Evidence used
- No CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded.
- The selected CVSS metric records a network-reachable, unauthenticated path with no user interaction.
- EPSS is 0.59% for the current model date.
BlackTreeCVE IntelligenceFull vulnerability report · 2025
CVE-2023-54090High confidence
ixgbe: Fix panic during XDP_TX with > 64 CPUs
Linux · Linux
9.8CriticalCVSS 3.1
Patch only the product branches with a verified fix
Fix availability varies by productCritical technical impact with a remotely reachable, unauthenticated path; no CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded. Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 9 structured product or package states remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
R
Open reassessment dashboard →Operational reassessment
Published severity in operational context
Published severityCritical→Operational priority:Critical, unchanged from published severity.unchanged
Compensating controls
- Validate the affected product branch and deploy the verified fixed release.
- Restrict the affected network interface to trusted sources where business-safe.
- Monitor vendor guidance and exploitation sources for a material change.
Verification
- Confirm that the asset runs Linux Linux and falls inside the recorded affected range.
- Verify the installed build against the product-specific fixed version after deployment.
- Validate exposure, authentication requirements and compensating controls in the actual environment.
- Reopen this reassessment when CVSS, KEV, EPSS, exploit evidence or remediation changes.
Remediation availability differs by product scope
Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 9 structured product or package states remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
- Canonical Ubuntu Security: 9 affected package states with no published fix
Distribution package intelligence
13 package statesRelease-specific package status
Debian, ubuntu findings are scoped to the named distribution, release and source package. An absent finding does not mean a package is unaffected.
Package result overrides the generic status
BlackTree has verified remediation for at least one product or source, but the relevant distribution still reports no fixed package for 9 affected package states shown here. Treat those rows as affected with no fix until that distribution publishes a fixed version.
Repository candidate not checked
A published vendor fix does not prove that a matching update is enabled and installable on a particular asset. Confirm the local package candidate before scheduling remediation.
| Distribution release | Source package | Vendor state | Fixed version | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debian trixietrixie · source | linux | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 6.3.7-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026 |
| Debian bookwormbookworm · source | linux | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 6.1.37-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026 |
| Debian forkyforky · source | linux | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 6.3.7-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026 |
| Debian sidsid · source | linux | Vendor fix publishedDebian records a fixed source-package version for this release. | 6.3.7-1 | Debian Security Tracker ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026 |
| Ubuntu 24.04 LTSnoble · standard archive | linux-azure-6.11 | Affected, no fix publishedCanonical OVAL identifies this running kernel flavour as affected and does not publish a fixed package version in this definition. | Not published in this feed | Canonical Ubuntu Security ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026 |
| Ubuntu 24.04 LTSnoble · standard archive | linux-gcp-6.11 | Affected, no fix publishedCanonical OVAL identifies this running kernel flavour as affected and does not publish a fixed package version in this definition. | Not published in this feed | Canonical Ubuntu Security ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026 |
| Ubuntu 24.04 LTSnoble · standard archive | linux-hwe-6.11 | Affected, no fix publishedCanonical OVAL identifies this running kernel flavour as affected and does not publish a fixed package version in this definition. | Not published in this feed | Canonical Ubuntu Security ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026 |
| Ubuntu 24.04 LTSnoble · standard archive | linux-lowlatency-hwe-6.11 | Affected, no fix publishedCanonical OVAL identifies this running kernel flavour as affected and does not publish a fixed package version in this definition. | Not published in this feed | Canonical Ubuntu Security ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026 |
| Ubuntu 24.04 LTSnoble · standard archive | linux-nvidia-6.11 | Affected, no fix publishedCanonical OVAL identifies this running kernel flavour as affected and does not publish a fixed package version in this definition. | Not published in this feed | Canonical Ubuntu Security ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026 |
| Ubuntu 24.04 LTSnoble · standard archive | linux-oem-6.11 | Affected, no fix publishedCanonical OVAL identifies this running kernel flavour as affected and does not publish a fixed package version in this definition. | Not published in this feed | Canonical Ubuntu Security ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026 |
| Ubuntu 24.04 LTSnoble · standard archive | linux-raspi-realtime | Affected, no fix publishedCanonical OVAL identifies this running kernel flavour as affected and does not publish a fixed package version in this definition. | Not published in this feed | Canonical Ubuntu Security ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026 |
| Ubuntu 24.04 LTSnoble · standard archive | linux-realtime | Affected, no fix publishedCanonical OVAL identifies this running kernel flavour as affected and does not publish a fixed package version in this definition. | Not published in this feed | Canonical Ubuntu Security ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026 |
| Ubuntu 24.04 LTSnoble · standard archive | linux-riscv | Affected, no fix publishedCanonical OVAL identifies this running kernel flavour as affected and does not publish a fixed package version in this definition. | Not published in this feed | Canonical Ubuntu Security ↗Source updated 5 Oct 2026 |
Critical technical impact with a remotely reachable, unauthenticated path; no CISA KEV confirmation is currently recorded. Verified remediation exists for at least one product or source, but 9 structured product or package states remain unresolved. Apply remediation only to the exact product branch confirmed by its source.
