Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- The selected CVSS metric records a network-reachable, unauthenticated path with no user interaction.
- EPSS is 1.13% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE IntelligenceApache Software Foundation · Apache Kafka
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
These OSV and GitHub advisory ranges apply only to the named package and ecosystem. A listed fixed version is not a universal product patch or proof that an update is installed.
| Ecosystem and package | Affected range | First fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| mavenorg.apache.kafka:kafka-metadata | >= 3.5.0, < 3.6.2 | 3.6.2 | GitHub advisory ↗github reviewed aggregator · 13 Feb 2025 |
High technical severity; prioritise exposed affected systems while verifying vendor guidance.
Fix not verifiedWhile an Apache Kafka cluster is being migrated from ZooKeeper mode to KRaft mode, in some cases ACLs will not be correctly enforced. Two preconditions are needed to trigger the bug: 1. The administrator decides to remove an ACL 2. The resource associated with the removed ACL continues to have two or more other ACLs associated with it after the removal. When those two preconditions are met, Kafka will treat the resource as if it had only one ACL associated with it after the removal, rather than the two or more that would be correct. The incorrect condition is cleared by removing all brokers in ZK mode, or by adding a new ACL to the affected resource. Once the migration is completed, there is no metadata loss (the ACLs all remain). The full impact depends on the ACLs in use. If only ALLOW ACLs were configured during the migration, the impact would be limited to availability impact. if DENY ACLs were configured, the impact could include confidentiality and integrity impact depending on the ACLs configured, as the DENY ACLs might be ignored due to this vulnerability during the migration period.
While an Apache Kafka cluster is being migrated from ZooKeeper mode to KRaft mode, in some cases ACLs will not be correctly enforced. Two preconditions are needed to trigger the bug: 1. The administrator decides to remove an ACL 2. The resource associated with the removed ACL continues to have two or more other ACLs associated with it after the removal. When those two preconditions are met, Kafka will treat the resource as if it had only one ACL associated with it after the removal, rather than the two or more that would be correct. The incorrect condition is cleared by removing all brokers in ZK mode, or by adding a new ACL to the affected resource. Once the migration is completed, there is no metadata loss (the ACLs all remain). The full impact depends on the ACLs in use. If only ALLOW ACLs were configured during the migration, the impact would be limited to availability impact. if DENY ACLs were configured, the impact could include confidentiality and integrity impact depending on the ACLs configured, as the DENY ACLs might be ignored due to this vulnerability during the migration period.
The application performs an authorisation check, but it does not correctly enforce the required permission boundary.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
While an Apache Kafka cluster is being migrated from ZooKeeper mode to KRaft mode, in some cases ACLs will not be correctly enforced. Two preconditions are needed to trigger the bug: 1. The administrator decides to remove an ACL 2. The resource associated with the removed ACL continues to have two or more other ACLs associated with it after the removal. When those two preconditions are met, Kafka will treat the resource as if it had only one ACL associated with it after the removal, rather than the two or more that would be correct. The incorrect condition is cleared by removing all brokers in ZK mode, or by adding a new ACL to the affected resource. Once the migration is completed, there is no metadata loss (the ACLs all remain). The full impact depends on the ACLs in use. If only ALLOW ACLs were configured during the migration, the impact would be limited to availability impact. if DENY ACLs were configured, the impact could include confidentiality and integrity impact depending on the ACLs configured, as the DENY ACLs might be ignored due to this vulnerability during the migration period.
The application performs an authorisation check, but it does not correctly enforce the required permission boundary.
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization. The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:NCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
Published 12 Apr 2024 · Last source change 30 Jul 2025, 03:55 UTC · CWE-863 · Incorrect Authorization
Core structured fields are present and their contributing authorities are shown above.
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.