Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- EPSS is 0.38% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE Intelligenceauthelia · authelia
Official source article: GitHub GHSA-M5MF-3963-4X26 ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.
Low technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
These OSV and GitHub advisory ranges apply only to the named package and ecosystem. A listed fixed version is not a universal product patch or proof that an update is installed.
| Ecosystem and package | Affected range | First fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| gogithub.com/authelia/authelia/v4 | < 4.38.19 | 4.38.19 | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 19 Feb 2025 |
Low technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
Fix not verifiedAuthelia is an open-source authentication and authorization server providing two-factor authentication and single sign-on (SSO) for applications via a web portal. If users are allowed to sign in via both username and email the regulation system treats these as separate login events. This leads to the regulation limitations being effectively doubled assuming an attacker using brute-force to find a user password. It's important to note that due to the effective operation of regulation where no user-facing sign of their regulation ban being visible either via timing or via API responses, it's effectively impossible to determine if a failure occurs due to a bad username password combination, or a effective ban blocking the attempt which heavily mitigates any form of brute-force. This occurs because the records and counting process for this system uses the method utilized for sign in rather than the effective username attribute. This has a minimal impact on account security, this impact is increased naturally in scenarios when there is no two-factor authentication required and weak passwords are used. This makes it a bit easier to brute-force a password. A patch for this issue has been applied to versions 4.38.19, and 4.39.0. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should 1. Not heavily modify the default settings in a way that ends up with shorter or less frequent regulation bans. The default settings effectively mitigate any potential for this issue to be exploited. and 2. Disable the ability for users to login via an email address.
Authelia is an open-source authentication and authorization server providing two-factor authentication and single sign-on (SSO) for applications via a web portal. If users are allowed to sign in via both username and email the regulation system treats these as separate login events. This leads to the regulation limitations being effectively doubled assuming an attacker using brute-force to find a user password. It's important to note that due to the effective operation of regulation where no user-facing sign of their regulation ban being visible either via timing or via API responses, it's effectively impossible to determine if a failure occurs due to a bad username password combination, or a effective ban blocking the attempt which heavily mitigates any form of brute-force. This occurs because the records and counting process for this system uses the method utilized for sign in rather than the effective username attribute. This has a minimal impact on account security, this impact is increased naturally in scenarios when there is no two-factor authentication required and weak passwords are used. This makes it a bit easier to brute-force a password. A patch for this issue has been applied to versions 4.38.19, and 4.39.0. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should 1. Not heavily modify the default settings in a way that ends up with shorter or less frequent regulation bans. The default settings effectively mitigate any potential for this issue to be exploited. and 2. Disable the ability for users to login via an email address.
The product does not implement sufficient measures to prevent multiple failed authentication attempts within a short time frame.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
Authelia is an open-source authentication and authorization server providing two-factor authentication and single sign-on (SSO) for applications via a web portal. If users are allowed to sign in via both username and email the regulation system treats these as separate login events. This leads to the regulation limitations being effectively doubled assuming an attacker using brute-force to find a user password. It's important to note that due to the effective operation of regulation where no user-facing sign of their regulation ban being visible either via timing or via API responses, it's effectively impossible to determine if a failure occurs due to a bad username password combination, or a effective ban blocking the attempt which heavily mitigates any form of brute-force. This occurs because the records and counting process for this system uses the method utilized for sign in rather than the effective username attribute. This has a minimal impact on account security, this impact is increased naturally in scenarios when there is no two-factor authentication required and weak passwords are used. This makes it a bit easier to brute-force a password. A patch for this issue has been applied to versions 4.38.19, and 4.39.0. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should 1. Not heavily modify the default settings in a way that ends up with shorter or less frequent regulation bans. The default settings effectively mitigate any potential for this issue to be exploited. and 2. Disable the ability for users to login via an email address.
The product does not implement sufficient measures to prevent multiple failed authentication attempts within a short time frame.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts. The product does not implement sufficient measures to prevent multiple failed authentication attempts within a short time frame.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 4.0: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 19 Feb 2025 · Last source change 19 Feb 2025, 18:39 UTC · CWE-307 · Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.