Fix availability varies by product01
What, why and how
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ixgbe: Fix panic during XDP_TX with > 64 CPUs Commit 4fe815850bdc ("ixgbe: let the xdpdrv work with more than 64 cpus") adds support to allow XDP programs to run on systems with more than 64 CPUs by locking the XDP TX rings and indexing them using cpu % 64 (IXGBE_MAX_XDP_QS). Upon trying this out patch on a system with more than 64 cores, the kernel paniced with an array-index-out-of-bounds at the return in ixgbe_determine_xdp_ring in ixgbe.h, which means ixgbe_determine_xdp_q_idx was just returning the cpu instead of cpu % IXGBE_MAX_XDP_QS. An example splat: ========================================================================== UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in /var/lib/dkms/ixgbe/5.18.6+focal-1/build/src/ixgbe.h:1147:26 index 65 is out of range for type 'ixgbe_ring *[64]' ========================================================================== BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000058 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 65 PID: 408 Comm: ksoftirqd/65 Tainted: G IOE 5.15.0-48-generic #54~20.04.1-Ubuntu Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R640/0W23H8, BIOS 2.5.4 01/13/2020 RIP: 0010:ixgbe_xmit_xdp_ring+0x1b/0x1c0 [ixgbe] Code: 3b 52 d4 cf e9 42 f2 ff ff 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 b9 00 00 00 00 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 83 ec 08 <44> 0f b7 47 58 0f b7 47 5a 0f b7 57 54 44 0f b7 76 08 66 41 39 c0 RSP: 0018:ffffbc3fcd88fcb0 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: ffff92a253260980 RBX: ffffbc3fe68b00a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff928b5f659000 RSI: ffff928b5f659000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffbc3fcd88fce0 R08: ffff92b9dfc20580 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d R11: 3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff928b2f0fa8c0 R14: ffff928b9be20050 R15: 000000000000003c FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92b9dfc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000058 CR3: 000000011dd6a002 CR4: 00000000007706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ixgbe_poll+0x103e/0x1280 [ixgbe] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x12/0xe0 __napi_poll+0x30/0x160 net_rx_action+0x11c/0x270 __do_softirq+0xda/0x2ee run_ksoftirqd+0x2f/0x50 smpboot_thread_fn+0xb7/0x150 ? sort_range+0x30/0x30 kthread+0x127/0x150 ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> I think this is how it happens: Upon loading the first XDP program on a system with more than 64 CPUs, ixgbe_xdp_locking_key is incremented in ixgbe_xdp_setup. However, immediately after this, the rings are reconfigured by ixgbe_setup_tc. ixgbe_setup_tc calls ixgbe_clear_interrupt_scheme which calls ixgbe_free_q_vectors which calls ixgbe_free_q_vector in a loop. ixgbe_free_q_vector decrements ixgbe_xdp_locking_key once per call if it is non-zero. Commenting out the decrement in ixgbe_free_q_vector stopped my system from panicing. I suspect to make the original patch work, I would need to load an XDP program and then replace it in order to get ixgbe_xdp_locking_key back above 0 since ixgbe_setup_tc is only called when transitioning between XDP and non-XDP ring configurations, while ixgbe_xdp_locking_key is incremented every time ixgbe_xdp_setup is called. Also, ixgbe_setup_tc can be called via ethtool --set-channels, so this becomes another path to decrement ixgbe_xdp_locking_key to 0 on systems with more than 64 CPUs. Since ixgbe_xdp_locking_key only protects the XDP_TX path and is tied to the number of CPUs present, there is no reason to disable it upon unloading an XDP program. To avoid confusion, I have moved enabling ixgbe_xdp_locking_key into ixgbe_sw_init, which is part of the probe path.
