Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- The selected CVSS metric records a network-reachable, unauthenticated path with no user interaction.
- EPSS is 0.32% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE Intelligence0xPolygonZero · plonky2
Official source article: GitHub GHSA-HJ49-H7FQ-PX5H ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
These OSV and GitHub advisory ranges apply only to the named package and ecosystem. A listed fixed version is not a universal product patch or proof that an update is installed.
| Ecosystem and package | Affected range | First fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| rustplonky2 | = 1.0.0 | 1.0.1 | GitHub advisory ↗upstream repository advisory · 30 Jan 2025 |
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
Fix not verifiedPlonky2 is a SNARK implementation based on techniques from PLONK and FRI. Lookup tables, whose length is not divisible by 26 = floor(num_routed_wires / 3) always include the 0 -> 0 input-output pair. Thus a malicious prover can always prove that f(0) = 0 for any lookup table f (unless its length happens to be divisible by 26). The cause of problem is that the LookupTableGate-s are padded with zeros. A workaround from the user side is to extend the table (by repeating some entries) so that its length becomes divisible by 26. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.1.
Plonky2 is a SNARK implementation based on techniques from PLONK and FRI. Lookup tables, whose length is not divisible by 26 = floor(num_routed_wires / 3) always include the 0 -> 0 input-output pair. Thus a malicious prover can always prove that f(0) = 0 for any lookup table f (unless its length happens to be divisible by 26). The cause of problem is that the LookupTableGate-s are padded with zeros. A workaround from the user side is to extend the table (by repeating some entries) so that its length becomes divisible by 26. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.1.
To fulfill the need for a cryptographic primitive, the product implements a cryptographic algorithm using a non-standard, unproven, or disallowed/non-compliant cryptographic implementation.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
Plonky2 is a SNARK implementation based on techniques from PLONK and FRI. Lookup tables, whose length is not divisible by 26 = floor(num_routed_wires / 3) always include the 0 -> 0 input-output pair. Thus a malicious prover can always prove that f(0) = 0 for any lookup table f (unless its length happens to be divisible by 26). The cause of problem is that the LookupTableGate-s are padded with zeros. A workaround from the user side is to extend the table (by repeating some entries) so that its length becomes divisible by 26. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.0.1.
To fulfill the need for a cryptographic primitive, the product implements a cryptographic algorithm using a non-standard, unproven, or disallowed/non-compliant cryptographic implementation.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
CWE-1240: Use of a Cryptographic Primitive with a Risky Implementation. To fulfill the need for a cryptographic primitive, the product implements a cryptographic algorithm using a non-standard, unproven, or disallowed/non-compliant cryptographic implementation.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 30 Jan 2025 · Last source change 30 Jan 2025, 19:55 UTC · CWE-1240 · Use of a Cryptographic Primitive with a Risky Implementation
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.