Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- EPSS is 0.21% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE IntelligenceFull vulnerability report · 2025
CVE-2025-27458High confidence
CVE-2025-27458
Endress+Hauser · Endress+Hauser MEAC300-FNADE4
6.5MediumCVSS 3.1
Patch only the product branches with a verified fix
Fix availability varies by productMedium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority. Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 1 structured product or package state remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
R
Open reassessment dashboard →Operational reassessment
Published severity in operational context
Published severityMedium→Operational priority:Medium, unchanged from published severity.unchanged
Compensating controls
- Apply the linked authoritative mitigation while planning the permanent fix.
- Restrict the affected network interface to trusted sources where business-safe.
- Monitor vendor guidance and exploitation sources for a material change.
Verification
- Confirm that the asset runs Endress+Hauser Endress+Hauser MEAC300-FNADE4 and falls inside the recorded affected range.
- Recheck the vendor advisory before scheduling a change because no verified fixed version is currently retained.
- Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
- Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
Remediation availability differs by product scope
Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 1 structured product or package state remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
- SICK PSIRT: 1 affected or under-investigation product state without a fixed product state in the same current advisory
Direct vendor intelligence
1 currentAuthoritative vendor CSAF and VEX advisories
Structured product status and remediation from the issuing vendor. Product-state explanations are always visible; large lists can be searched or downloaded.
SCA-2025-0008 · CSAF 2.0 · revision 1.0.0 · finalSICK PSIRTMultiple vulnerabilities in Endress+Hauser MEAC300-FNADE4
The vendor explicitly identifies these products as affected by this CVE.
- Endress+Hauser MEAC300-FNADE4 all firmware versions
- Summary
- The VNC authentication mechanism bases on a challenge-response system where both server and client use the same password for encryption. The challenge is sent from the server to the client, is encrypted by the client and sent back. The server does the same encryption locally and if the responses match it is prooven that the client knows the correct password. Since all VNC communication is unencrypted, an attacker can obtain the challenge and response and try to derive the password from this information.
- Remediation
- Please make sure that you apply general security practices when operating the MEAC300-FNADE4. The following General Security Practices could mitigate the associated security risk.
Medium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority. Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 1 structured product or package state remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
Fix availability varies by product01
What, why and how
The VNC authentication mechanism bases on a challenge-response system where both server and client use the same password for encryption. The challenge is sent from the server to the client, is encrypted by the client and sent back. The server does the same encryption locally and if the responses match it is prooven that the client knows the correct password. Since all VNC communication is unencrypted, an attacker can obtain the challenge and response and try to derive the password from this information.
What
The VNC authentication mechanism bases on a challenge-response system where both server and client use the same password for encryption. The challenge is sent from the server to the client, is encrypted by the client and sent back. The server does the same encryption locally and if the responses match it is prooven that the client knows the correct password. Since all VNC communication is unencrypted, an attacker can obtain the challenge and response and try to derive the password from this information.
Why
The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.
How
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication after a user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
What
The VNC authentication mechanism bases on a challenge-response system where both server and client use the same password for encryption. The challenge is sent from the server to the client, is encrypted by the client and sent back. The server does the same encryption locally and if the responses match it is prooven that the client knows the correct password. Since all VNC communication is unencrypted, an attacker can obtain the challenge and response and try to derive the password from this information.
Why
The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.
How
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication after a user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
02
Exploit reality and attack path
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
Observed exploitation No confirmed evidence
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
Public PoC / exploit material None recorded
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
- Likely attack path
- a network path → Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm → cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor
- Attack surface
- Network
- Privileges required
- None: unauthenticated exploitation is possible
- User interaction
- Required interaction required
- Attack complexity
- Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
- Security boundary
- Unchanged: impact remains within the vulnerable component's security authority
- Weakness
?
CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration: a standard category for the underlying weakness. - CWE-327 ↗
CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm. The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.
- CVSS vector
?
CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity. CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
AVNetworkAttack vector: The vulnerable component can be reached over a network.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.PRNonePrivileges required: The attacker does not need an account or existing privileges.UIRequiredUser interaction: Another user must perform an action for exploitation to succeed.SUnchangedScope: The security impact remains within the vulnerable component's authority.CHighConfidentiality impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.INoneIntegrity impact: No direct loss is represented by this metric.ANoneAvailability impact: No direct loss is represented by this metric.- Post-exploitation / living off the land
- No specific living-off-the-land technique is confirmed in the structured sources. Monitor normal administration tools for activity inconsistent with the affected service's baseline.
03
Patch and workaround
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
- Status
?
Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change. - Fix availability varies by product
- Action
- Use the product-specific evidence above. Patch only products with a verified fixed release, and keep every affected or under-investigation state without a matching fix in the remediation queue.
- Workaround
- Please make sure that you apply general security practices when operating the MEAC300-FNADE4. The following General Security Practices could mitigate the associated security risk.
04
Evidence and provenance
Published 3 Jul 2025 · Last source change 3 Jul 2025, 13:15 UTC · CWE-327 · Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
CVE recordCVE.org · 5.1
CVSS sourceCNA
EPSS source FIRST · tracked since 2026-08-14
?
The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2025-19870
Product sourceVendor CSAF · SICK PSIRT
Remediation sourceVendor CSAF · SICK PSIRT
CWE sourceCNA
NVD statusNVD enriched
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
Material change intelligence
View recent updates ↗What changed after publication
- Vendor guidanceAuthoritative vendor guidance changed: added remediation: sick.com/psirt; removed remediation: endress.com.SICK PSIRT ↗
- Before
- remediation: endress.com
- After
- remediation: sick.com/psirt
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
- CVE
- Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
- CVSS
- Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
- EPSS
- Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
- CWE
- Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
- CNA
- CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
- CISA ADP
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
- NVD
- National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
- CERT / CSIRT
- A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
- PoC
- Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
- CSAF
- Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
- LoTL
- Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.