What
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ixgbe: Fix panic during XDP_TX with > 64 CPUs Commit 4fe815850bdc ("ixgbe: let the xdpdrv work with more than 64 cpus") adds support to allow XDP programs to run on systems with more than 64 CPUs by locking the XDP TX rings and indexing them using cpu % 64 (IXGBE_MAX_XDP_QS). Upon trying this out patch on a system with more than 64 cores, the kernel paniced with an array-index-out-of-bounds at the return in ixgbe_determine_xdp_ring in ixgbe.h, which means ixgbe_determine_xdp_q_idx was just returning the cpu instead of cpu % IXGBE_MAX_XDP_QS. An example splat: ========================================================================== UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in /var/lib/dkms/ixgbe/5.18.6+focal-1/build/src/ixgbe.h:1147:26 index 65 is out of range for type 'ixgbe_ring *[64]' ========================================================================== BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000058 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 65 PID: 408 Comm: ksoftirqd/65 Tainted: G IOE 5.15.0-48-generic #54~20.04.1-Ubuntu Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R640/0W23H8, BIOS 2.5.4 01/13/2020 RIP: 0010:ixgbe_xmit_xdp_ring+0x1b/0x1c0 [ixgbe] Code: 3b 52 d4 cf e9 42 f2 ff ff 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 b9 00 00 00 00 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 83 ec 08 <44> 0f b7 47 58 0f b7 47 5a 0f b7 57 54 44 0f b7 76 08 66 41 39 c0 RSP: 0018:ffffbc3fcd88fcb0 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: ffff92a253260980 RBX: ffffbc3fe68b00a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff928b5f659000 RSI: ffff928b5f659000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffbc3fcd88fce0 R08: ffff92b9dfc20580 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d R11: 3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff928b2f0fa8c0 R14: ffff928b9be20050 R15: 000000000000003c FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92b9dfc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000058 CR3: 000000011dd6a002 CR4: 00000000007706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ixgbe_poll+0x103e/0x1280 [ixgbe] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x12/0xe0 __napi_poll+0x30/0x160 net_rx_action+0x11c/0x270 __do_softirq+0xda/0x2ee run_ksoftirqd+0x2f/0x50 smpboot_thread_fn+0xb7/0x150 ? sort_range+0x30/0x30 kthread+0x127/0x150 ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> I think this is how it happens: Upon loading the first XDP program on a system with more than 64 CPUs, ixgbe_xdp_locking_key is incremented in ixgbe_xdp_setup. However, immediately after this, the rings are reconfigured by ixgbe_setup_tc. ixgbe_setup_tc calls ixgbe_clear_interrupt_scheme which calls ixgbe_free_q_vectors which calls ixgbe_free_q_vector in a loop. ixgbe_free_q_vector decrements ixgbe_xdp_locking_key once per call if it is non-zero. Commenting out the decrement in ixgbe_free_q_vector stopped my system from panicing. I suspect to make the original patch work, I would need to load an XDP program and then replace it in order to get ixgbe_xdp_locking_key back above 0 since ixgbe_setup_tc is only called when transitioning between XDP and non-XDP ring configurations, while ixgbe_xdp_locking_key is incremented every time ixgbe_xdp_setup is called. Also, ixgbe_setup_tc can be called via ethtool --set-channels, so this becomes another path to decrement ixgbe_xdp_locking_key to 0 on systems with more than 64 CPUs. Since ixgbe_xdp_locking_key only protects the XDP_TX path and is tied to the number of CPUs present, there is no reason to disable it upon unloading an XDP program. To avoid confusion, I have moved enabling ixgbe_xdp_locking_key into ixgbe_sw_init, which is part of the probe path.
