Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- The selected CVSS metric records a network-reachable, unauthenticated path with no user interaction.
- EPSS is 0.82% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE IntelligenceApache Software Foundation · Apache Kafka
Medium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
These OSV and GitHub advisory ranges apply only to the named package and ecosystem. A listed fixed version is not a universal product patch or proof that an update is installed.
| Ecosystem and package | Affected range | First fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mavenorg.apache.kafka:kafka_2.10 | ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0.10.2.0; last affected 0.10.2.2 | Not stated | OSV record ↗aggregator derived · 10 Sep 2026 |
| Mavenorg.apache.kafka:kafka_2.11 | ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0.10.2.0; last affected 2.4.1 | Not stated | OSV record ↗aggregator derived · 10 Sep 2026 |
| Mavenorg.apache.kafka:kafka_2.12 | ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0.10.2.0; fixed 3.7.2 | 3.7.2 | OSV record ↗aggregator derived · 10 Sep 2026 |
| Mavenorg.apache.kafka:kafka_2.12 | ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.8.0; fixed 3.8.1 | 3.8.1 | OSV record ↗aggregator derived · 10 Sep 2026 |
| Mavenorg.apache.kafka:kafka_2.13 | ECOSYSTEM: introduced 0.10.2.0; fixed 3.7.2 | 3.7.2 | OSV record ↗aggregator derived · 10 Sep 2026 |
| Mavenorg.apache.kafka:kafka_2.13 | ECOSYSTEM: introduced 3.8.0; fixed 3.8.1 | 3.8.1 | OSV record ↗aggregator derived · 10 Sep 2026 |
| mavenorg.apache.kafka:kafka_2.10 | >= 0.10.2.0, <= 0.10.2.2 | Not stated | GitHub advisory ↗github reviewed aggregator · 2 Jul 2025 |
| mavenorg.apache.kafka:kafka_2.11 | >= 0.10.2.0, <= 2.4.1 | Not stated | GitHub advisory ↗github reviewed aggregator · 2 Jul 2025 |
| mavenorg.apache.kafka:kafka_2.12 | >= 0.10.2.0, < 3.7.2 | 3.7.2 | GitHub advisory ↗github reviewed aggregator · 2 Jul 2025 |
| mavenorg.apache.kafka:kafka_2.12 | = 3.8.0 | 3.8.1 | GitHub advisory ↗github reviewed aggregator · 2 Jul 2025 |
| mavenorg.apache.kafka:kafka_2.13 | >= 0.10.2.0, < 3.7.2 | 3.7.2 | GitHub advisory ↗github reviewed aggregator · 2 Jul 2025 |
| mavenorg.apache.kafka:kafka_2.13 | = 3.8.0 | 3.8.1 | GitHub advisory ↗github reviewed aggregator · 2 Jul 2025 |
Medium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
Fix not verifiedIncorrect Implementation of Authentication Algorithm in Apache Kafka's SCRAM implementation. Issue Summary: Apache Kafka's implementation of the Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism (SCRAM) did not fully adhere to the requirements of RFC 5802 [1]. Specifically, as per RFC 5802, the server must verify that the nonce sent by the client in the second message matches the nonce sent by the server in its first message. However, Kafka's SCRAM implementation did not perform this validation. Impact: This vulnerability is exploitable only when an attacker has plaintext access to the SCRAM authentication exchange. However, the usage of SCRAM over plaintext is strongly discouraged as it is considered an insecure practice [2]. Apache Kafka recommends deploying SCRAM exclusively with TLS encryption to protect SCRAM exchanges from interception [3]. Deployments using SCRAM with TLS are not affected by this issue. How to Detect If You Are Impacted: If your deployment uses SCRAM authentication over plaintext communication channels (without TLS encryption), you are likely impacted. To check if TLS is enabled, review your server.properties configuration file for listeners property. If you have SASL_PLAINTEXT in the listeners, then you are likely impacted. Fix Details: The issue has been addressed by introducing nonce verification in the final message of the SCRAM authentication exchange to ensure compliance with RFC 5802. Affected Versions: Apache Kafka versions 0.10.2.0 through 3.9.0, excluding the fixed versions below. Fixed Versions: 3.9.0 3.8.1 3.7.2 Users are advised to upgrade to 3.7.2 or later to mitigate this issue. Recommendations for Mitigation: Users unable to upgrade to the fixed versions can mitigate the issue by: - Using TLS with SCRAM Authentication: Always deploy SCRAM over TLS to encrypt authentication exchanges and protect against interception. - Considering Alternative Authentication Mechanisms: Evaluate alternative authentication mechanisms, such as PLAIN, Kerberos or OAuth with TLS, which provide additional layers of security.
