Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- Exploitation requires an existing local or physical foothold with privileges.
- EPSS is 0.21% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE Intelligencemetal3-io · ironic-image
Official source article: GitHub GHSA-G2CM-9V5F-QG7R ↗. Check the applicable product and release in the original source.
Medium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
Medium technical severity with no CISA KEV confirmation; remediate through the normal risk-based patch cycle unless local exposure raises the priority.
Fix not verifiedIronic-image is an OpenStack Ironic deployment packaged and configured by Metal3. When the reverse proxy mode is enabled by the `IRONIC_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` variable set to `true`, 1) HTTP basic credentials are validated on the HTTPD side in a separate container, not in the Ironic service itself and 2) Ironic listens in host network on a private port 6388 on localhost by default. As a result, when the reverse proxy mode is used, any Pod or local Unix user on the control plane Node can access the Ironic API on the private port without authentication. A similar problem affects Ironic Inspector (`INSPECTOR_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` set to `true`), although the attack potential is smaller there. This issue affects operators deploying ironic-image in the reverse proxy mode, which is the recommended mode when TLS is used (also recommended), with the `IRONIC_PRIVATE_PORT` variable unset or set to a numeric value. In this case, an attacker with enough privileges to launch a pod on the control plane with host networking can access Ironic API and use it to modify bare-metal machine, e.g. provision them with a new image or change their BIOS settings. This vulnerability is fixed in 24.1.1.
Ironic-image is an OpenStack Ironic deployment packaged and configured by Metal3. When the reverse proxy mode is enabled by the `IRONIC_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` variable set to `true`, 1) HTTP basic credentials are validated on the HTTPD side in a separate container, not in the Ironic service itself and 2) Ironic listens in host network on a private port 6388 on localhost by default. As a result, when the reverse proxy mode is used, any Pod or local Unix user on the control plane Node can access the Ironic API on the private port without authentication. A similar problem affects Ironic Inspector (`INSPECTOR_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` set to `true`), although the attack potential is smaller there. This issue affects operators deploying ironic-image in the reverse proxy mode, which is the recommended mode when TLS is used (also recommended), with the `IRONIC_PRIVATE_PORT` variable unset or set to a numeric value. In this case, an attacker with enough privileges to launch a pod on the control plane with host networking can access Ironic API and use it to modify bare-metal machine, e.g. provision them with a new image or change their BIOS settings. This vulnerability is fixed in 24.1.1.
The product requires authentication, but the product has an alternate path or channel that does not require authentication.
An attacker operating through local access may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
Ironic-image is an OpenStack Ironic deployment packaged and configured by Metal3. When the reverse proxy mode is enabled by the `IRONIC_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` variable set to `true`, 1) HTTP basic credentials are validated on the HTTPD side in a separate container, not in the Ironic service itself and 2) Ironic listens in host network on a private port 6388 on localhost by default. As a result, when the reverse proxy mode is used, any Pod or local Unix user on the control plane Node can access the Ironic API on the private port without authentication. A similar problem affects Ironic Inspector (`INSPECTOR_REVERSE_PROXY_SETUP` set to `true`), although the attack potential is smaller there. This issue affects operators deploying ironic-image in the reverse proxy mode, which is the recommended mode when TLS is used (also recommended), with the `IRONIC_PRIVATE_PORT` variable unset or set to a numeric value. In this case, an attacker with enough privileges to launch a pod on the control plane with host networking can access Ironic API and use it to modify bare-metal machine, e.g. provision them with a new image or change their BIOS settings. This vulnerability is fixed in 24.1.1.
The product requires authentication, but the product has an alternate path or channel that does not require authentication.
An attacker operating through local access may attempt exploitation with low privileges. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
CWE-288: Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel. The product requires authentication, but the product has an alternate path or channel that does not require authentication.
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 17 Apr 2024 · Last source change 2 Aug 2024, 01:52 UTC · CWE-288 · Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.