Why
The current structured CVE record identifies a security weakness, but the root cause requires confirmation in the linked vendor material.
How
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
What
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ixgbe: Fix panic during XDP_TX with > 64 CPUs Commit 4fe815850bdc ("ixgbe: let the xdpdrv work with more than 64 cpus") adds support to allow XDP programs to run on systems with more than 64 CPUs by locking the XDP TX rings and indexing them using cpu % 64 (IXGBE_MAX_XDP_QS). Upon trying this out patch on a system with more than 64 cores, the kernel paniced with an array-index-out-of-bounds at the return in ixgbe_determine_xdp_ring in ixgbe.h, which means ixgbe_determine_xdp_q_idx was just returning the cpu instead of cpu % IXGBE_MAX_XDP_QS. An example splat: ========================================================================== UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in /var/lib/dkms/ixgbe/5.18.6+focal-1/build/src/ixgbe.h:1147:26 index 65 is out of range for type 'ixgbe_ring *[64]' ========================================================================== BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000058 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 65 PID: 408 Comm: ksoftirqd/65 Tainted: G IOE 5.15.0-48-generic #54~20.04.1-Ubuntu Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R640/0W23H8, BIOS 2.5.4 01/13/2020 RIP: 0010:ixgbe_xmit_xdp_ring+0x1b/0x1c0 [ixgbe] Code: 3b 52 d4 cf e9 42 f2 ff ff 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 b9 00 00 00 00 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 83 ec 08 <44> 0f b7 47 58 0f b7 47 5a 0f b7 57 54 44 0f b7 76 08 66 41 39 c0 RSP: 0018:ffffbc3fcd88fcb0 EFLAGS: 00010282 RAX: ffff92a253260980 RBX: ffffbc3fe68b00a0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffff928b5f659000 RSI: ffff928b5f659000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffbc3fcd88fce0 R08: ffff92b9dfc20580 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d R11: 3d3d3d3d3d3d3d3d R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff928b2f0fa8c0 R14: ffff928b9be20050 R15: 000000000000003c FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff92b9dfc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000058 CR3: 000000011dd6a002 CR4: 00000000007706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ixgbe_poll+0x103e/0x1280 [ixgbe] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x12/0xe0 __napi_poll+0x30/0x160 net_rx_action+0x11c/0x270 __do_softirq+0xda/0x2ee run_ksoftirqd+0x2f/0x50 smpboot_thread_fn+0xb7/0x150 ? sort_range+0x30/0x30 kthread+0x127/0x150 ? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 </TASK> I think this is how it happens: Upon loading the first XDP program on a system with more than 64 CPUs, ixgbe_xdp_locking_key is incremented in ixgbe_xdp_setup. However, immediately after this, the rings are reconfigured by ixgbe_setup_tc. ixgbe_setup_tc calls ixgbe_clear_interrupt_scheme which calls ixgbe_free_q_vectors which calls ixgbe_free_q_vector in a loop. ixgbe_free_q_vector decrements ixgbe_xdp_locking_key once per call if it is non-zero. Commenting out the decrement in ixgbe_free_q_vector stopped my system from panicing. I suspect to make the original patch work, I would need to load an XDP program and then replace it in order to get ixgbe_xdp_locking_key back above 0 since ixgbe_setup_tc is only called when transitioning between XDP and non-XDP ring configurations, while ixgbe_xdp_locking_key is incremented every time ixgbe_xdp_setup is called. Also, ixgbe_setup_tc can be called via ethtool --set-channels, so this becomes another path to decrement ixgbe_xdp_locking_key to 0 on systems with more than 64 CPUs. Since ixgbe_xdp_locking_key only protects the XDP_TX path and is tied to the number of CPUs present, there is no reason to disable it upon unloading an XDP program. To avoid confusion, I have moved enabling ixgbe_xdp_locking_key into ixgbe_sw_init, which is part of the probe path.
Why
The current structured CVE record identifies a security weakness, but the root cause requires confirmation in the linked vendor material.
How
An attacker operating through a network path may attempt exploitation without authentication or user interaction. If successful, the issue may cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor.
02
Exploit reality and attack path
CVSS severity, EPSS forecast probability, public exploit material and CISA-confirmed exploitation are separate signals.
