gain access to sensitive APIs and resources that could result in the compromise of resource integrity and confidentiality, data loss, denial of service, and availability of infrastructure managed by CloudStack. Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache CloudStack 4.19.3.0 or 4.20.1.0, which fixes the issue with the following: * Strict validation on Role Type hierarchy: the caller's user-account role must be equal to or higher than the target user-account's role. * API privilege comparison: the caller must possess all privileges of the user they are operating on. * Two new domain-level settings (restricted to the default Admin): - role.types.allowed.for.operations.on.accounts.of.same.role.type: Defines which role types are allowed to act on users of the same role type. Default: "Admin, DomainAdmin, ResourceAdmin". - allow.operations.on.users.in.same.account: Allows/disallows user operations within the same account. Default: true.
The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may gain additional privileges.
A privilege escalation vulnerability exists in Apache CloudStack versions 4.10.0.0 through 4.20.0.0 where a malicious Domain Admin user in the ROOT domain can reset the password of user-accounts of Admin role type. This operation is not appropriately restricted and allows the attacker to assume control over higher-privileged user-accounts. A malicious Domain Admin attacker can impersonate an Admin user-account and gain access to sensitive APIs and resources that could result in the compromise of resource integrity and confidentiality, data loss, denial of service, and availability of infrastructure managed by CloudStack. Users are recommended to upgrade to Apache CloudStack 4.19.3.0 or 4.20.1.0, which fixes the issue with the following: * Strict validation on Role Type hierarchy: the caller's user-account role must be equal to or higher than the target user-account's role. * API privilege comparison: the caller must possess all privileges of the user they are operating on. * Two new domain-level settings (restricted to the default Admin): - role.types.allowed.for.operations.on.accounts.of.same.role.type: Defines which role types are allowed to act on users of the same role type. Default: "Admin, DomainAdmin, ResourceAdmin". - allow.operations.on.users.in.same.account: Allows/disallows user operations within the same account. Default: true.
The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may gain additional privileges.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
CWE-269: Improper Privilege Management. The product does not properly assign, modify, track, or check privileges for an actor, creating an unintended sphere of control for that actor.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 10 Jun 2025 · Last source change 26 Feb 2026, 17:50 UTC · CWE-269 · Improper Privilege Management
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.