Incorrect Implementation of Authentication Algorithm in Apache Kafka's SCRAM implementation. Issue Summary: Apache Kafka's implementation of the Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism (SCRAM) did not fully adhere to the requirements of RFC 5802 [1]. Specifically, as per RFC 5802, the server must verify that the nonce sent by the client in the second message matches the nonce sent by the server in its first message. However, Kafka's SCRAM implementation did not perform this validation. Impact: This vulnerability is exploitable only when an attacker has plaintext access to the SCRAM authentication exchange. However, the usage of SCRAM over plaintext is strongly discouraged as it is considered an insecure practice [2]. Apache Kafka recommends deploying SCRAM exclusively with TLS encryption to protect SCRAM exchanges from interception [3]. Deployments using SCRAM with TLS are not affected by this issue. How to Detect If You Are Impacted: If your deployment uses SCRAM authentication over plaintext communication channels (without TLS encryption), you are likely impacted. To check if TLS is enabled, review your server.properties configuration file for listeners property. If you have SASL_PLAINTEXT in the listeners, then you are likely impacted. Fix Details: The issue has been addressed by introducing nonce verification in the final message of the SCRAM authentication exchange to ensure compliance with RFC 5802. Affected Versions: Apache Kafka versions 0.10.2.0 through 3.9.0, excluding the fixed versions below. Fixed Versions: 3.9.0 3.8.1 3.7.2 Users are advised to upgrade to 3.7.2 or later to mitigate this issue. Recommendations for Mitigation: Users unable to upgrade to the fixed versions can mitigate the issue by: - Using TLS with SCRAM Authentication: Always deploy SCRAM over TLS to encrypt authentication exchanges and protect against interception. - Considering Alternative Authentication Mechanisms: Evaluate alternative authentication mechanisms, such as PLAIN, Kerberos or OAuth with TLS, which provide additional layers of security.
The requirements for the product dictate the use of an established authentication algorithm, but the implementation of the algorithm is incorrect.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
Incorrect Implementation of Authentication Algorithm in Apache Kafka's SCRAM implementation. Issue Summary: Apache Kafka's implementation of the Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism (SCRAM) did not fully adhere to the requirements of RFC 5802 [1]. Specifically, as per RFC 5802, the server must verify that the nonce sent by the client in the second message matches the nonce sent by the server in its first message. However, Kafka's SCRAM implementation did not perform this validation. Impact: This vulnerability is exploitable only when an attacker has plaintext access to the SCRAM authentication exchange. However, the usage of SCRAM over plaintext is strongly discouraged as it is considered an insecure practice [2]. Apache Kafka recommends deploying SCRAM exclusively with TLS encryption to protect SCRAM exchanges from interception [3]. Deployments using SCRAM with TLS are not affected by this issue. How to Detect If You Are Impacted: If your deployment uses SCRAM authentication over plaintext communication channels (without TLS encryption), you are likely impacted. To check if TLS is enabled, review your server.properties configuration file for listeners property. If you have SASL_PLAINTEXT in the listeners, then you are likely impacted. Fix Details: The issue has been addressed by introducing nonce verification in the final message of the SCRAM authentication exchange to ensure compliance with RFC 5802. Affected Versions: Apache Kafka versions 0.10.2.0 through 3.9.0, excluding the fixed versions below. Fixed Versions: 3.9.0 3.8.1 3.7.2 Users are advised to upgrade to 3.7.2 or later to mitigate this issue. Recommendations for Mitigation: Users unable to upgrade to the fixed versions can mitigate the issue by: - Using TLS with SCRAM Authentication: Always deploy SCRAM over TLS to encrypt authentication exchanges and protect against interception. - Considering Alternative Authentication Mechanisms: Evaluate alternative authentication mechanisms, such as PLAIN, Kerberos or OAuth with TLS, which provide additional layers of security.
The requirements for the product dictate the use of an established authentication algorithm, but the implementation of the algorithm is incorrect.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
CWE-303: Incorrect Implementation of Authentication Algorithm. The requirements for the product dictate the use of an established authentication algorithm, but the implementation of the algorithm is incorrect.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 18 Dec 2024 · Last source change 18 Dec 2024, 17:02 UTC · CWE-303 · Incorrect Implementation of Authentication Algorithm
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.