Observed exploitation No confirmed evidence
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No CISA KEV match was present at the last successful refresh. This means no confirmation from that source, not proof of no exploitation.
Public PoC / exploit material None recorded
?
Confirmed exploitation and public exploit material are separate signals. Attacks can occur without public proof-of-concept or exploit code.No exploit-tagged reference or CISA SSVC proof-of-concept state is currently recorded. Research may still exist outside the structured feeds.
- Likely attack path
- a network path → vulnerable operation → cause the confidentiality, integrity or availability impact described by the vendor
- Attack surface
- Network
- Privileges required
- None: unauthenticated exploitation is possible
- User interaction
- None
- Attack complexity
- Low: no specialised conditions are recorded
- Security boundary
- Unchanged: impact remains within the vulnerable component's security authority
- Weakness
?
CWE means Common Weakness Enumeration. - CWE not yet assigned
- CVSS vector
?
CVSS means Common Vulnerability Scoring System. The vector records the metric values used to calculate technical severity. CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HCommon Vulnerability Scoring System 3.1: the compact vector below is decoded into plain language.
AVNetworkAttack vector: The vulnerable component can be reached over a network.ACLowAttack complexity: No specialised conditions are required beyond attacker-controlled input.PRNonePrivileges required: The attacker does not need an account or existing privileges.UINoneUser interaction: No action by another user is required.SUnchangedScope: The security impact remains within the vulnerable component's authority.CHighConfidentiality impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.IHighIntegrity impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.AHighAvailability impact: A successful attack can cause a major loss.- Post-exploitation / living off the land
- No specific living-off-the-land technique is confirmed in the structured sources. Monitor normal administration tools for activity inconsistent with the affected service's baseline.
03
Patch and workaround
Operational remediation based on structured source evidence.
- Status
?
Patch availability is based on structured fixed-version fields and authoritative update references. If no fix is verified, check the vendor advisory before making a change. - Fix availability varies by product
- Action
- Use the product-specific evidence above. Patch only products with a verified fixed release, and keep every affected or under-investigation state without a matching fix in the remediation queue.
- Workaround
- No verified workaround is recorded. If business-safe, reduce exposure to the affected interface and allow only trusted sources until authoritative guidance is available.
04
Evidence and provenance
Published 24 Dec 2025 · Last source change 5 Aug 2026, 09:17 UTC · CWE not yet assigned
CVE recordCVE.org · 5.2
CVSS sourceCNA
EPSS source FIRST · tracked since 2026-08-14
?
The date BlackTree first stored a score for this CVE from the daily FIRST EPSS feed.European sourceENISA EUVD · EUVD-2023-60355
Product sourceCNA
Remediation sourceCVE/CNA references
CWE sourceUnavailable
NVD statusNVD not scheduled
Missing structured fields: CWE classification. Missing data is not evidence of low risk; review the primary advisory.
Material change intelligence
View recent updates ↗What changed after publication
No material field changes have been recorded since change tracking began. Routine source refreshes and cosmetic edits are intentionally excluded.
CVE published
Fixed release or patch reference recorded
Technical terms and abbreviations used in this report
- CVE
- Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures: the public identifier for one disclosed vulnerability.
- CVSS
- Common Vulnerability Scoring System: a technical severity framework; it is not patching priority by itself.
- EPSS
- Exploit Prediction Scoring System: FIRST's estimate of the probability that exploitation activity will be observed in the next 30 days; it is a forecast, not confirmation.
- CWE
- Common Weakness Enumeration: the standard category describing the underlying software or hardware weakness.
- CNA
- CVE Numbering Authority: an organisation authorised to assign and publish CVE records.
- CISA ADP
- Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Authorized Data Publisher: structured enrichment added to a CVE record.
- NVD
- National Vulnerability Database: NIST's enrichment service for CVE records.
- CERT / CSIRT
- A computer security incident response team that publishes warnings or coordinates incident response.
- PoC
- Proof of concept: public material that demonstrates or helps reproduce exploitation.
- CSAF
- Common Security Advisory Framework: a machine-readable format for security advisories.
- LoTL
- Living off the land: abuse of legitimate tools or system functions during an attack.